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STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 
1915 



STUDIES IN 

MINOR TACTICS 

1915 



Prepared hy 
DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART 

The Army Service Schools 







PRESS OF 

THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS 

FORT LEAVENWORTH 



1915 



48 65 55 

AUG -6 1942 



THE LIBRARY Of 

CONGRtSS 
SERIAL RECORD 

W1A^ 131943 



\lJ^ 



''>^\^^' 



LC Control Number 



tmp96 028889 



Preface 



THERE having been an insistent demand for Studies in Minor 
Tactics, and the edition of 1908 being out of print, it was de- 
cided that the Department of Military Art should prepare a 
new book on the subject along somewhat different lines. 

With this purpose in view, Captain E. D. Scott, Field Artillery, 
Captain Le Roy Eltinge, Cavalry, and Captain H. B. Fiske, Infantry, 
were designated to prepare these studies, each in his own arm. This 
they have ably done, and the results of their labor appear in the fol- 
lowing pages. 

It has been the aim to teach the principles of minor tactics by 
applying them in a practical way to the handling of small units, 
varying in size from a patrol to a regiment. 

This has been done by a series of troop leading problems in which 
the various phases of field operations are set forth and commented 
upon, orders being given for all the units involved down to the smallest 
patrol. 

It is believed this book will prove of great value to those officers 
seeking information as to the practical handling of small units in 
field operations, and of marked assistance to those preparing them- 
selves for admission to The Army Service Schools. 

The authors desire to make grateful acknowledgment to Lieuten- 
ant Aristides Moreno, Infantry, for his valuable assistance in cor- 
recting and proof-reading the manuscript. Those portions of the 
studies referring to the sanitary dispositions are the work of Major 
Wm. N. Bispham, Medical Corps, to whom grateful acknowledgment 
is made. 

W. A. HOLBROOK, 

Lieutenant Colonel, Cavalry, 

Senior Instructor, 
Department of Military Art. 

The Army Service Schools, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
November 30, 1915. 



Introduction 



IN using this text, nothing will be gained by casual or hurried 
reading. If any benefit is to be derived therefrom, it can only be 
as the result of careful and painstaking study of every detail. 

The reasons submitted for each action should be weighed in 
comparison with others that may appeal to the student. If the latter 
can not agree with the action taken, he should come to a definite con- 
clusion as to a better procedure. In no case should the student un- 
critically accept the conclusions of the text. 

If he does not like an order as written, he should actually draft 
the one he prefers. By such criticism of the text, he will work him- 
self thoroughly into the spirit of the situation, and, by the tactical 
thought required, gain the instruction which the authors hope to 
furnish simply by suggestion. 

When studying the text, the student should break off whenever 
a decision or order is called for, and himself write out that decision, 
or that order, before reading further in the text. He should then 
compare his work with the text and decide whether or not he is 
wrong, remembering that no two men will solve the same problem in 
exactly the same way and that he may be right and still differ 
materially from another who is also right. 

The map furnished with the text is a photographic reduction of 
the 3-inch map of the same ground. Those who find the map 
trying on the eyes, would do well to purchase the larger map, which 
may be obtained from the Book Department, The Army Service 
Schools for $1.00, mounted on muslin. 

In these pages the attempt has been made, in each of the twelve 
parts, to carry a small unit of one of the three arms through a num- 
ber of continuous situations covering a more or less extended period. 
By varying incidents presented to the commanders concerned, the sev- 
eral primary forms of tactical procedure required of, and proper for, 
small detached units are illustrated and discussed and the manner 
indicated in which, in service, the commander's problems must shade 
into each other, and his solutions be connected into the complete lead- 
ing of his troops. 

For example: Part I deals with an infantry regiment which de- 
trains, advances, reconnoiters, and attacks an enemy in position, 
pursues, halts for the night, establishes outposts, prepares and occu- 
pies a defensive position, withdraws therefrom and retreats. The 
whole covers a period of three consecutive days. The troop leading 
of the regiment and all of its parts, from its reconnoitering, com- 
bat and security patrols, through its company and battalion to regi- 
mental headquarters, is illustrated by quoting the orders issued, ex- 
vi 



cept where to do so would be a mere repetition of those given elsewhere. 

When an important decision is required, involving a radical 
change in tactical procedure, as from the offensive to the defensive, 
the commander's complete estimate of the situation appears. When 
the new action is more in conformity with previously-determined 
policy, brief reasons only for the action are stated. When the 
reasons are obvious, the orders issued are permitted to speak for 
themselves. Finally, where the manner in which a decision is carried 
into effect, for instance, the conduct of the attack, does not sufficiently 
explain its technique, that phase concludes with detailed explanatory 
comment. To make the study complete in a particular frequently 
neglected, the manner of handling the regiment's sanitary personnel, 
including its bandsmen, is described in detail and discussed. 

In Part II a detached battalion in charge of a convoy is con- 
sidered. Opportunity is there found for discussion of the details of 
outposting such an unwieldy body; of police arrangements necessary 
therewith; of those for security while on the march; and of a bat- 
talion's position for the convoy's defense. As an incident to this 
study, the conduct of a distant reconnoitering patrol is described at 
some length. 

Part III jumps to the other side of the situation set forth in Part 
II, and deals with a battalion whose mission is the attack of this con- 
voy. In this part, also, a reconnoitering patrol is followed during 
some hours. The part culminates with the battalion's reconnaissance 
and attack of an enemy in position. 

Following the general plan of Parts I to III, which deal with 
infantry, Parts IV to VIII, which deal with cavalry, take up, in 
succession, a distant reconnoitering patrol; a squadron covering in- 
fantry to which it is attached, both on the march and in battle; a 
squadron acting alone; and a regiment acting as divisional cavalry. 

It is important that officers not belonging to the artillery, but 
who may have organizations of that arm in their commands, shall 
have a clear understanding of what artillery can accomplish, in 
order that they may not assign tasks to it which are beyond reason- 
able expectation of accomplishment, and on the other hand not neglect 
to take advantage of the valuable assistance which in nearly all cases 
artillery can render. 

This requirement necessitates first, a knowledge of the effects 
of artillery fire, and approximately the time and amount of ammuni- 
tion needed to obtain desired results; secondly the kind of positions 
needed by the artillery to best fulfill its functions. It is of course 
entirely unnecessary for officers not belonging to the artillery to 
have technical knowledge as to the manner in which the guns are ac- 
tually handled, but they should thoroughly understand the tactics of 
the artillery, and what it can and can not do, and be prepared to 
issue orders for its joint action with other arms and assume full 
responsibility for such orders. 

Artillery has no independent role on the battlefield. Minor tac- 
tics, as the term is applied to the operations of troops who are able 
to maintain such a role, is scarcely the correct designation for the 



minor operations of the artillery. In general, the tactics of artillery 
means those operations necessary to get the artillery into such posi- 
tion that it can by fire action assist in the carrying out of a tactical 
idea in cooperation with other troops. 

With this feature of artillery tactics all officers of other arms are 
concerned. Without intelligent understanding of it, they are not 
able to appreciate the possibilities of the arm or its limitations, to 
evaluate the reports and recommendations of the artillery commander; 
and to make proper decisions thereon. 

The fire tactics of artillery calls for a technical training that 
officers of other arms have no opportunity to receive, and it will be 
well to leave it to the artillery, merely indicating what is desired. 

In the parts of this book devoted to artillery, the attempt has 
been made to illustrate some of the various activities of that arm 
with which officers of other arms should be familiar. Fire tactics 
has not been considered except in so far as it may affect the distribu- 
tion and location of fire units. 

Parts VIII and IX are battery problems; Parts X, XI and XII 
are battalion problems. All have been used in The School of the Line, 
and three are followed by comments suggested by students' solutions. 

To facilitate an understanding of the text, simple sketches on 
which the troops are placed at important periods have been inter- 
spersed through the pages; orders, messages and reports are set off 
from the context and placed in small type; and important hours are 
carried into the margin for ready reference. 

The orders, quoted throughout the text, are not presented as 
those best fitting the circumstances; nor should they, by any means, 
be considered or used as models. They are simply submitted as 
ones which w^ould probably initiate in a competent manner the action 
decided upon. 



Vlll 



Table of Contents 



Part I— An Infantry Regiment 

Situation 1 1 

An Advance 1 

Battalion covering detraining 1 

Battalion orders for a march 2 

A company as advance guard 3 

A position in readiness 4 

Incidents and actions to 1:00 p. m 5 

Regimental commander's estimate of the situation 7 

His orders for a march forward 9 

Dispositions of the field train 9 

A battalion as advance guard 10 

A company as advance party 11 

A flank patrol 12 

A company as flank guard 13 

A platoon as advance guard of a company 13 

A march outpost 14 

An Attack 16 

Preliminary reconnaissance by advance guard 16 

Reconnoitering patrols 17 

Regimental commander's estimate of the situation 20 

His attack orders and arrangem^ents 22 

Actions and orders, 1st Battalion 23 

Actions and orders, Company A 24 

Actions and orders, 2d Battalion 27 

Actions and orders. Company E 27 

Progress of the attack — 4:45 to 5:15 p. m. 28 

Actions and orders, 3d Battalion, and progress 

engagement to its conclusion 29 

The pursuit -- 31 

Comment 33 

Sanitary arrangements 38 

Halt for the Night 42 

Arrangements and orders, regimental headquarters 42 

Outpost arrangements and orders 44 

Comment 46 

A Defense 48 

Situation 48 

Regimental commander's estimate of the situation 48 

Actions and orders, regimental headquarters 53 

Outpost arrangements and orders 54 

Orders, outpost commander 54 

Dispositions and orders. Company C 55 

Dispositions and orders. Picket No. 1 56 

Dispositions and orders. Company D 57 

Comment 59 

Actions and orders, 2d Battalion 61 

Orders and arrangements, Company E 62 

Actions and orders, 3d Battalion 63 

Orders and arrangements, Company L 64 

ix 



Events of the morning to 9:30 o'clock 65 

Orders, regimental commander for occupation of the 

position 6Q 

Orders, battalion commanders 67 

Withdrawal From Action 69 

Orders, regimental commander 69 

Remarks 70 

Actions and orders, 3d Battalion 72 

Actions and orders, Company I 73 

Actions and orders, Company M 73 

Actions and orders, 2d Battalion 75 

Actions and orders, 1st Battalion 77 

A Retreat 81 

Orders, regimental commander 81 

Orders, commander rear guard 82 

Orders, commander support 82 

A Halt 83 

Actions and orders, regimental commander 83 

A march outpost 84 

Orders, commander rear guard 84 

A halt for the night 85 

Actions and orders, regimental commander 85 

Outpost 86 

Actions and orders, outpost commander 86 

Actions and orders, support commander 87 

Sanitary arrangements 89 

Part II — An Infantry Battalion 
Escorting a Convoy 92 

Battalion commander's estimate of the situation 92 

An infantry patrol 99 

Orders, battalion commander 107 

A company as advance guard 108 

Arrangements and orders, commander of the escort 108 

A Battalion in Defense 110 

The battalion commander's estimate of the situation 110 

Actions and orders of the battalion commander 113 

The withdrawal 114 

Part III — An Infantry Battalion 
Attack of a Convoy 116 

Battalion commander's estimate of the situation 116 

Actions and orders, battalion commander 118 

Orders, commander advance guard 120 

An infantry patrol 120 

A battalion attack 125 

Advance guard reconnaissance 125 

Battalion commander's estimate of the situation 126 

His orders for attack 128 

Part IV — Cavalry Patrol 
An Officer's Patrol 130 

Preliminary arrangements 131 

Provision for transmitting information that may be gained. _ 134 
A ruse 136 

Change of route 137 

Simultaneous reconnaissance in several directions 137 

Combat of a patrol 140 

Disposition made of a prisoner 141 

Observation of hostile main body 144 

Sending back important information ^ 144 

X 



utilizing friendly inhabitants to gain information 146 

Going around hostile flank to send information by wire 147 

Part V — Reconnaissance and Flank Protection by a 

Squadron 

Reconnaissance 148 

Distant patrols 149 

Advance guard of the squadron 150 

An advance guard action 157 

Squadron supports its advance guard __159 

Pursuit prevented 162 

Flank Protection 163 

Estimate of the situation 163 

Decision 166 

Covering the front during a change of position 167 

Preparations for an attack 167 

Part VI — Squadron Combat 
Mounted Action by a Squadron 168 

Approaching the enemy 1 173 

Guarding the squadron's flanks 173 

Instant action required 176 

Orders for a mounted attack 176 

Part VII — Cavalry Regiment 
Combat by a Regiment : 178 

Supporting a contact troop 178 

Action when the advance guard is seen to form for attack 179 

Advantages of the different kinds of possible action 184 

Dispositions and orders for the attack 186 

Use of the reserve 187 

Part VIII — Light Artillery 

A Battery in Rencontre. Enemy on the Defensive 188 

Orders of the commander of the force 188 

Estimate of the situation 189 

Discussion of possible battery positions 191 

Reconnaissance and selection of a position 194 

The battery commander's orders 195 

Observation and communications 195 

Conduct of an infantry support 194 

Part IX— Light Artillery 

A Battery in Rencontre. Enemy on the Offensive 197 

Orders of the commander of the force 197 

Estimate of the situation 198 

Reconnaissance and selection of a position 199 

Use of reconnaissance ofl?icer and scouts during action 200 

Comment suggested by students' solutions 200 

Part X — Light Artillery 
A Battalion in Observation 202 

Covering the flank of a battle line 202 

A short march with an infantry brigade 202 

Brigade commanders orders — position in readiness 202 

A march outpost 212 

Artillery to position in observation 202 

Preliminary orders of battalion commander 205 

His reconnaissance and selection of positions 206 

xi 



Orders to a battery commander 207 

Occupation of its position by a battery 208 

Orders to battery commanders . 210 

Assignment of sectors of observation 211 

Duties of headquarters personnel 205, 206, 207, 210, 211, 212 

Battery and battalion communications 205, 210, 211 

Comment suggested by students' solutions 212 

Part XI — Light Artillery 

Battalion in Surprise Attack Against the Flank of 

A Hostile Battle Line 215 

The march situation 215-216 

Information en route . 216 

Actions and orders of the commander of the force — 215, 216, 217 
Actions and orders of battalion commander 217, 218, 219, 220, 221 

Firing data ready for batteries on their arrival 217 

Assignment of targets 217 

A battery detached . 218 

Reconnaissance, selection and occupation of its position, and 

selection of its first target 217, 220 

Co-operation with infantry support 221 

Conduct of support 220 

Comment suggested by students' solutions 221 

Part XII — Light Artillery 

Battalion in the Dual Role of Supporting the 

Defense of a Position and an Attack 224 

The march situation 224 

Orders of the commander of the force 225 

Preliminary actions and orders of the battalion commander. _225 

General reconnaissance 226, 227 

Communication with defensive position 228 

Establishment of observation 227, 228, 229 

Selection of a position 228 

Orders to battery commanders 228, ^9 

Auxiliary observation 228, 229, 230 

Information officers with attacking columns 230 

Communications 230 



xu 



Part I~ An Infantry Regiment 



SITUATION 



(General Map Gettysburg — Antietam, 1 inch = 10 miles, and 
Topographical Map, 3 inches = 1 mile) 

The Pennsylvania — Maryland line separates hostile 
states. The northern state (Blue) is concentrating its 1st 
Division by rail at Carlisle. To cover this concentration it 
has ordered the 1st Infantry to Gettysburg. 

Red points of concentration and intentions are uncer- 
tain, although the former seem most likely to be Baltimore 
and Frederick. 

The 1st Infantry, on June 17, v^as moving south on 
the Gettysburg and Harrisburg Railroad in four sections 
one hour apart. The leading section detrained at Table 
Rock Station, 5 miles north of Gettysburg, upon receipt of a 
telegram from the Gettysburg station agent in v^hich he 
reported that a thousand Reds had just entered that tov^n 
from the south. 



AN ADVANCE 

Colonel A read the telegram to the Major of the 1st 
Battalion, and directed : 

Move south towards Goldenville to cover the detraining of the re- 
mainder of the regiment. I'll remain at this station until the next 
section comes in. 

With the fourth section there v^ere 5 days' rations for 
the regiment. These v^ere in addition to those required on 
the train, in the ration section of the field train, and on the 
person. The regiment had 3 ambulances. 

The Regimental Quartermaster v^as unloading the v^^ag- 
ons and animals, the wagons by a ramp at the end of one 
car, and the animals by another ramp on to the station plat- 
form. Prepared ramps had been brought on the train. The 
Quartermaster was assisted by the teamsters, the company 
Q. M. Sergt., cooks, artificer, clerk and four men from each 

1 



2 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

company. The work proceeded with the utmost rapidity 
since the train had to get back to Aspers, some five miles 
north, to find a siding long enough to permit the prompt 
passage of the 2d section. 

The colonel reported his action in detraining at once to 
the Division Chief of Staff in Carlisle. In sending this tel- 
egram and the necessary railroad ones for the passage of the 
following trains by the empties, Gettysburg, needless to say, 
was cut out of the line. 

A Covering Battalion 

8:15 a.m. Major B assembled his officers at 8:15 a. m., and 

directed : 

A thousand Reds are reported to have entered Gettysburg this 
morning. 

This Battalion marches on Golden ville to cover the detraining of 
the remainder of the regiment. 

Lieut. K (Bn. Adjt.) will patrol with his orderly to the Hamilton 
farmhouse, about a mile south of Goldenville, taking station for ob- 
servation in that vicinity. 

Company A will constitute the Advance Guard, and will march 
at once by the railroad to Goldenville, and thence across country to 
knoll 651. 

Companies B, C, & D, in the order named, will follow at 500 yards. 

Sergeant L (the Bn. Sergt. Major) will take the ammunition 
wagons, as soon as they are unloaded, via Table Rock S. H. and the 
unimproved road to join the Battalion near Goldenville. 

I will march between the Advance Guard and the Main Body. 

The major before starting to issue this order, spread 
his map on the station platform. He issued his order slow- 
ly, pointing out each place as he named it, but permitting no 
interruption until the complete order was given. He then 
answered the questions of those who had failed to grasp any 
part of it. 

Lieut. K informed his orderly of the enemy's presence 
8:40 a. m. in Gettysburg. He then moved, at 6 miles an hour, via Tex- 
as and the Carlisle Road. At 8 : 40 a. m., the lieutenant, lead- 
ing by 50 yards, approached the Hamilton farmhouse. He 
stationed the orderly, mounted, near roadfork 646, watch- 
ing down both roads to the south, tied his horse at the gate, 
and using the farm telephone tried to get Gettysburg. 
Failing there he tried the farmhouse on the same party line 
to the south but without result. Then going to the orderly, 
he directed : 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 3 

Stay at this point, observing particularly down the right hand 
road (towards C. Topper). I am going to the clump of timber on 
that knoll (pointing to 664) and will show myself to you as soon as I 
get there. If you see anything unusual come to me under cover to 
report. 

The lieutenant then took station just under cover of 
the southern edge of the timber, where he could keep both 
branches of the Carlisle Road and his orderly in view. 



A Company in Advance Guard 

The officers of A company immediately upon receipt of 8:25 a.m. 
the major's order rejoined the company; the non-commis- 
sioned officers and other squad leaders were assembled and, 
at 8 :25 a. m., the captain ordered : 

A thousand Reds are reported to have entered Gettysburg this 
morning. 

Our Battalion marches to the south to cover the detraining of the 
remainder of the Regiment. Lt. K has gone with his orderly to take 
station a couple of miles down the road towards Gettysburg. 

This company forms the advance guard. 

Lieut. N with the 1st Platoon, as advance party, will precede the 
remainder of the company by 400 yards. March by the railroad to 
Goldenville, and thence across country to the crest a half mile to the 
southeast. Move rapidly until your distance is gained. 

Sergeant J (left guide) will be on the alert for signals from the 
rear. 

The musicians will march with me at the head of the company. 

Squad leaders will tell their men of the enemy's presence in Get- 
tysburg. 

(The musicians are kept in observation of the terrain, 
one to the right, the other to the left of the road.) 

The captain put the company in march as soon as the 
advance party had its distance. 

At 8 :45 a. m., near the farm road crossing of the rail- 8:46 a,ra. 
road north of Goldenville, the captain directed Corporal Y, 
of the 5th squad : 

Take your front rank and patrol to the top of that hill (707). 
Remain there in observation to the west and south. I will establish 
a semaphore station on one of those houses to the south (Goldenville). 
Get connection with that station. 

At 8:50 a. m., in Goldenville, to Corporal R, of the 6th 8:50 a.m. 
squad : 



4 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Take your front rank and patrol east along this road (the Golden- 
ville-Hunterstown) to the first crossroads about I mile east of this 
place (Goldenville). Remain in that vicinity in observation to the 
east and south. The company marches on that low knoll (651) a 
half mile to the southeast. 

A Position in Readiness 

8:47 a. m. At 8 :47 a. m., Major B directed the captain of A Co. : 

The battalion, less your company, will assemble east of Golden- 
ville. Your company will take station on knoll 651, and provide 
security to include both branches of the Carlisle Road. Get sema- 
phore connection with Goldenville, and connect with Lieut. K, who 
should be near Hamilton's. 

9:20 a.m. By 9:20 a. m., the battalion was disposed as follows: 

Companies B, C, and D were east of Goldenville and between 
it and the nearby stream line. Arms were stacked and 
packs removed, but the men remained close at hand. A 
signal station was on the western building of Goldenville. 
One musician thereat was watching knoll 654, another hill 
707 and Table Rock Sta., and a third, the farmhouse 700 
yards east of Goldenville. The combat wagons had joined 
and were in column, facing south, on the unimproved road. 

The main body of A Co. was in the saddle between 
knolls 654 and 651, but north of the crest. One squad was 
marching to relieve Lieut. K on knoll 664. (The lieutenant 
when relieved left his orderly as messenger with this squad 
and went back to report to the major.) A cossack post was 
at the northwestern corner of the patch of timber between 
knolls 654 and 664. A semaphore station was on knoll 654 
in communication with Goldenville. And two signallers 
were on the house i mile east of Goldenville for communi- 
cation with the cossack post south of crossroads 608. A 
sentry squad was on knoll 651, and another near the south- 
east edge of the timber i mile southeast of knoll 651. A 
cossack post was on hill 707. (See sketch No. 1.) 

Major B has taken up a position in readiness at Gol- 
denville from which point he can move on short lines to meet 
the enemy in whatever direction the latter may advance. 
The eastern branch of the Carlisle Road is the direct one 
to that town, and therefore the one most likely to be used by 
an enemy moving against it. That road is covered by the 
greater part of one company from knoll 651, which will be 



SKETCH NO. I. Position (n Readiness, June 17 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 5 

able to offer sufficient resistance to give time for the coming 
up of the remainder of the battalion. If the enemy advances 
by the western branch, the major will not go out to fight 
near Hamilton's since he would be getting entirely too far 
from the rest of the regiment, but will take a position east 
of hill 707 across the Carlisle Road. And in the unlikely 
case of a hostile advance by roads east or west of these most 
direct routes, suitable positions within short distances of 
Goldenville are to be found for opposing the enemy. 

With the excellent views obtained from hill 707 and 
the Hamilton — 651 ridge, but few and small detachments 
are needed to provide ample security. It is sufficient to 
keep the bulk of the command together in one place, provided 
prompt information is forwarded as soon as the detachments 
in observation catch sight of the enemy. Only 4^ squads 
altogether are detached from A Co. to furnish a line of ob- 
servation, but the greatest care is taken to organize a 
system of communication through which there will be 
prompt receipt of the information obtained by these groups. 

Incidents and Actions to 1:00 p. m. 

The second section containing the 2d Battalion reached 
Table Rock Station about 9:00 a.m. By 9:30 it had un- 9:00a. m. 
loaded and was ready to march. The quartermaster was 
left at the station to forward the remaining troops as they 
came in, get his field train together, and store the extra 5 
days' rations. The colonel marched with the 2d Battalion to 
Goldenville, where he arrived at 9:50 a. m. The 2d Bat- 
talion assembled north of the 1st. Nothing further had 
been heard of the enemy, and no one had been able to get in- 
to communication with Gettysburg or any of its nearby 
farms by telephone or telegraph. 

Colonel A's most pressing need is for information. The 
report of the number of hostile troops in Gettysburg may be 
grossly exaggerated, as is so likely to be the case with civ- 
ilian estimates. If so, a good deal of time is being lost and 
unnecessary labor performed. But the inability to obtain 
telephone or telegraph communication with Gettysburg or 
its neighborhood corroborates the operator's telegram at 
least to the extent that the enemy certainly has some force 



9:50 a.m. 



6 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

therein. It would not do, of course, to proceed farther by- 
rail until Gettysburg is clear of the enemy nor, in the present 
uncertainty about the enemy's strength and intentions, 
would the colonel be justified in marching before he has his 
whole regiment together. Even if all of the sections come 
in on time the regiment can hardly be assembled at Golden- 
ville before twelve or twelve-thirty. At best then it can- 
not march before the hour last named. Meantime infor- 
mation must be obtained as to the situation in Gettysburg. 

The position of the 1st Infantry is very unusual in that 
the regiment has been detached to a considerable distance 
from support, without any attached cavalry to do its distant 
reconnoitering. But, while Colonel A sadly misses the 
mounted troops, there is nothing to be gained by bemoan- 
ing the fact ; he has simply to take his problem as it has de- 
veloped and obtain the best solution with the means avail- 
able. 

The distance to Gettysburg is too great for the use of 
dismounted patrols unless no other means can be found. 
That town is two hours' march away. If the patrol march- 
ed straight there and back, with no delay of any sort, what 
it learned would not be at hand before the middle of the 
afternoon. And patrols, naturally, cannot obtain informa- 
tion by such simple and direct procedure. 

But there are the mounted orderlies and the mounted 
officers. The Colonel accordingly selected the adjutant of 
the 2d Battalion to lead a patrol made up by giving him four 
of the regimental orderlies and directed him : 

The Gettysburg agent of the P. & R. telegraphed me a little before 
8:00 o'clock that a thousand Reds were then entering the town. We 
have been unable since to get Gettysburg either by telephone or tele- 
graph. I want you to take four of the headquarters orderlies, and 
proceed thereto by routes entering town from the west to learn the 
hostile strength and dispositions. Let me have a report by 12:30 
p. m. I will remain here till the last companies are up, which will 
be about that hour. 

About 12:30 p. m. the colonel received the following 
message : 

No. 1. Knoll J mile west of penn college. 

17 June, 11:30 a. m. 
12:30 p. m. Can see Red troops intrenching north of penn college. Retired 

Blue soldier tells me Red regiment came into town from south about 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 7 

8:00 a. m.; two battalions went through to north; a third is collect- 
ing money and supplies and loading onto impressed transporta- 
tion. Blue soldier had overheard men this battalion talking, his im- 
pression regiment half recruits. Remain here in observation. 

L, 

Lieut. 

By 1:00 o'clock, the regiment was united at Golden- 
ville. The men had lunched. 



The Regimental Commander's Estimate of the Situation 

Lieut. L was exceedingly fortunate in obtaining so 
promptly such detailed information, which from its source 
can be accepted as accurate. With that information at 
hand Colonel A has to decide upon his future action. His 
mission is to cover the detraining of the division at Carlisle. 
To perform that he was ordered to Gettysburg. But he 
must not take his orders too literally. His important duty 
is to remain between any hostile force and Carlisle. Shall 
he carry that out by remaining where he is, making prepa- 
rations only for fighting defensively if the enemy comes 
north, or shall he move aggressively on Gettysburg and at- 
tempt to throw the Reds out of that town ? 

While the enemy is intrenching north thereof, it is 
probable nevertheless that only a temporary occupation of 
Gettysburg is intended, and that the Reds will withdraw as 
soon as they have got their booty beyond reach, since Gettys- 
burg itself is of no particular value to them unless they are 
starting a general advance. That such may be the case, al- 
though no news of any further hostile troops have been re- 
ceived, is of course a possibility, and must be kept in mind. 
Initial successes upon the outbreak of war very greatly af- 
fect the morale of both sides, and are consequently of con- 
siderable importance. To obtain one in this case by attack- 
ing seems very possible for the Blues if there is in Colonel 
A's front a single Red regiment, composed largely of re- 
cruits, and hampered also as the Reds are by their convoy 
and the hostile town behind them. If, on the other hand. 
Colonel A contents himself with holding his regiment su- 
pinely nearby while a Red regiment works its will upon a 
large Blue town, the moral affect upon the Blue troops and 



1:00 p.m. 



8 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

the civil population will be anything but good. While keep- 
ing his main mission of covering the remainder of the divis- 
ion very carefully in view, the colonel therefore believes him- 
self justified in an aggressive advance to attack the Red 
troops in Gettysburg. 

He must next decide upon a route. The direct road is 
now by way of Boyd schoolhouse. It has the advantage 
also over the eastern branch of the Carlisle Road that the 
march of the regiment will probably be concealed a little 
longer from hostile view. The route farther west by the C. 
Topper farm and the Mummasburg Road is a mile longer. 
The more promptly he can close with the enemy the bet- 
ter, because the chances of preventing the escape of the 
hostile convoy are thereby increased, and because the day 
is already advanced, and daylight is necessary for secur- 
ing the full fruits of victory. The enemy's work in in- 
trenching seems chiefly designed to meet a Blue advance 
from the north. It is possible that a movement by the 
Mummasburg Road would strike those trenches more or less 
in flank. The enemy's information in hostile country will be 
relatively poor. To come in by the Mummasburg Road, the 
regiment's march would be under cover of Oak Ridge until 
close at hand, and it is just possible that the enemy might 
not learn of the Blue's approach until too late to construct 
or move into trenches in this direction. But the Reds can 
be expected to have a security detachment of some sort on 
Oak Ridge ; and the probabilities are the enemy would learn 
of the Blue approach in ample time to make the slight changes, 
on short lines, that would be required in his dispositions 
to oppose the Blues from the new direction. Nothing then 
would have been gained by the Blue detour. While the de- 
ployment to attack would be made from commanding ground, 
yet an envelopment of the enemy's left would have to proceed 
through timber shown by Colonel A's map to have a heavy 
undergrowth. The consequent breaking up of the forma- 
tions of the main attack and difficulties of communication 
would lessen the prospect of success very materially. 

An advance by the Mummasburg Road would uncover 
Colonel A's proper line of retreat, but, being in Blue terri- 
tory, this would make very little difference so far as the 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 9 

safety of the 1st Infantry alone is concerned. It could re- 
treat towards Mummasburg in about as great safety as 
towards Carlisle. But, in doing so it would uncover the 
main body of the division. The requirements of Colonel A's 
larger mission, to cover the division's concentration, must 
not be forgotten. In the usual case such a mission can best 
be fulfilled by remaining squarely between the hostile forces 
and the point of concentration ; and in this case to do so is 
more than usually expedient, because Colonel A is in some 
uncertainty as to what assistance the Red regiment may re- 
ceive from the south. If he strikes superior hostile forces 
he wants to be able to retire directly towards Carlisle. On 
the whole the advantages of the direct route towards Gettys- 
burg outweigh those of any other. He decides to march by 
Boyd schoolhouse. 

And he must march in one column. To send a portion 
of his command directly on Gettysburg while the remainder 
made in effect a turning movement by the Mummasburg 
Road would be an inexcusable dispersion in the face of an 
enemy at least equal in numbers. 

Orders for a March Forward 

He accordingly issued verbal orders, at 1 :00 p. m., to 
his 3 majors, commanding officer Machine Gun Company, 
and staff, in Golden ville, as follows : i :00 p. 

Lieut. L is with two orderlies west of Gettysburg. He reports 
that the Reds are intrenching north of Penn College, and that they 
seem to have a total strength about Gettysburg of one regiment, half 
of whose men are recruits. 

This regiment will march on Gettysburg. 

The 1st Battalion and the Machine Gun Company will constitute 
the Advance Guard, and will proceed at once by the Hamilton farm 
and Boyd S. H. 

The remainder of the regiment, in the order: 2d Bn., 3d Bn., Band 
and ambulances, will follow at one-half mile. 

The field train will await orders at Texas. 

Regimental headquarters will march between the advance guard 
and the main body. 

Dispositions of the Field Trains 

In compliance with the above instructions for the field 
train the Quartermaster, after storing the 5 days' surplus 
rations in the house and on the platform at Table Rock Sta- 
tion, left a corporal and 3 men of his detail in charge thereof . 
The remainder of the unloading detail was directed to march 



m. 



10 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

via Golden ville to join the regiment. The train then moved 
by the unimproved road westw^ard till its head halted at the 
Texas crossroads, in which position it was so placed as to 
be able to move at once either north or south. The Quarter- 
master sent a Q. M. sergeant and 3 men to hill 707 in ob- 
servation ; put a signal station on one of the houses of Texas 
in communication therewith and in observation to the west ; 
stationed a sergeant and 3 men at the edge of the timber 
midway between Texas and Table Rock Station, and an- 
other sergeant and 3 men at the roadfork 100 yards west 
of Texas. The wagons were all drawn well to the left side 
of the road and closed until the leaders noses were at the tail- 
gate of the wagon ahead. The remainder of the men (Com- 
pany Q. M. sergeants, cooks, artificers and clerks) stacked 
arms in the field opposite, and north of the middle of the 
train, and remained within a few yards of their pieces, ex- 
cept one sentry who was alert at the stacks. The Quarter- 
master sent mounted men at once to reconnoiter the two 
bridges north and northwest of Texas, the roads as far 
north as Biglerville and to find a place for watering. Re- 
ceiving the report of the last, he had the teamsters unhook 
two of their animals at a time and sent them to water at the 
ford of the Conewago, 400 yards east of the Carlisle Road. 



A Battalion in Advance Guard 

Major B, rejoining his battalion, assembled the captains 
1 :io p. m. of Cos. B, C, D, and the Machine Guns, and issued the follow- 
ing verbal orders, at 1 :10 p. m. : 

Lieut. L with two orderlies is west of Gettysburg. He reports 
that the Reds are intrenching north of Penn College, and that they 
seem to have a total strength about Gettysburg of one regiment, half 
of whose men are recruits. 

Our Regiment marches on Gettysburg. 

This Battalion, reinforced by the Machine Gun Company, consti- 
tutes the advance guard. 

Co. B, with Lieut. K (Bn. Adjt.) and his orderly, will form the 
advance party,preceding the remainder of the battalion at 400 yards. 
The advance party will march at once by the railroad to the Carlisle 
Road and thence by the Stock Farm and Boyd S. H. 

Companies C, D and the Machine Guns will follow, in the order 
named, as soon as B Com.pany has its distance. C Company will regu- 
late the pace. 

I will send A Company as left flank guard by the eastern branch 
of the Carlisle Road. . ^ 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 11 

The combat wagons will proceed at once by the crossroads a quar- 
ter of a niile west of Goldenville and the Carlisle Road so as to join 
the tail of D Company at the railroad crossing. 

I will march behind the advance party. 

Major B then rode rapidly to A Company, and directed 
its captain : 

Lieut. L with two orderlies is west of Gettysburg. He reports 
that the Reds are intrenching north of Penn College, and that they 
seem to have a total strength about Gettysburg of one regiment, half 
of whose men are recruits. 

Our Regiment marches on Gettysburg. 

The 1st Battalion and the Machine Guns constitute the advance 
guard. 

The rest of the Battalion, B Co. as advance party, is proceeding 
by the western branch of the Carlisle Road. 

Your company will march as left flank guard by the eastern 
branch of the Carlisle Road. 

I will ride between the advance party and the support. 



A Company as Advance Party 

The captain of Company B assembled his officers and 
non-commissioned officers, and, at 1:17 p.m., issued verbal i:i7p. m. 
orders to them and to Lieut K (Bn. Adjt.) as follows : 

Lieut. L with two orderlies is west of Gettysburg. He reports 
that the Reds are intrenching a short distance north of that town, 
and that they seem to have a total strength about Gettysburg of one 
regiment, half of whose men are recruits. 

Our Regiment marches on Gettysburg, the 1st Bn. and Machine 
Guns as advance guard. A company will march as left flank guard 
by the first road east of this place (Goldenville.) 

This Company constitutes the advance party, and will march at 
once by the railroad and the west branch of the Carlisle Road. 

Lieut. K with his orderly will trot ahead as mounted point to 
precede the company by about a mile. 

Lieut. M (1st Lieut.) will take the first squad as the point, pre- 
ceding the company by 300 yards. He will move rapidly ahead to 
get his distance. 

The company will march as soon as the point has its 300 yards. 

Sergeant M (left guide) will watch for signals from the rear. 

Approaching roadfork 646, the captain directed Sergt. 
K, the company's right guide : 

Take the first two squads. Patrol down this road to the right 
till you strike the railroad about half a mile from this point, thence 
along the railroad some two miles until you reach the Mimimasburg 
Road a mile northwest of Gettysburg. Communicate by semaphore 
with the company at least once every mile. If you see nothing to 
report, simply signal O.K. You are likely to find the enemy in some 
strength near the Mummasburg Road. 



12 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Near the stock farm the captain sent a patrol of 2 men 
to the southeast to knoll 576 and to rejoin at the tail of the 
company. These two patrols were the only ones sent out 
during the first hour. The captain marched at the head of 
the company with his two musicians, one of whom kept 
track of the flank guard and watched the terrain to the east 
of the road, the other similarly kept track of the progress of 
Sergeant K's patrol and of the ground to the westward. 
Both were alert for and prepared to receive messages from 
the directions assigned them. 



Flank Patrol 

It may be of interest to see how Sergt. K conducted his 
flank patrol. Turning off to the right with the designated 
squads at roadfork 646, the sergeant halted his patrol as 
soon as it had cleared the main road, and gave instructions 
as follows : 

This detachment moves as a flank patrol to the railroad half a 
mile down this road, and thence along the railroad a couple of miles 
farther. 

Corporal L, take your front rank rapidly ahead as the point. 
When you've gained 200 yards regulate your gait by mine. 

The remainder of the detachment, Right by Twos, March. Open 
up the files, one going on each side of the road. Take 5 paces distance 
between men. Corporal B, watch the ground to the right of the road; 
Private L, to the left of the road. 

The patrol moved at about a 4J mile gait along the des- 
ignated route, so as to get even with or ahead of the dis- 
mounted point on the main road. Near the crossing south- 
east of C. Topper, it halted while a signaller caught the 
company, and got an acknowledgment of his 0. K. During 
this halt, the sergeant came forward to direct the point to 
leave the railroad, and move along the crest of Oak Ridge. 
Through the light timber thereon, the patrol moved in much 
the same formation as it had previously except that the 
point's distance was cut down to about 100 yards, and the 
sergeant sent forward a connecting file. Two men were sent 
around the west side of the heavy patch of timber north 
of J. JForney to rejoin on knoll 642. On arriving at that 
knoll the point halted, deployed, at the timber's V-shaped 
opening south of the crest ; two men from the main body of 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 13 

the patrol were sent through the orchard to the J. Forney 
house, and O.K. was again signalled to the company. The 
column was seen to be halted at the end of the first hour 
and during that halt the patrol's main body rested north 
of the crest of knoll 642. 



A Company as Flank Guard 

As soon as the captain of A Company received the 
major's order, he assembled his officers and noncommission- 
ed officers, including all squad leaders except those away 
with detachments, and at 1 : 30 p. m. directed : l :30 p. m. 

The enemy is believed to have one regiment in Gettysburg. 

Our regiment is marching on that town, the 1st Bn. and ma- 
chine guns as the advance guard. All but this company are moving 
by the road west of us. 

A Company marches as the flank guard. 

Lieut. J (2d Lieut.) and the 4th Platoon will constitute the ad- 
vance guard of this company and will march at once by the country 
road east of this knoll (651) and the east branch of the Carlisle 
Road. The advance guard will precede the rest of the company by 
600 yards. 

The captain had the detachments on hill 707, and near 
roadfork 608 signalled "Join Co." and sent men to direct 
the detachments towards Hamilton's and a half a mile east 
of knoll 651 to join the company enroute. He followed the 
advance guard at the proper distance with the main body 
of the company. 



A Platoon as Advance Guard of a Company 

Lieut. J had the 4th Platoon fall in immediately and 
marched it to the fence corner east of knoll 651. There he 
issued orders to the entire platoon as follows : 

The Reds are believed to have one regiment in Gettysburg. Our 
Regiment is marching against them, the 1st Battalion as advance 
guard. All but A Company are going by the road west of us, A Co. 
goes by this road to the south (pointing out the east branch.) 

This platoon is the company's advance guard. 

Sergeant M, with Corporal K and the Corporal's front rank, will 
constitute our point, preceding the remainder of the platoon by 300 
yards. March by this country road to the highway. Move rapidly 
until you get your distance; then regulate your march by my gait. 

Corporal K (at the tail of the platoon) will watch for signals 
from the rear. We are to keep about 500 yards ahead of the company. 



14 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The point moved out at about a 4^ mile an hour gait, 
in double column of files, one file on each side of the road, and 
with some 10 yards distance between men. The sergeant 
and the corporal were on the left side of the road, the ser- 
geant leading. The sergeant watched chiefly to the front, 
the corporal to the left front and left. The 3 privates were 
on the right of the road, the leader observing down the road, 
the next, to the right front and right, and the third watched 
for signals from the rear. 

The platoon sent forward single men as connecting 
files, spacing them about 100 yards apart. The platoon 
itself marched in double column of files opened well out on 
each side of the road to make a poorer target from the front, 
but the men of each file took only about one yard of dis- 
tance. The lieutenant observed chiefly to the front, but 
he required the men of each file to watch toward their proper 
side and call his attention to anything they happened to 
observe. 

The company marched in column of squads, sending 
forward connecting files towards its advance guard. 

The advance guard sent out one patrol of four men at 
roadfork 513, to move to the southeast across Rock Creek, 
and across country east of it, to come in again near road- 
fork 511. No other patrols were used during the first hour's 
march. 

A March Outpost 

At 2 :20 p. m., when the dismounted point of the right 
column reached a point 600 yards northwest of the junction 
of the two branches of the Carlisle Road, a ten minute halt 
was ordered. As Lieut. K (the Bn. Adjt.) with the mount- 
ed point rode over the crest east of knoll 521, he was fired 
upon from the direction of knoll 522 to the south. And he 
2:20 p.m. had at 2:20 fallen back on the dismounted point to report 
this fact. 

The dismounted point did not halt at once when the sig- 
nal to do so was received, but continued to the crest at knoll 
521, deployed and lay down. Sergt. K's two squads over on 
Oak Ridge, which were about abreast of the point on the 
main road, signalled O.K. from knoll 642, and remained 



SKETCH NO. 2. March Oufpost June 17 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 15 

thereat. B Company halted near the stream 400 yards 
northwest of its point. One musician remained in observa- 
tion to the east and southeast, the other to the west and 
southwest. A Company's point was about 300 yards south 
of crossroads 488, and A Company's main body was east of 
the farmhouse 500 yards north of crossroads 488, with a 
patrol of two men 300 yards to the east. C and D Companies 
and the Machine Guns were halted opposite the farmhouse 
400 yards south of Boyd S. H. The head of the main body 
of the regiment was 500 yards north of that schoolhouse. 
Throughout the regiment the left half of the road was ab- 
solutely clear of officers, men and animals, at the halt as it 
was on the march, in order to permit the passage of mount- 
ed messengers at the highest gaits, without necessity for 
drawing rein at any point. One man in each company of 
the command watched for signals along the column, and 
the ground as well to both flanks. 

It is evident how very simple need be the arrangements 
to provide ample security during a short halt even when, as 
in this case, all indications are that the enemy is very close 
at hand. If the halt were at all prolonged it would be neces- 
sary to make more elaborate arrangements, occupying, 
for example. Oak Ridge with detachments both west of C and 
D Companies, and west also of the main body of the regi- 
ment. The longer the stay is to be, the more elabor- 
ate, naturally, must the arrangements become because of 
the greater time given the enemy to move about and select 
a point of attack. 



THE ATTACK 



Advance Guard Reconnaissance of an Enemy in Position 

When the captain of B Company received Lieut. K's re- 
port that he had drawn fire from knoll 522, he sent the lieu- 
tenant back to make the same report to the major, and went 
forward himself to the point. There he was shortly joined 
by Major B. 

It then became neccessary to determine whether the 
enemy's main position was on the low elevation containing 
knoll 522, or farther south with simply an outpost near 
522. And to get this information as promptly as possible 
was, of course, the business of the advance guard. Major 
B accordingly directed the captain: 

We must locate the enemy's main position. Take the bulk of 
your company straight south along the Carlisle Road to drive in any 
hostile covering detachments. Send strong patrols to locate the 
enemy's flanks. I will bring the machine guns to this knoll for your 
support and assemble the other companies at the orchard north of us. 
Lieut. K (the Bn. Adjt.) is sending an ammunition wagon up to your 
company. 

The major then rode back to order the machine guns 
to knoll 521, to report his actions and 'intentions to the 
colonel, and to bring forward the remaining companies of 
the first battalion. 
2:30 p. m. Captain B (Commanding B Co.) at 2 :30 p. m. directed 

the lieutenant in charge of the point: 

I'll send you another squad in a few minutes. When it joins you, 
move your reinforced patrol east to Rock Creek and thence south to 
locate the hostile right. I am going to take the company straight 
down this road to develop the enemy's main position. 

The captain next moved back, north of the crest, until 
he and a musician who accompanied him were perfectly 
concealed from the front, and told the musician to call Ser- 
geant K's patrol (the one on Oak Ridge). He then, at 
2 :35 p. m. 2 :35 p. m. gave the musician, word by word, as it was sema- 
phored, the following message : 

Move south. Locate Red left. 
16 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 17 

Returning to the company, he had extra ammunition is- 
sued, directed one squad to report to the first lieutenant 
(near knoll 521), and before marching at 2:45 p. m. in- 2:45p.m. 
formed the company: 

The Reds fired upon our advance from a point about three-quar- 
ters of a mile to the south. This company moves down the road we are 
on to locate the enemy's main position. Sergt K, with two squads, is 
moving south along the ridge to the west, and Lieut. M, also with two 
squads, down the stream to the east. When we deploy. Corporal B 
will take C and as a combat patrol to cover our right flank, K will 
take L and M as a combat patrol to cover our left. Both these patrols 
should keep several hundred yards to the front of the skirmish line 
and four or five hundred yards to the flank. 

The chief of each flank platoon caused one man to keep 
track of the progress and location of the adjacent combat 
patrol. 

Approaching the crest east of knoll 521, the captain 
commanded : As skirmishers, Guide Right, 3 paces, March, 
and the company advanced steadily towards knoll 522. 

The captain made his reconnoitering patrols strong be- 
cause they would probably have to drive in detachments of 
Reds to get the desired information. The combat patrols 
were small because only information of the presence of hos- 
tile forces was desired from them. They were echeloned 
forward in order that the location of flanking groups of the 
enemy might be learned before the company's line came un- 
der the fire of such. 

Reconnoitering Patrols 

When the second squad joined, Lieut. M (commanding 
the point) said to his men : 

The company is going down this road to find out what is in our 
front. This patrol will move east and then south to locate the 
enemy's right. Corporal B, you will go ahead with your front rank 
to the orchard east of us and then towards that low knoll (pointing 
to Barlow). K, with the rear rank of that squad, will follow the 
corporal to the orchard, then go on east to the stream (Rock Creek) 
and then south near it. I'll follow the corporal at 100 yards. Cor- 
poral C will deploy his squad at 3 paces and follow me at 100 yards. 
All 3 parties will each have one man constantly watching me for sig- 
nals. 

Barlow knoll was found unoccupied. The patrol at 
once moved east under cover of the knoll to the Harrisburg 
Road. Starting towards Gettysburg thereon, it quickly 



18 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

drew fire from the County Almshouse. Small Red groups 
were shortly afterwards seen retreating from the Almshouse 
towards Gettysburg. Meantime, the patrol moved rapidly- 
east to Rock Creek, and under shelter of its fringe of trees, 
thence on to the south. Four men, under Corporal B led at 
150 yards, while two other men crossed the stream and 
moved as a flanking group just east of the timber beyond. 
The remainder of the patrol was in column of files, the lieu- 
tenant at the head. At the mouth of Stevens Run, the patrol 
again turned towards Gettysburg up the bed of that stream. 
But after going some three hundred yards in this direction 
they were fired upon from the roadfork at the letter H in 
Harrisburg. The patrol promptly took cover in the light 
timber just south of Stevens Run, and rapidly worked back 
to the east a hundred yards or so until it was sheltered 
by the small nose from the direction of the enemy's fire. 
Deploying his advance party then at five paces, Corporal B 
moved quickly towards the York Turnpike exit of Gettys- 
burg. Two men were sent south to the railroad near 471- 
W. The remainder of the patrol deployed at 3 paces and 
lay down. Corporal B's movement promptly drew fire from 
the buildings between the Hanover Road and the York Turn- 
pike. His party was compelled to take cover in the small 
depressions afforded by the nearby ground. The lieutenant 
reinforced him with one squad and opened fire. The hostile 
reply was so heavy as to make certain the enemy had too 
many men to permit a further advance in that direction. 
He accordingly crawled over to the nose on the right fiank 
of his patrol, and began searching the ground north of Get- 
tysburg with his glasses. What he saw caused him to write 
the following message : 



No. 1 
100 yards south Stevens run, north of 

YORK TURNPIKE exit GETTYSBURG. 

17 June, 3:20 p. m. 
Red trenches visible extending harrisburg road, 500 yards south- 
v/est ALMSHOUSE, across mumasburg road. Direction slightly north 
of west. Trenches full of men. Seems to be one company in support 
near harrisburg road, 200 yards behind hostile right. My patrol held 
here by hostile fire from eastern exit Gettysburg. 



M, • 
Lieut. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 19 

The lieutenant moved back to his 6 men in reserve and 
sent two with the message to find B Company. He then 
started a patrol of 3 men to the south to work into Gettys- 
burg from that direction. The remainder of the men were 
gradually drawn back to better cover. 

Let us turn now to Sergeant K's patrol on the western 
flank. Upon receipt of the semaphored order, leaving 4 
men as a reserve to follow at 300 yards, the sergeant de- 
ployed the 10 remaining (2 men are at J. Forney) at three 
paces and advanced towards knoll 577. This movement 
drew fire from 15 or 20 rifles on 577 and in the edge of the 
timber east of that knoll. The patrol reached the ditch of 
the Mummasburg Road. The sergeant then directed the 
next in rank to hold the patrol in that position during his 
absence. With 3 men, he worked down the railroad to the 
farm road crossing thereof south of the Mummasburg Road. 
From that point he could see a hostile trench to the south- 
east. A small hostile group behind a nose less than 400 
yards to the south convinced the sergeant he could get no 
farther in that direction. Returning to the Mummasburg 
Road, he wrote the following message : 

No. 1 

MUMMASBURG ROAD SOUth of MCLEAN farillhouse, 

17 June, 3:10 p. m. 
From point 300 yards south of this, I have seen Red company 
trench on low knoll northwest of penn college and about 500 yards to 
southeast of point where I was. No signs of trenches to south. Reds 
still at work in trench seen. Could locate no reserves. My patrol 
held southeast of J. forney by hostile detachment 500 yards to south. 

K, 

Sergt. 

Two men were sent with this north of knoll 522 to de- 
liver it to Captain B. The sergeant then started three men 
to work around to the west and into Gettysburg from the 
direction of the Lutheran Seminary. 

By 3:10 p. m. Company B was lying down on a front 3 :10 p.m. 
of 300 yards along the 522 ridge on both sides of the Carlisle 
Road. Only a few scattered shots met its advance thereto, 
these coming principally from knoll 522 and the direction 
of the Almshouse. After some minutes spent in careful 
observation to the south, the captain wrote the message 
quoted below : 



20 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

CARLISLE ROAD, northwest of ALMSHOUSE, 

17 June, 3:25 p. m. 
Major B : 
^•25 D m Hostile trenches visible along low crest about 700 yds. 

P' ' south of crest I am on. Trenches seem to extend from harrisburg 
ROAD to include low knoll west of mumasburg road. Have drawn fire 
from central trenches due south this point. Only small hostile parties 
were on 522 ridge. 

B, 

Captain. 

The reports from the two flank patrols were sent back 
to the major as they came in. 
3:30 p.m. At 3:30 p. m. Companies D, C, and A, were in line of 

companies in columns of fours at full intervals across the 
stream line midway between Barlow Knoll and knoll 521. 
The machine guns were in the draw head northeast of knoll 
521. Extra ammunition had been issued to the 1st Bat- 
talion. The combat wagons, containing the packs of D, C 
and A companies, were east of the Carlisle Road, north of the 
orchard north of knoll 521. 

The 2d and 3d Battalions were in column on the Carlisle 
Road with the tail of the 3d Battalion near Boyd S. H. Ex- 
tra ammunition was being issued, and the men's packs 
placed on the emptied combat wagons upon the order of the 
colonel. The colonel with his staff and majors was on Bar- 
low Knoll. By 3:35 p. m. he had received the reports of 
Captain B and of B Company's two flanking patrols. (See 
Sketch No. 3). 

Regimental Commander's Estimate of the Situation 

Colonel A estimates the situation somewhat as follows : 
The reports of Captain B and those of his two flanking 
groups pretty definitely establish the length and location of 
the hostile trenches. Their length, some 800 yards, indi- 
cates that at least two Red battalions are in the position. In 
addition, the whole or a part of the remaining battalion of 
the enemy's regiment may be in reserve. Some part of this 
last battalion, though, is almost certainly engaged in the 
work of requisitioning and guarding the supplies in Gettys- 
burg, and it will hardly, therefore, be able to take part as a 
whole in the fight. But whatever the exact hostile dispo- 
sitions may be, the odds, considering in addition to the above 
the reported character of many of the Red soldiers, rather 



SKETCH NO. 3. Situafion At 3i2 P M. June 17 



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AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 21 

favor the Blue regiment. With a reasonable prospect 
of success, the colonel would hardly be justified in permit- 
ting the Reds to escape with their booty through his failure 
to attack. In fact he has found conditions at Gettysburg 
exactly as expected when he marched from Goldenville. 

Deciding to attack, it is necessary next to consider how 
that attack should be made, whether frontally, or by en- 
veloping the right or the left flank. A purely frontal attack 
should only be made when the ground greatly favors such, 
or an envelopment is not practicable, or would require time 
that cannot be spared. Usually that flank is enveloped 
which affords the best cover for the attacker. An envel- 
opment of the hostile left, with the main attack moving in 
the general direction of the railroad, would require an ad- 
vance over nearly flat and entirely open ground to long 
ranges. If the main attack moved west to cover behind 
Oak Ridge, either a portion of the enemy's trenches beyond 
the Blue left would not be engaged, or the regiment would 
be attacking on a dangerously broad front. In the first 
case an opportunity would be offered the enemy to come out 
of his trenches and attack the exposed Blue left ; and in the 
second case, to attack and defeat the frontal or holding at- 
tack before the main attack was ready to strike. A further 
disadvantage of the attack by way of Oak Ridge lies in the 
close timber about knoll 582. Such timber, with heavy 
undergrowth to break up the attacker's formations and 
make all command and coordination extremely difficult, is 
a very positive disadvantage thereto. If the timber, on 
the other hand, were free from undergrowth and open in 
character, the cover afforded by it would be an equally posi- 
tive advantage. In considering these disadvantages of an 
envelopment to the west the colonel is simply running over 
again the reasons that caused him at Goldenville to abandon 
the idea of a march along Oak Ridge. An envelopment of 
the hostile right is favored by considerable cover in front 
of that flank, and very much also by the low elevations paral- 
lel to the enemy's trenches, which furnish suitable inter- 
mediary objectives for advancing groups, on which to re- 
build the firing lines. The colonel decides to envelop the 
hostile right. 



22 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

He will assign the battalion in advance guard to the 
secondary or frontal attack in order to get strong firing 
lines promptly into position, under whose cover the deploy- 
ment of the main attack can be made without fear of hostile 
interference. And since this holding attack by the advance 
guard is to be largely by fire, and only to be pushed home 
when the enemy is about to break from the pressure on his 
flank, a very broad frontage will be assigned it. A conven- 
ient line to separate the objectives of the two attacks is 
furnished by the Carlisle Road. The 1st Battalion will be 
assigned the hostile trenches west thereof. The 2d Bat- 
talion will be sent east of Barlow Knoll to attack the short 
front between the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads and to 
make the envelopment east of that objective. The 3d Bat- 
talion and Machine Guns will at first follow the 2d Battalion 
to be thrown in later as the progress of the action makes ex- 
pedient. The 3d Battalion will be used either to prolong the 
enveloping attack, or to push the attack forward where hos- 
tile weakness has developed, and the machine guns at the de- 
cisive moment to bring an intense fire upon that portion of 
the hostile lines where seems to be the best chance of pene*- 
trating. 

His Orders and Arrangements 

3:45 p. m. At 3 :45 p. m., the colonel issued verbal orders to the 3 

majors, C. 0. Machine Gun Co., and staff, on Barlow knoll, 
as follows : 

The enemy is in an intrenched position on the low ridge 500 yards 
south of the Almshouse, extending from the Harrisburg Road to a 
point about half a mile west thereof. 

B Company is deployed across the Carlisle Road on the Alms- 
house Ridge. It has two squads south of Stevens Run covering our 
left flank, and two squads near the Mummasburg Road on Oak Ridge 
covering our right flank. 

The Regiment will attack, enveloping the hostile right. March 
conditions cease. 

The 1st Battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Car- 
lisle Road, inclusive, to the west. The strong patrols of B Company 
will be left on the duty of flank protection. 

The 2d Battalion will proceed across country to the cover of Rock 
Creek, and thence south by this knoll (Barlow) to the Harrisburg 
Road. It will then attack the hostile trenches from the Carlisle Road, 
exclusive, to the east, and will envelop the enemy's right. 

The 3d Battalion and Machine Guns, in reserve, will follow the 
2d Battalion to cover east of this (Barlow) knoll. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 23 

No advance will be made from the 522 — Almshouse ridge until 
ordered by me. 

Ambulances and combat wagons will assemble at Boyd S. H. 

The Band is at the disposal of the Surgeon. 

Messages to this point, with which all battalions will maintain 
semaphore connection. 

At regimental headquarters, the horses were held north 
of Barlow Knoll by orderlies not otherwise engaged. The 
colonel, lieutenant colonel, adjutant and sergeant major 
were on the knoll. The sergeant major was in immediate 
charge of the details of communication. He had stationed 
one orderly to watch each battalion, keep track of its pro- 
gress, and transmit signal and semaphore messages. Two 
other orderlies, dismounted, were near at hand to carry 
written messages, and two were mounted just north of the 
hill for the transmission of any such where mounted de- 
livery was practicable. 

The comljat wagons were parked by a supply sergeant 
off the road with teamsters alert on the wagons and ready 
to move in either direction at a moment's notice. 

Actions and Orders, 1st Battalion 

The colonel having completed his order. Major B 
moved rapidly to the center of his three companies, on the 
Carlisle Road midway between Barlow and knoll 521, as- 
sembled the captains, and directed : 

The enemy occupies an intrenched position about three-quarters 
of a mile south of this point. 

The regiment attacks. B Company has a strong patrol near the 
Mumasburg Road, south of that wooded knoll (pointing to 642). 

This Battalion will advance to attack. 

D Company will at once gain 500 yards to the west and will then 
follow the right of the firing line at 400 yards in support. 

C and A Companies will gain ground to the west until C Co. is 
near the rail fence (pointing to the one 200 yards west of the road). 
They will then advance, C Company, the base company, moving up 
the little draw just east of the fence until I signal "Halt". 

The major sent the sergeant major to conduct the bat- 
talion ammunition wagons to Boyd S. H. 

When A Company, on the left of C, was about 100 yards 
north of knoll 522, the major signalled to both companies, 
Halt, lie down, Captains join me, this last addressed to 
those of Companies C, A, and B. These three officers, the 
major, and his adjutant moved cautiously up to 522 and lay 



24 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

down behind its crest. There the major pointed out the in- 
dications of hostile trenches less than 700 yards away. 
(The enemy had cut the orchard between knolls 522 and 
527, and burned the farm buildings thereat.) The Major 
ordered : 

The 2d Battalion attacks the trenches east of the Carlisle Road. 

This Battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Carlisle 
Road, inclusive, to the west. 

Companies C, A, and B, in the order named from right to left, 
will each deploy upon a front of 125 yards, with 25 yards interval be- 
tween companies, C Company's right at first near that fence comer 
(pointing to the one 200 yards west of knoll 522). Objectives: B 
Company, the hostile trench from the Carlisle Road, inclusive, to the 
fence corner about 150 yards west thereof (pointing to the one at G in 
Gettysburg) ; A Company, from that fence corner to include the 
Mumasburg Road about 7 fingers to the west; C Company, remainder 
of the hostile trenches. 

Deploy and signal me when you are ready to fire but await my 
order to commence. 

Make no advance beyond this crest until ordered by me. 

B Company will leave its 4 squads out to cover o#ir flanks. 

D Company is following the right of the firing line in support. 

I will be behind the center of the firing line. 

Actions and Orders, Company A 

The major having finished, the captain of A Company 
signalled his lieutenants and sergeants to come up to the 
crest. The company was lying down in line of platoon 
columns about 100 yards to the north. The captain moved 
to the center of the front assigned his company for deploy- 
ment, lay down so that he could just see over the crest, with 
his four platoon commanders, first sergeant, and remain- 
ing duty sergeants lying close to him on both sides. All so 
equipped were using field glasses. The captain ordered: 

The Regiment attacks. 

Catch the Red college building at 12:00 o'clock, then the hostile 
trench whose right is at 7:00 o'clock therefrom. 

Our objective is that trench. Its total length is about 7 fingers. 

The First and Second Platoons will each cover by their fire the 
entire western half of the company's objective; and the Third and 
Fourth Platoons will each cover the entire eastern half of that ob- 
jective. 

Give me the range. 

Each man estimated the range. The 1st Sergeant 
dropped back of the crest, and with the help of the musicians, 
quickly took it with the Weldon range finder to the fence 
corner near G in Gettysburg. Assisted by the mean of the 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 25 

ranges given by the estimators, having rejected any wild 
one in getting this, and by the finding of the Weldon, the 
captain decided upon the range as 600 yards. Deducting 
50 yards so as to bring the sheaf of fire from the line of 
aiming points into the trenches, he announced : 

Aiming point, crest line just above trenches. Range, 550. 

The captain signalled to the company : As skirmishers, 
March, and Forward, March; then Halt, Lie Down, when 
the skirmish line was about twenty yards back of the crest. 

The chiefs of platoon caused their squad leaders to 
crawl up to the crest, pointed out the company's objective 
to them, and assigned each squad its proportional part, us- 
ing with them the sight leaf instead of "fingers" in desig- 
nating the squad targets. Each squad leader then placed 
himself where the center of his squad was to be and signalled 
his men to join him by crawling. The squad leader 
pointed out to his men the company and squad objectives, 
the aiming point, gave the range, and when certain that 
every man understood, signalled "ready" to the chief of 
platoon. These chiefs in turn signalled "ready" to the cap- 
tain when all corporals of the platoon had so reported. 
The captain when all four of his platoons had reported 
signalled "ready" to the major. As soon as ready all men 
drew back from the crest and hugged the ground. The 
captain and his chiefs of platoon remained in observation 
of the foreground while awaiting the major's signal to com- 
mence firing. 

The deployment of C Company on the right was simi- 
lar. This company sent four scouts as a combat patrol to 
work at first to the farmhouse on the Mummasburg Road 
southwest of 522. That patrol endeavored to keep 3 or 4 
hundred yards south of the company, and a little farther 
than that to the flank, and to maintain touch with the two 
squads of B Company on the ridge to the west. One man 
on the right of the company watched this patrol and the pa- 
trol kept at least one man always in sight of the company. 
Reports of the patrol were made by signals, or extremely 
abbreviated semaphore messages. 



26 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

B Company on the battalion's left moved back from the 
crest and closed in to its right. Packs were dropped. The 
orders issued in this company were similar again to those 
of A Company, except that, having a shorter objective as- 
signed, the captain ordered each platoon to distribute its 
fire over the company's whole objective, the idea being of 
course to maintain a greater density of fire over the sec- 
tion of the objective immediately in front of a rushing pla- 
toon. 

Before leaving the 1st Battalion, let us go further into 
the arrangements therein for communication. The agents 
and means of communication were as follows: Each com- 
pany had one musician lying near the captain watching bat- 
talion headquarters, the other musician similarly watched 
the four chiefs of platoon. The battalion had one of its two 
mounted orderlies holding the four horses in the stream line 
500 yards north of knoll 522. The adjutant was four or 
five yards to the right of the major observing the enemy 
and the three companies of the firing line; the sergeant 
major, who had returned from conducting the empty com- 
bat wagons to Boyd S. H., was about the same distance to 
the left watching regimental headquarters on Barlow Knoll ; 
and the second orderly from a position behind the major 
kept track of D Company (in support) . All of these agents 
were alert to transmit, both ways forward and back, signals 
and semaphore messages, or in case of necessity to make 
personal delivery. 

Although every care had been taken in the deployment 
to keep under cover, the enemy's attention had nevertheless 
4:25 p.m. i^qq^i attracted and he opened fire. By 4:25 p. m. several 
men in the three companies had been hit and the men gener- 
ally were becoming rather nervous. To keep his battalion 
in hand, the major accordingly signalled, Commence Fir- 
ing, without waiting longer for the 2d Battalion's deploy- 
ment to be completed. The enemy's fire increased rapidly 
in intensity so that in a few minutes the battalion was en- 
gaged in a very hot fire fight. B Company quickly found it 
necessary to bring some fire on the Red trench east of the 
Carlisle Road, which formed part of the 2d Battalion's ob- 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 27 

jective. Its captain did so by signalling to the chief of his 
left platoon, Shift 5 fingers, left. 

Actions and Orders, 2d Battalion 

Turning now to the 2d Battalion, whose head it will be 
remembered was near the farm road 650 yards south of 
Boyd S. H., we find its major rejoining at 3 :55 p. m., after 3:55 p. m. 
having listened to the colonel's attack order. He saw that 
ammunition had been issued during his absence. The four 
companies had been drawn up in double column, each column 
of two companies on the sides of the road. The ammunition 
wagons then had driven down between the two columns, and 
the boxes were quickly dumped into the road, and their con- 
tents distributed. This issue required about ten minutes. 
The major ordered the empty wagons to proceed to Boyd S. 
H. as soon as the 2d and 3d Battalions had passed to the 
south. He then conducted the battalion in column of squads 
across country slightly south of east to the steep banks bor- 
dering Rock Creek and along these to the south. Nearing 
Rock Creek the major directed the leading company to 
double time a squad ahead to gain a couple of hundred yards 
on the battalion as its point, and to send a second squad 
across Rock Creek to march as a flank patrol east of the 
fringe of timber. The head of the battalion had arrived be- 
tween Barlow Knoll and 474W when the heavy fire of the 1st 
Battalion opened. The major assembled his captains on the 
southeast nose of Barlow knoll, and at 4 :30 p. m. directed : 4:30 p. m. 

The right of the Red trenches is about a thousand yards down 
this road (Harrisburg). 

The Regiment is attacking. The 1st Bn. is now engaged on our 
right. 

This Battalion will envelop the enemy's right. 

E Company will deploy with its left on this road (Harrisburg), 
and will at once advance to attack the enemy's trenches between the 
Harrisburg (inclusive) and Carlisle roads (exclusive). 

F Company will deploy with its right on the road, and will ad- 
vance with E Company. 

G and H Companies in support will continue south along Rock 
Creek at 300 yards. 

I will follow F Co. 

Actions and Orders, Company E 

The captain immediately double timed over to his com- 
pany and ordered : 



28 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The enemy is intrenched about a thousand yards to the southwest. 
We attack straight down this road. Scouts out. 

He signalled: As skirmishers, Guide Left. The 2d 
lieutenant and one scout from each squad double timed, 
deployed at about 7 paces interval, for the Almshouse Ridge. 
The company followed in quick time at 200 yards. That 
ridge gained the scouts lay down. The lieutenant dropped 
back to meet the captain, and reported that two orchards 
west and southwest of the Almshouse were down, that the 
enemy's trenches were in full view only five or six hundred 
yards away, and that the Almshouse ridge would make a 
suitable position for opening fire. The preliminary orders 
and arrangements for firing were similar in E Company to 
those of A Company previously described, although execu- 
ted with much less deliberation than in the case of the latter. 
4:45 p. m. At 4 :45 p. m. E Company opened fire. F Company, east of 
the Harrisburg Road, with the exception of a few men on 
the extreme right, could not see the hostile trenches, and ex- 
cept the right squad did not open fire with E Company. 

At this time G and H Companies were in column of 
twos in the timber along Rock Creek, with the head of G 
Company at the fence corner somewhat north of east of the 
Almshouse. A patrol of four men from G Company was at 
the mouth of Stevens Run. The E Company flanking patrol 
of one squad was on the nose 400 yards east of G Company. 

Progress of the Attack 4:45 to 5:15 p. m, 

4:46 p.m. At 4:45 p. m., the 3d Battalion and the Machine Gun 

Company were east of Barlow Knoll. The colonel verbally 
directed the captain of that company : 

Put your guns on the Almshouse Ridge between the 1st and 2d 
Battalions and open fire. Target: The Red trenches east of the Car- 
lisle Road. 

The colonel had the 2d Battalion signalled to advance. 
Its major signalled Forward to F Company on the left of 
the firing line. That company moved steadily forward with- 
out halting until it reached the nose south of the Almshouse. 
The Reds met this movement by deploying a company east 
of the Harrisburg Road in prolongation of their trenches 
west thereof. And F Company and this new Red company 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 29 

immediately engaged in a hot fire fight with less than four 
hundred yards separating their men. As soon as the Reds 
prolonged their firing line in this manner, the major sema- 
phored the leading company of his support, which had 
moved forward with F Company, *'R L F" (customary ab- 
breviation in the battalion for ''reinforce left of F Com- 
pany"). Thereupon G Company deployed from the timber 
along Rock Creek, moved forward until its skirmishers pro- 
longed the line of F Company to the eastward ; and joined 
that company in its fire fight with the Red company east of 
the Harrisburg Road. E Company on the right of F ad- 
vanced by platoon rushes to the orchard west of the road. 

The machine guns opened fire from the knoll northwest 
of the Almshouse at 5:00 p. m. Regimental headquarters, ^' ^'^' 
after ordering the 3d Battalion to advance along Rock Creek 
to Stevens Run, moved forward to the crest north of the 
Almshouse. 

At 5:10 p. m., Red skirmish lines appeared north of 5:iop. m. 
the eastern exit of Gettysburg. F and G Companies by this 
time had gained a decided fire superiority over their Red 
opponents, and were beginning to gain ground by platoon 
rushes from the left. The fire, however, of the fresh hostile 
skirmishers north of Stevens Run and of several machine 
guns which opened from the same direction with them quick- 
ly stopped the Blue advance; and the two companies were 
soon suffering severely notwithstanding the active support 
of the Blue machine guns. Immediately upon the appear- 
ance of these Red reinforcements, the colonel sent verbal 
orders by his adjutant, accompanied by one orderly, to the 
3d Battalion : 

Attack eastern exit Gettysburg at once. 

Actions and Orders, 3d Battalion 

In compliance with this order, the major of the 3d Bat- 
talion put the battalion in march to the south, and, at 5 : 17 5:17 p. m. 
p. m., standing fifty yards south of the mouth of Stevens 
Run, directed his leading captain : 

We attack the eastern exit of Gettysburg. 

Deploy, guide left, and advance at once with your left marching 



30 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

on that white house (pointing to the nearest one of Gettysburg on the 
York Turnpike). 

K Company will deploy on your left. 

I'll support you with the remaining companies. 

When the second company came up, the Major directed 
its captain : 

We are attacking the eastern exit of Gettysburg. 
Deploy, guide right, and prolong the left of I Company, which is 
the base company. 

The remaining companies will follow in support. 
I'll follow the firing line at 50 yards. 

As the third and fourth companies came up, he directed 
each captain: 

I and K Companies are attacking the eastern exit of Gettysburg. 
L and M, M on the left, will follow in support behind the left of K at 
200 yards. M Company will send a platoon at once to Benner's Hill 
to protect our left. 

I and K Companies advanced through the flanking pa- 
trol of B Company, and opened fire. To oppose them the 
enemy very soon deployed nearly an equal number of rifles. 
Each company (I and K) took roughly half of the front 
opposing them, and the platoons in like manner divided up 
the company's objective. The major almost immediately 
prolonged the firing line to the left by sending forward L 
Company. 

By this advance of the 3d Battalion the pressure on the 
2d Battalion was relieved. The major of the 2d Battalion 
deployed his last company over the front of the whole bat- 
talion and sent it into the firing line. The 1st Battalion ex- 
tended its right also with its last company. The fi^re of all 
the companies and of the machine guns rose rapidly in in- 
tensity. The hostile fire on the other hand everywhere im- 
mediately lost in effectiveness. Between the Carlisle Road 
and Stevens Run it, in fact, grew wild. The 2d Battalion 
began to gain ground by company rushes from the left. 
The enemy in front of this battalion left his trenches, and 
ran to the rear. The colonel signalled "Charge" to all of 
the battalions, and the musicians throughout the regiment 
sounded the charge. As the lines rushed forward the ene- 
my everjrwhere broke except east of Gettysburg, and in the 
last trenches northwest of Penn College. In these last some 



SKETCH NO. A. Positions At 51P P M. June 17 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 31 

two hundred men hung on until all of them were captured 
by the movement westward of portions of the 2d Battalion. 
The colonel rushed the machine guns forward to take 
up the fire pursuit. While these quickly cleared the main 
north and south streets of Gettysburg, they were not able 
to do much damage elsewhere because of the cover afforded 
the enemy by the town's buildings. 

The Pursuit 

When it became evident at regimental headquarters 
that the end of the action was approaching, the horses were 
brought forward. The colonel and staff mounted and gal- 
loped up to the Red trenches on the Carlisle Road. There 
he found the 1st Battalion less disorganized than the 2d — 
the 3d was still engaged east of the town. The colonel 
therefore hastened to the major of the 1st Battalion, whose 
companies were assembling near the hostile trenches on the 
Mummasburg Road, and at 5:55 p. m. directed: 5:55p.m. 

The 3d Battalion is still engaged east of town. 
Take up the pursuit at once through Gettysburg with your bat- 
talion and the machine gun company. 

The colonel then had the adjutant send a mounted or- 
derly with orders for the field train, still back at Texas, to 
come up to Gettysburg, and for the combat wagons to pick 
up the packs of B Company and also come on to Gettysburg. 

The major, 1st Battalion, assembled his captains at a 
double time, without interrupting the reorganization of 
the four companies, and, at 6:00 p. m., ordered: 6:00 p.m. 

The 3d Bn. is still engaged with hostile forces east of Gettysburg. 

This Battalion and the machine guns pursue at once. 

Co. D will proceed by the Mummasburg Road and the first street 
east of Penn College straight south through Gettysburg. 

Co. B, to the Carlisle Road and thence due south. 

Both companies will move rapidly. 

A and B Companies and the Machine Guns, in the order named, 
will follow D Company at 400 yards. 

Leave small details in charge of your prisoners, and to search for 
wounded. 

I will be at the head of A Company. 

The major sent the battalion adjutant to the captain 
of the machine gun company to notify him that the colonel 



32 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

had attached his command to the 1st Battalion for the pur- 
suit, and to direct him to f ollow B Company. 

Each leading company (D and B) moved out at once, 
double timing a platoon 200 yards in advance. Each of 
these platoons hurried a squad 150 yards to its front. Both 
D and B Companies were throughout in double column of 
files, one column on each side of the street. At the first 
cross street to the east, B Company, on the left, sent a pla- 
toon as left flank guard to the next north and south street. 
D Company similarly sent a squad to the right. 

In passing through the town the 1st Battalion picked 
up about 50 Reds who were turned over to a couple of squads 
of the last company to be assembled at the central square. 

As soon as the advanced groups of D and B Companies 
emerged from the town, they received a hot fire from the 
National Cemetery. These companies deployed immedi- 
ately across the Taneytown and the Baltimore turnpikes. 

The major turned the main body west by the cross 
street just north of the race track, and southwest by the 
country road. Near the group of houses opposite the south- 
ern part of the race track, the major, halting the battalion, 
took his three captains to the nose a hundred yards still far- 
ther to the south, and directed : 

The machine guns will take station in this vicinity and fire on the 
cemetery. 

Cos. A and B will deploy, B Company on the right, A Company's 
left west of this point, and will then advance. B Company will direct 
its left upon that yellow house (pointing to the H. Bishop farmhouse). 
B Company will send a strong patrol to Seminary Ridge. 

I'll follow the left of A Company. 

Under the fire of the machine guns, and upon the ad- 
vance of A and B companies, and of a portion of the 3d Bat- 
talion across country east of Gettysburg, the hostile resis- 
tance quickly broken down. By 7 : 00 o'clock. Cemetery Hill 
was in possession of the 1st Battalion which was pursuing 
by fire down the Taneytown Road small rapidly retreating 
groups of the enemy. 

All of the battalions sent parties to search the ground 
over which they had attacked for wounded. By early eve- 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 33 

ning, their reports indicated that there had been some 121 
casualties distributed about as follows: 

1st Bn. 1 officer, 6 men killed, 30 wounded, 
2d Bn. 2 officers, 9 men killed, 45 wounded, 
3d Bn. 1 officer, 5 men killed, 20 wounded, 
M. G. Co. 2 wounded. 

About 70 Red wounded were found. 



Comment 

With reference to the whole conduct of the attack, cer- 
tain things are to be noted. 

While prompt action was of great importance in pre- 
venting the escape of the enemy with his booty, nevertheless 
the colonel did not throw his regiment into the fight until 
the advance guard's reconnaissance had made it pretty cer- 
tain just where the hostile trenches were located and what 
was their extent. The long range of modern rifles renders 
it exceedingly difficult to change the direction of attack of 
troops once committed to action. Unless it is known before- 
hand where the enemy is, troops can only by chance ad- 
vance in the direction for striking him. A command that 
attacks with an incorrect direction line will at best simply 
strike a blow in the air and at worst will be annihilated by 
flanking or enfilade fire from the enemy's real position. 
Moreover, unless the enemy has been rather definitely locat- 
ed, the attack can hardly be made systematically and upon a 
well considered plan, but the troops will have to be sent in 
piece-meal simply to meet the exigencies of the engagement 
as they arise. Such a haphazard attack even if its direction 
lines happen to be right will have little chance of success 
unless made with an overwhelming superiority in numbers. 
The colonel, having these principles in mind, curbed there- 
fore his impatient desire to get the action started, and waited 
quietly for more than an hour while his advance guard was 
clearing up the situation. 

Such quiet waiting can of course easily be carried to 
an excess. Probably no commander ever feels certain that 
he has learned the exact situation on the other side. The 
determination, consequently, of the proper moment for con- 



34 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

eluding that no more information can be awaited, but that 
from what has already been obtained a certain hostile situa- 
tion must be assumed to exist, and an attack based upon 
that assumption be ordered, calls ordinarily for the exercise 
of the nicest judgment. 

It may be asked why the colonel did not take advantage 
of this long period of waiting for information to bring up 
the 2d and 3d Battalions from their halting place south of 
Boyd S. H. into assembly positions rather close behind the 
advance guard. The answer, of course, is that the colonel 
had not yet made up his mind just how he would attack. 
By leaving the bulk of the regiment, until this decision was 
made, as far back as possible without dangerously isolating 
the advance guard, the movement then of these battalions to 
the right or left for deployment could be better covered from 
hostile view, and the attacking battalions could be directed 
from a greater distance exactly towards their proper ob- 
jectives, and so have all of their movements in deployment 
partake less of the nature and dangers of flank marches. 

The question of when to drop the packs, it is believed 
will usually be a diflftcult one to answer. If as soon as an 
advance guard encounters a delaying force of the enemy, it 
immediately drops the packs, then, when the enemy is driven 
away, either much time is lost in going back for them, or 
they are left miles to the rear, and are perhaps not seen 
again for many days, if at all. On the other hand it is a 
great advantage in a prolonged engagement to relieve the 
men of this burden. In Colonel A's engagement the fight 
promised to be serious enough to make it expedient to take 
them off, and there was likely to be no difficulty in getting 
them up later since he had no idea of a prolonged pursuit 
south of Gettysburg. But the colonel, and not one of his 
subordinates, was the proper one to make the decision. 

The method employed by the advance guard in its pre- 
liminary reconnaissance was the one that will ordinarily 
best serve. A detachment of considerable size must be de- 
ployed upon a broad front and sent straight towards where 
the enemy's main strength is thought to be to drive in the 
groups by which he will screen his dispositions, and so com- 
pel him to disclose his main position. In the case in ques- 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 35 

tion, a single company sufficed to lay bare the front of the 
enemy's position. It might have been necessary to deploy 
the greater part of the advance guard, had the hostile cover- 
ing detachments proved of greater strength, and Major B 
was prepared, and had grouped his other companies so as to 
be able, to meet this necessity. While clearing up the front 
in this manner, strong patrols must be sent at the same time 
to the right and to the left to determine the limits of the 
hostile position. Usually the general terrain and the pre- 
vious idea of the strength of the opposing force will enable 
a guess to be made as to the location of the flanks. The 
patrols testing its accuracy are assigned routes, which, if 
the guess is correct, will take them by the enemy. If the 
guess has not been correct, then other points still farther 
to the flank must be promptly tested. The patrols should 
be strong so as to drive in the corresponding security de- 
tachments of the other side and to be able to detach for close 
examination of particular points. The two flanking patrols 
of this problem met exactly similar bodies and were unable 
to gain much ground. But they nevertheless got far enough 
to locate very accurately the extremities of the Red line. 
Such reconnoitering groups must work boldly and rapidly, 
giving but little thought to their own safety, or, the infor- 
mation they obtain, if any at all is obtained, will come in to 
headquarters too late to be of much value. 

Next should be noted the care taken by the colonel to 
secure a united attack by ordering that no advance be made 
from the 522 ridge until further orders. Had the 1st Bat- 
talion attempted to move forward from that ridge before 
the 2d Battalion was ready, the 1st would probably at best 
have suffered severely, or might even have been defeated, 
by the concentration upon it over perfectly open ground of 
the entire hostile fire. This coordination of the two attacks 
might also have been obtained by ordering the 1st Battalion 
to "support" the attack of the 2d, which would have made 
the 2d Battalion the guide of the movement. Such an order 
would however have required the 1st Battalion to divert 
agents of communication from other duties to keep track of 
the progress of the 2d Battalion, while the regimental head- 



36 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

quarters was already most conveniently located and had the 
proper personnel for the performance of this duty. 

The regiment's initial deployment was upon a front of 
slightly over a thousand yards. This is not excessive for a 
regiment (at war strength be it remembered) acting alone, 
because an affair between regiments will last a comparative- 
ly short time, and there will consequently not be the same 
need for relatively large supports and reserves to replace 
losses and push the firing line forward that will be found in 
an engagement between larger bodies. After the attack- 
ing lines had compelled the enemy to throw in his reserves, 
and make his dispositions and intentions reasonably clear, 
there was no hesitation on the colonel's part to put in all of 
his men, and to meet the hostile extension by a very consid- 
erable extension of his own lines. He did not permit 
himself to be prevented from so using all of his men by the 
possibility that the enemy still had other reserves, or that 
perhaps other hostile forces would soon be coming in to 
help the one Red regiment reported. Such risk had to be 
run. War cannot successfully be made without taking 
chances. Judgment is displayed by taking only those in 
which the risk is reasonable or necessary. 

As is usually the case in an enveloping attack the enemy 
finally presented a salient in his lines near the Harrisburg 
Road, which broke under the concentrated fire the Blues 
were thereby enabled to bring upon it. 

Everyone concerned from a captain of an outside com- 
pany through the majors to the colonel kept the matter of 
flank protection constantly in mind. The regimental com- 
mander perhaps need not have said anything in his attack 
order about it, since the steps already taken by B Company 
in sending out two strong patrols incidentally could amply 
provide for security. But those patrols went out primarily 
for information. Having obtained that, and the company 
being assigned another task with no mention of the duty 
of security therein, it was possible these patrols might be 
drawn in or fail to realize that their mission had changed 
from reconnaissance to security. The matter was of too 
great importance to run any chance of a misunderstanding, 
and accordingly was provided for in the regimental order. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 37 

Means of communication and connection throughout 
the command from the squads to the regimental headquar- 
ters were systematically and carefully provided in advance 
of the necessity for their use. For such purposes agents 
of communication must be trained to specific duties, unless 
detachments are to be lost sight of, and a failure of com- 
munication to result. A careful organization of the whole 
system of information and communication both in the bat- 
talion and in the regiment must be provided by those direct- 
ly responsible if these organizations are to be combined into 
a smoothly working team. For distances up to 1200 yards, 
and even with favorable conditions of light up to a mile, 
the semaphore flag (which can be used prone, or kneeling, 
as well as standing) will quite frequently be of the utmost 
value. But in using it, as well as in using any other system 
of signalling, the messages must be highly condensed and 
abbreviated. And the agents must not simply have a fair 
knowledge of their systems but must be expert. When 
using the semaphore it must also be remembered that no one 
system is ordinarily sufficient to meet all demands for com- 
munication. It is frequently advisable, even with a most 
efficient system of signalling in existence, to make personal 
delivery of certain messages. 

Whenever practicable, both in the battalion and in the 
companies, there was careful designation of objectives and 
targets to secure proper distribution and accuracy of fire. 
These preliminary measures were hurried or omitted only 
when the exigencies of immediate action made to do so im- 
peratively necessary. Time spent in such measures for the 
adjustment of fire, unless carried to an excess, is ordinarily 
well expended. 

The machine guns were kept at first in reserve, to go 
into action only when the fight had progressed far enough 
to make rather certain where the attack had the best chance 
of getting home. Then the colonel put in these guns to ob- 
tain their powerful assistance in beating down the hostile 
fire over the limited front east of the Carlisle Road. 

Finally, it is well to note that the colonel after the 
attack order, remained quietly in one spot until the action 
was nearly over, issuing meantime comparatively few or- 



38 STUDIES IN MINOE TACTICS 

ders. After starting his battalions towards the enemy by 
that initial order he had practically nothing to do but to 
watch carefully the progress of the action and determine 
therefrom just when and where to put in his reserves. Yet 
this decision was of such moment that it justified the absorp- 
tion of his entire thought. He permitted his subordinates to 
make their deployments and dispositions, with system and 
deliberation, and without hurrying by or interference from 
regimental headquarters. And in all of his orders he as- 
signed tasks only, carefully abstaining from any directions 
as to the manner of execution, which last must be left to the 
discretion of a competent subordinate. 



Sanitary Arrangements 

The sanitary personnel with a regiment consists of 4 
officers, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 20 privates 1st 
class or privates. Before the command entrained at Car- 
lisle the regimental surgeon, by direction of the colonel, 
distributed the sanitary personnel as follows: With each 
battalion, 1 officer, 1 N. C. 0., 5 privates, the latter including 
the officer's orderly. He himself remained with the com- 
manding oflftcer and the rest of the personnel or aid station 
party followed in the mixed section. 

When the regiment detrained this formation was ad- 
hered to and on the march each battalion was followed by 
its detachment. 

The aid station party with the 3 ambulances tailed the 
regiment. 

As soon as the order for the attack on the Red position 
was given the Colonel placed the band at the disposal of the 
regimental surgeon. Each battalion detachment followed 
its battalion into the engagement, keeping as close to the 
firing line as the terrain permitted. During the fighting 
all the wounded who could be reached were given first aid 
treatment, and if possible they were removed to some pro- 
tected spot until further evacuation could be safely carried 
out. 

The Aid Station party and the band remained in the 
ravine in front of Barlow Knoll, and under the direction 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 39 

of the regimental surgeon established an aid station at that 
point when necessary. 

By 5 :30 p. m. this aid station had been abandoned as 
the line advanced and was now established in the ravine at 
the County Almshouse. A few slightly wounded had been 
received at the first station, and when the advance took place 
a non-commissioned officer of the band and a sanitary pri- 
vate were left in charge of them. 

At the second station the terrain was favorable to a 
partial collection of the wounded, and litter squads com- 
posed of bandsmen were sent out to the several battalions 
to bring in as many men as possible. 

As soon as the enemy was driven from his position and 
protection from rifle fire was no longer a factor, the regi- 
mental surgeon moved the aid station to the County Alms- 
house and sent his orderly to Boyd S. H. to direct that the 
ambulances repair immediately to the battlefield. The sani- 
tary personnel of the 1st Battalion accompanied it in the 
pursuit and cared for the wounded who fell during the 
second engagement. 

The sanitary personnel and the band with the assis- 
tance of the details from the combatant troops and the am- 
bulances, collected the wounded into the regimental aid 
station. At that time it was found that there were: 10 
non-transportable, very severe cases ; 39 moderately severe, 
but able to stand transportation ; 48 slightly wounded, 13 of 
whom required very little attention and could immediately 
rejoin their companies. In addition to these, there were 
67 severely wounded Reds. 

The regimental surgeon requested that rail transpor- 
tation be sent from Carlisle to Gettysburg on the morning 
of June 18th, to remove 39 severely and 35 slightly wounded 
Blues, and 54 severely wounded Reds. This was approved 
by the colonel and forwarded to division headquarters. 
Pursuant to this request a train consisting of 4 baggage cars 
and one ordinary passenger coach arrived at 7 : 00 a. m. and 
by 9 :00 a. m. with the use of the ambulances and vehicles, 
the wounded capable of being transported had been loaded 
on the train, which immediately started on its return jour- 
ney to Carlisle. 



40 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The 10 Blue and 13 Red non-transportable wounded 
were left in the Almshouse at which point a small temporary- 
hospital was established. 

Comment 

The distribution of the sanitary personnel with a regi- 
ment on the march and when preparing for an attack as 
outlined above is solely to provide for efficient assistance for 
all parts of the command without delay or confusion. By 
this arrangement a battalion ordered to some duty away 
from the regiment will always have its proper quota of 
sanitary assistance. 

Attention is called to the fact, as emphasized in this 
problem, that the regimental aid station is nothing more 
than a collecting point for the wounded. No elaborate 
treatment is contemplated and the administering of first aid 
is all that can be expected. This station is established when- 
ever there is a sufficient number of wounded in a given area, 
who can be collected in one protected spot, without undue 
exposure of the sanitary troops. This point is not fixed and 
there may be several such locations during an engagement 
as shown above. As the line advances the station advances, 
after collecting all the wounded in the first area. A point 
protected from direct rifle fire is selected as close to the line 
as possible and collection of the wounded into this station is 
begun at once. A detail sufficiently large to administer to 
the wants of the wounded is left at each location, when an 
advance of the station is ordered. 

A pursuit by a force of any size should be provided with 
some sanitary personnel. Casualties are very apt to occur 
and assistance would be needed at once, therefore the per- 
sonnel attached to the 1st Battalion accompanied it in the 
pursuit, leaving the remainder of the detachment to collect 
and care for the wounded of the main engagement. 

After wounded are collected and dressed, immediate 
efforts should be made to remove them to the rear. It might 
be said that the facilities presented in the town of Gettys- 
burg for the care of the small number of wounded were 
ample, and no evacuation would be necessary. Though this 
is in part true, still several factors should be given more 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 41 

weight in considering this matter. In the first place the 
enemy might be reinforced, and in turn compel the evacua- 
tion of the town ; causing all of these wounded to fall into 
their hands. Secondly, the problem of supply for even a 
small command requires careful consideration; and if men 
are present who cannot be used on the firing line for some 
time, they should be removed as extra mouths to be fed with- 
out commensurate services returned. 

The casualties in engagements are, unless more detailed 
information is provided, divided into their categories by the 
following percentages, which have been worked out accor- 
ding to the detailed reports of modern campaigns : 

Killed 20% 

Severely wounded — 

Non-transportable 8% 

Transportable, sitting 20% 

Transportable, recumbent 12% 

Slightly wounded — 

Able to walk to dressing sta- 
tion or field hospital 28% 

Able to walk to advance 

depot 12% 

It should be noted that the Red wounded are all classed 
as severe cases. This conclusion is arrived at by assuming 
that the slightly wounded have retreated with their own 
troops. 



A HALT FOR THE NIGHT 



Arrangements and Orders, Regimental Headquarters 

6:15 p.m. At 6:15 p. m., the colonel directed the major, 2d Bat- 

talion : 

Leave one company to collect all the prisoners and confine 
them for the night in Penn College. Also leave detachments to search 
for your wounded. March the remainder of your battalion to the 
Taneytown Road at the southern exit of Gettysburg. 

The colonel then sent the adjutant to direct the 3d Bat- 
talion, whose firing by this time had died away, to proceed 
to the Baltimore Turnpike at the southern exit of Gettys- 
burg. The colonel, himself, went ahead in the direction of 
the steady firing to be heard south of town; and from its 
outskirts watched the sucessful attack of the 1st Bat- 
talion. At its conclusion, he directed the battalion comman- 
der: 

Do not pursue farther. We will camp for the night east of the 
racetrack — the 3 battalions in the usual order from north to south. 
Which of your companies can best go on outpost? 

A Company, then, will take station in the vicinity of Cemetery 
Hill, and will secure the command from the Emmitsburg Road to the 
Baltimore Turnpike, both inclusive. Transmit this order to its cap- 
tain. 

The adjutant will mark the company streets. 

Reserve rations tonight. The wagons will not be up for some 
hours. The combat wagons have been ordered to pick up B Com- 
pany's packs. 

The colonel then sent the adjutant to the machine gun 
company, with orders for that organization to proceed to 
the race track. The colonel personally rode to the other 
two battalions and directed their majors: 

The enemy is retreating to the south in considerable disorder. 

We will camp east of the race track — battalions in the usual 
order from north to south. The adjutant is posting the company flags. 

A "Company takes station on Cemetery Hill to secure the com- 
mand from the Emmitsburg road to the Baltimore turnpike. 

Reserve rations tonight. The wagons will not be up for some 
hours. Your combat wagons have been ordered to bring up the 
packs 

Go on to the camp ground. 

42 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 43 

The colonel directed the major of the 3d Battalion 
to have his adjutant report for duty with a reconnoitering 
patrol. When the adjutant reported, the colonel, at 7:30 7:30 p.m. 
p. m., directed: 

The enemy has retired by the Taneytown Road in considerable 
confusion. 

We are going into camp south of Gettysburg. 

I want you to select four orderlies, follow the enemy, and remain 
in contact with him. Let me know where he camps tonight. 

While camp was being made, the colonel directed the 
guard company to station a cossack post on knoll 574 of 
Seminary Ridge west of camp, a sentry south of camp and 
one at the picket line north of camp, and also to establish a 
signal station on the highest building immediately east of 
camp for observation of the surrounding country and for 
communication with the outpost. 

The ammunition supply was low, and very unequally 
distributed. There seemed to be an average of about 40 
rounds per man, and some 2000 rounds in the Machine Gun 
Company. The ordnance officer was directed to redistri- 
bute so as to equalize throughout the regiment. 

Two hundred and fifty Red unwounded prisoners had 
been captured, in addition to the 67 severely wounded. 

Five days' rations were still stored at Table Rock 
Station under a small guard. During the night, the quar- 
termaster hired seven civilian teams, which he sent at day- 
break with the empty ration wagons to bring these rations 
from Table Rock to Gettysburg. 

The railroad officials reported the track intact to the 
north. 

The colonel forwarded the following telegraphic re- 
port : 

1st Inf., Gettysburg, 

17 June, 9:20 p. m. 
Chief Staff, 

Carlisle. 
Found 1st Red Inf. in position north of Gettysburg. Attacked and 
defeated it. Enemy retired in disorder to south. Am now camped 
southern outskirts Gettysburg. Had one hundred twenty casualties. 
Captured two hundred fifty unwounded Reds and sixty seven severely 
wounded. Have average only forty rounds ammunition. Request 
three hundred thousand rounds ammunition be shipped Gettysburg by 
rail tonight. Also cars for evacuation Red prisoners and ninety- 
three severely and thirty-five slightly wounded. 

A, 
Colonel. 



44 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Outpost Arrangements and Orders 

The colonel's order to establish an outpost having been 
transmitted to the captain of A Company, the latter 
marched that organization to the orchard about 300 yards 
south of Cemetery Hill, where he halted the company, and 
assembling his officers and non-commissioned officers, direc- 
ted: 

The enemy is retreating rapidly to the south. 

Our regiment camps east of the race track. 

This company will take station in this vicinity to furnish the out- 
post. 

Corporal L, take your squad, as outguard No. 1, down the road 
to the right (Emmitsburg) about half a mile to the crossing of that 
road and the railroad. 

Sergeant M, take the 2d and 3d squads, as outguard No. 2, to 
the roadfork about three quarters of a mile south on the Taneytown 
Road. 

Corporal N, station your squad, as outguard No. 3, on the Balti- 
more Turnpike north of the stream which runs just north of those 
hills (pointing to Powers and McAllister Hills). 

All outguards will get signal communication with the company 
station which will be established on the house just south of us. 

Lieut. B will take charge of the company. Explain the situa- 
tion to the men. Put an observation post at the house south of us. 
Establish communication with the outguards and with the Regiment's 
camp. 

Get water from the farmhouse (pointing to one just to the south). 
Put a sentry over the well. Collect rations and put men to work get- 
ting supper. Reserve rations tonight. Arrange to use the farmhouse 
range for cooking. Our wagons and packs will not be up for some 
hours. Check up our ammunition. 

Lieut. C, prepare an outpost sketch. I will locate the troops 
thereon when I return from inspecting the outguards. 

Corporal P, you, and L, M and N will come with me. 

I am going to visit the outguards from the right to the left. 

The captain first looked at the ground nearby with a 
view to defense, and determined to occupy the southern edge 
of the orchard on knoll 606 in case of a hostile advance from 
the south or southwest, and to move back to Cemetery Hill 
if the enemy should advance along the Baltimore Turnpike. 

He then started with Corporal P and his men across 
country to the southwest. He found Corporal L, in charge 
of outguard No. 1, had posted his squad east of the road 
just south of the southernmost of the N. Codori houses, 
with one sentry 25 yards down the road. The corporal in- 
tended to cut wire to barricade the road just beyond the 
sentry. Two of his men had collected the rations and were 
arranging to cook supper in one of the farmhouses. One 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 45 

man was at the northernmost house to get semaphore con- 
nection with the company. The captain notified Corporal 
L that he need do no patrolling at night except to investigate 
something suspicious. 

From No. 1 outguard, the captain and his patrol pro- 
ceeded to No. 2 by the railroad track, southeast to the un- 
improved road, and thence along it between knolls 566 and 
592 to the 545 roadfork. The main body of Sergeant M's 
picket was bivouacking in the southern edge of the orchard 
north of the roadfork. A cossack post was on knoll 592 with 
its sentry up a tree in observation of the Taneytown Road. 
At dark the cossack post was to be drawn in to the picket. 
One sentry was posted at the picket. The two roads were 
barricaded about 25 yards out. After dark a sentry was to 
be posted near each barricade. As in the first outguard, 
the rations had been combined and supper was being pre- 
pared in the farmhouse north of the orchard. One signaller 
at that house had made semaphore connection with the com- 
pany. The captain directed the sergeant to send a patrol 
of 3 men every hour one mile to the south, and upon a hos- 
tile advance in any strength greater than a reconnoitermg 
patrol to fall back promptly until abreast of the company 
on the Taneytown Road. 

The captain went to No. 3 outguard by the road to the 
east and then north between Powers and McAllister hills. 
The outguard was at the southern house with a sentry 
posted, one signaller on the northern house in communica- 
tion with the company, and two men in the last named house 
getting the combined supper. The captain directed that 
the stream crossing be barricaded, and, in case of a hostile 
advance, that the outguard retire along the Baltimore Turn- 
pike, delaying the enemy as much as possible. He informed 
the corporal that hourly patrols would be sent from the 
company by the route the captain had come, and directed the 
corporal to require each patrol leader to name himself be- 
fore being allowed to cross the stream. 

All three of the outguards had either an electric torch 
or lanterns with which to signal a hostile advance in 
strength, and these means were to be used for no other pur- 



46 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

pose. The farmhouses near each outguard were required 
kept absolutely dark. 

The captain got back to the company about 8 :30 p. m. 
He found that the packs had come up, and a bivouac of the 
company in one line just north of the two houses had been 
prepared. Semaphore connection from one of the houses 
had been made with each outguard, and by flag with a house 
in Gettysburg on which was the regimental station. The 
field wagons had not appeared. He ordered a barricade 
of the road 25 yards to the south, and one sentry squad 
into the position, just south of the houses, in which, if re- 
quired, the company would fight at night. 

The captain then prepared the following report, the 
back of which carried Lieutenant C's sketch (No. 5) : 

Co, A, at farmhouse, 400 yards 
8:45 p. m. south of CEM. hill, 

17 June, 8:45 p. m. 
Colonel A: 

Company A posted as on sketch. In case hostile advance on 
TANEiTOWN ROAD will defend this locality, if on Baltimore pike will 
defend cem. hill. I have only 50 rounds ammunition per man. 

A, 
Capt. 

This he sent to regimental headquarters by a messen- 
. ger, directing the man after delivering the report to wait 
for the baggage wagon and come back on it. 

The baggage and ration wagons joined the company at 
9 :45, were unloaded, and returned to the regimental camp. 

The captain caused patrols of 3 men each to traverse 
hourly the route followed by him in visiting the outguards. 
The first three patrols sent out were each guided by one of 
the men that had gone about with the captain. 



With a badly beaten enemy, the regiment can safely 
trust to the simplest measures for securing its camp. In 
this case, though, as in all other cases, the prime requisite is 
that touch shall be maintained with the retreating enemy. 
Only mounted men can satisfactorily accomplish this mis- 
sion. That contact the colonel provides for by sending 
a single small patrol. After that, one company a short dis- 
tance to the south furnishes ample protection. 



SKETCH NO. 5. Oufpost. Night June 17-18 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 47 

In that company again the most simple measures, con- 
sisting only in placing three small detachments on the main 
roads to the south, are sufficient. Practically the only func- 
tion of these is to give the company a few minutes to get into 
position for action. In the absence of mounted men with the 
outguards, some system of signalling both by day and by 
night is required in order to give sufficient warning to the 
company of a hostile advance. Even if mounted men were 
available, the use of signals would still be the more rapid 
means. 

Under the circumstances, furthermore, no elaborate 
system of patrolling is called for. But little more is there- 
fore provided than a visiting patrol, which incidentally 
covers the ground between outguards frequently enough to 
have a reasonable prospect of discovering in time a hostile 
movement in strength across country. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the regiment has had a 
considerable initial success, it is still in a dangerous situa- 
tion through its isolation so near the hostile territory, and 
before an enemy that has shown himself by no means lack- 
ing in energy and aggressiveness. Colonel A may have to 
fight again tomorrow. If he does, with only 40 rounds 
of ammunition per man, he will stand little chance of suc- 
cess. To get at least enough ammunition tonight to refill 
the men's belts and the combat wagons, is therefore the most 
important matter now requiring the colonel's attention. 



THE DEFENSE 

Situation 

During the night of June 17-18, a train brought suffi- 
cient ammunition to refill the belts and ammunition wagons, 
and empty cars which took the wounded and prisoners back 
to Carlisle. 

On the 18th, the Chief of Staff telegraphed that the re- 
mainder of the 1st Brigade would be sent by rail to Gettys- 
burg, where its first train should arrive by 10 :00 a. m. on the 
19th. Three reports were received from the mounted patrol 
sent to the south : the first to the effect that the defeated Red 
regiment camped at Centennial S. H. for the night after the 
fight; the second that at 4:00 a. m. of the 18th it marched 
towards Emmitsburg; and the third, received at 10 :00 p. m. 
of the 18th, that two fresh regiments marched from Em- 
mitsburg during the afternoon and camped at Fairplay on 
the Gettysburg road for the night of June 18-19th. 



Regimental Commander's Estimate of the Situation 

In solving the new problem so presented to him. Colonel 
A considered the questions involved about as follows : 

He must keep clearly in view his original mission which 
was to secure the division's concentration at Carlisle, some- 
thing over 25 miles north of Gettysburg. Any protection 
of Gettysburg must be made subservient to the primary 
mission, in which there has yet been nothing in circum- 
stances or orders to produce any radical change. The com- 
ing of the remainder of the brigade perhaps indicates some 
fear on the part of the division commander, that Colonel A 
will be unable to gain the required time with his regiment 
alone ; and it may indicate also, that he hopes to retain Get- 
tysburg through this added strength. 

If the objective of the two new hostile regiments is 
Gettysburg, and they start from their night's camp at 5:00 
o'clock, having about six miles to go, their advance, if unin- 
terrupted, would be in the neighborhood of the Blue outposts, 

48 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 49 

as now located, between 7:00 and 7:30 a. m. Even on a 
long June day they are not likely to start before 5 :00 o'clock, 
and, of course, they may start much later. 

If the hostile reconnaissance upon gaining contact is 
promptly carried out, the enemy may have sufficient infor- 
mation to determine upon his method of attack in an hour 
thereafter. His deployment for attack and advance to de- 
cisive ranges will take another hour, and to carry the at- 
tack through to a decision would probably take a third hour. 
So, Colonel A can reasonably expect from one position to 
hold the two hostile regiments until somewhere near 10 :30 
a. m. By 10:00 o'clock the 1st section of the Blue rein- 
forcements should reach Gettysburg, and its troops should 
arrive on the battlefield within 15 or 20 minutes thereafter. 
The reinforcement then received will probably consist only 
of one battalion. This will by no means place Colonel A 
upon equal terms with his adversary, who not only seems to 
have two regiments now advancing towards Gettysburg, but 
may be able to reinforce them with some part of the beaten 
Red regiment. It is doubtful, therefore, whether, if the ene- 
my advances aggressively in the morning, all of the time re- 
quired for uniting the 1st Brigade can be gained in one posi- 
tion south of Gettysburg. 

Colonel A might advance at daybreak with his whole 
regiment in the direction of the enemy, to fight a series of 
delaying actions, and so gain the necessary time for uniting 
the brigade and for saving Gettysburg from another hostile 
visitation. At first sight the idea appears decidedly 
good. But the enemy may not march at an early hour in 
the morning, and his objective may not be Gettysburg at 
all; he may simply have moved out to cover Emmitsburg. 
And the possibility of this last being the case, seems greater 
when it is remembered that the beaten Red regiment was 
operating in hostile territory without cavalry; and being 
so hampered in obtaining information, may have no very 
clear idea of the Blue strength opposed to it. Consequently, 
if Colonel A remains near Gettysburg he may not have to 
fight at all, or not until he has been strongly reinforced. 
An unnecessary fight, particularly against superior numbers, 
is always to be avoided. While to conduct a series of 



50 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

delaying actions may on its face seem a simple proposition, 
yet in fact to carry such through against an enemy of twice 
his strength is an exceedingly difficult and dangerous opera- 
tion, in which Colonel A, by the slightest false step or bad 
luck might easily have his regiment destroyed. 

By advancing to meet the enemy the engagement would 
probably become a rencontre in which the hostile superiori- 
ty in numbers would have every advantage. The ground 
west of the Round Tops has too much timber to favor delay- 
ing actions, in which extended fields of fire are of the utmost 
value ; yet, if the enemy marches promptly in the morning, 
that is the place where he most likely to be met. Further- 
more, by such an advance Colonel A would give up all time 
for intrenching, and the great advantage for the defense 
thereof. 

It would hardly do to evacuate Gettysburg, moving to 
the north, only perhaps to learn later that the enemy also 
was on the defensive, and had no intention of advancing ; or, 
that he advanced so slowly, that the town might well have 
been saved from his return. 

Some consideration is given to the occupation of a flank- 
ing position on Round Top, but this is promptly decided 
against because the position there is not strong to the west 
and south after the enemy begins to get anywhere near at 
hand, and because it is doubtful if it could be properly oc- 
cupied by the regiment in time. The long range fire from 
a small detachment thereon would cause almost as much 
delay as would the regiment in a hurriedly occupied 
position which it did not intend to hold to the end. 

In view of all these considerations, it seems much bet- 
ter to make one fight and that, rather close in to Gettysburg, 
provided a suitable position is there to be found. And in 
making the fight alone it must not be to a decision. If it 
becomes apparent that reinforcements are not going to reach 
him in time. Colonel A, remembering that his primary mis- 
sion is to cover the division, will withdraw to the north of 
Gettysburg while still able to do so. 

In looking for a position, the colonel notes that every- 
where south of the J. Smith farm, within distances that 
might be considered, there is too much timber to obtain 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 51 

suitable fields of fire. North, however, of J. Smith's, there is 
cons-derable open ground. A fair position is there offered 
with its left on knoll 606, near the Taneytown Road, and ex- 
tending nearly due west until the right is on Seminary 
Ridge. Over parts of this front the field of fire is excellent, 
over other portions it is rather restricted by the small folds 
of the earth. But machine guns judiciously posted can 
flank most of these folds that w^ould otherwise afford shelter 
for attacking lines until very close in. Seminary Ridge 
must be included to prevent it from covering the enemy's 
main attack while he is making his envelopment on the 
shortest and most natural lines. 

By occupying Seminary Ridge the position will become 
nearly 1700 yards in length, entirely too long for the regi- 
ment to hold in a decisive engagement. But in a purely de- 
laying action a position of considerable length is, on the 
other hand, an advantage since it makes the hostile recon- 
naissance more difficult, requires movements upon longer 
lines to prepare envelopments, and renders it much harder 
to determine what strength is occupying the position. All 
of these add to the time taken before a decisive attack can 
be launched. 

The position in question covers both the Emmitsburg 
and the Taneytown roads. To get into Gettysburg the 
enemy must either attack it or make a very considerable 
detour with consequent loss of much time. 

Behind its front there is considerable cover, both in the 
shape of folds in the ground and of timber, which will facili- 
tate withdrawal when such becomes necessary. Its flanks 
will be secured by fairly good fields of fire. 

On the whole, it is simply a fair position. Par- 
ticularly in a delaying action the field of fire should be very 
extensive. Yet in this one, in several places, it is consider- 
ably restricted. But the perfect position probably does not 
exist. Colonel A simply has to make the best of what he 
can find; and this position is good enough to warrant its 
use under the circumstances. 

Now as to its occupation, it seems best not to use more 
than two battalions in the first line, since a strong reserve 
should be held well back to facilitate withdrawal in case such 



52 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

becomes necessary. The machine gun company will be split 
between the two first line battalions, one platoon going with 
each to compel the early deployment of the enemy, to flank 
those areas in which the enemy's lines could otherwise work 
forward under cover to close range, and to bring a concen- 
trated fire to the flanks to hinder envelopment. Unlike the 
attack, the delaying action makes it expedient to bring the 
machine guns into action from the very first. Until the 
enemy shows his hand, the reserve will be held at the race 
track, whence it can quickly be moved under cover to which- 
ever flank is threatened. 

While preparing the main position with two of his bat- 
talions, shall he detach the reserve battalion, with the ma- 
chine guns perhaps, to the south to meet and compel the 
enemy to make a partial deployment, and so gain time ? Do- 
ing so would have all of the disadvantages inherent in the 
occupation of an advanced position. Unless the battalion 
sent forward were to break off its delaying action at exact- 
ly the right moment, it would find itself unable to do so, and 
in the presence of six times its numbers would, if it rejoined 
at all, come back a badly beaten command. Then not 
only would the battalion itself be unfit for much more that 
day, but the morale of the whole regiment as well would be 
greatly lowered by this partial defeat. The machine guns 
also can do better work by getting themselves well into posi- 
tion and intrenched for the main engagement. This does 
not, of course, mean that Colonel A will fail to cover his 
working parties by outposts. But it does mean that these 
outposts will be so weak that they can do little more than 
send in timely warning of the enemy's approach in strength, 
and give his patrols some trouble in locating the main po- 
sition. 

By the time Colonel A had come to his decision it was 
nearly eleven o'clock. Shall he turn out the troops as soon 
as the order can be issued and have them work the remain- 
der of the night in preparing the position? He decides 
against the idea. Although at night there is much lost mo- 
tion he would perhaps have better trenches when the fight 
begins, but his men instead of being fresh would meet the 
enemy tomorrow tired and disgusted. And it is men that 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 53 

will win the fight, not trenches. He decided to start the 
regiment at 4 :00 o'clock, and ordered reveille for 3 :00. 

Actions and Orders, Regimental Headquarters 

The colonel immsdiately directed the quartermaster 
to pick up such tools for entrenching as could be found in 
Gettysburg, and have them at camp by 4:00 a. m. ; also to 
hire wagons for carrying the three days' additional rations 
still on hand. 

The outpost w^as notified at once of the new enemy. 

Then the colonel telegraphed as follows : 

1st Inf., Gettysburg, 

18 June, 11:00 p. m. 
Chief Staff, 
Carlisle. 

Defeated Red regiment continued retreat to Emmitsburg today. 
Two fresh hostile regiments marched from Emm.tsburg this after- 
noon, camped at Fairplay. I will intrench a pos.t.on one mile south of 
Gettysburg at daybreak. If remainder brigade unable to get up in 
time shall decline decisive engagement and withdraw north of Gettys- 
burg. 

A, 
Colonel. 

At 3:30 a. m. June 19, the colonel issued verbal orders 3:30 a. m. 
to the assembled commanders of battalions, machine gun 
company, and staff, as follows : 

The Red regiment we defeated on the 17th has withdrawn in dis- 
order to Emmitsburg. But two fresh hostile regiments marched from 
Emmitsburg yesterday afternoon, and camped at Fairplay last night. 

The remainder of the 1st Brigade is coming to reinforce us. Its 
leading sect'on should arrive by rail about 10:00 o'clock this morning. 

This regiment will prepare a defensive position extending from 
Seminary Ridge to the southern portion of knoll 606. 

The 2d Battalion will prepare from Seminary Ridge, inclusive, 
to the southern porton of the large orchard 600 yards southwest of 
the E. Trostle farmhouse, exclusive. 

The 3d Battalion, from that orchard, inclusive, to knoll 606, in- 
clusive. 

The Machine Gun Company will send a platoon to report to each 
of these battalions. 

Standing trench will be d"^g. 

The 1st Battalion will send Company A to the 2d Battalion to 
assist in clearing the foreground along Seminary Ridge. I will or- 
der B Company to report to the 3d Battalion for similar work as soon 
as it is relieved from outpost. 

The 1st Battalion (less Cos. A and B) will march at 4:00 a. m. to 
take over the outpost duties, and will secure the line J. Musser-cross- 
roads 580. Upon a hostile advance in strength the outpost will check 
the enemy, and wit^^out becoming seriously engaged, will retire be- 
hind the flanks of the main line. 



54 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The Quartermaster has obtained tools in Gettysburg which he 
will divide among organizations in accordance with the duties allot- 
ted them. 

The field trains will assemble in this field ready to march at 
5:00 a. m. Combat wagons when emptied will be returned to this 
field. 

Messages to E. Trostle. 

The colonel directed the quartermaster to load the 
surplus rations on hired wagons and add them to his field 
train. 

He caused regimental headquarters to be established 
at E. Trostle shortly after 4:00 o'clock; but followed the 2d 
Battalion to Seminary Ridge, and, after learning from its 
commander of the manner in which he intended to prepare 
and hold his section, went then to the 3d Battalion for a 
similar conference there. He agreed with their disposi- 
tions, pointing out, though, to both the necessity for flanking 
the front by machine gun fire, not only of their own com- 
panies, but in each case of the companies of the other bat- 
talion, as far as the ground permitted. 



Outpost Arrangements and Orders 

Major B, 1st Battalion, issued verbal orders to the cap- 
3:45 a. m. tains of Companies A, C, and D, and his staff, at 3 :45 a. m. : 

The Red regiment that we defeated has retreated to Emmitsburg 
in disorder. Two fresh hostile regiments marched from Emmitsburg 
yesterday afternoon and camped at Fairplay last night. 

We are to be reinforced today by the remainder of our brigade. 

The Regiment will prepare a defensive position about a mile 
south of this camp. 

Company A will report to the 2d Battalion to clear the fore- 
ground of that battalion's position. 

Companies C and D, under my command, will secure the general 
line Geo. Spangler — J. Musser — Pitzer S. H. 

Company C will march at once to crossroads 580; whence it will 
provide security from Willoughby Run to the Peach Orchard, inclusive. 

Company D will proceed to J. Musser to secure the line Peach 
Orchard, exclusive, Round Top, J. Eckenrodes. 

The outpost will prevent hostile patrols from reconnoitering the 
Regiment's position, but will withdraw, at my order, upon the advance 
of the enemy in strength. 

Do not issue extra ammunition. Combat wagons will remain 
here. 

Field wagons will report, ready to march, to the Quartermaster at 
5:00 a. m. 

I will take station on Round Top, with which signal connection 
will be made. The signal F. B. addressed to a company will be the 
order for its withdrawal. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 55 

Dispositions and Orders, Company C 

The captain formed the company at 4 : 00 a. m. in march 
kit, and proceeded by the Emmitsburg Road. At N. Codori 
the company was halted while he questioned the outguard 
there for further information of the enemy. Nothing new 
having been learned, he issued orders, at 4:20 a. m., to his 4:20 a,m. 
lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, as follows : 

The Red regiment defeated by us on the 17th has retreated in 
disorder to Emmitsburg. Two fresh hostile regiments marched from 
Emm.tsburg yesterday, and camped at Fairplay, aboc^t 5 miles south- 
west of us. We are to be reinforced today by the remainder of our 
brigade. 

The regiment is preparing a defensive position on the rise behind 
us. 

Companies C and D outpost the command; D Company has the 
sector east of us. 

This company is assigned the sector from Willoughby Run to 
include some five or six hundred yards east of this road (Emmits- 
burg). We will march now on crossroads 580, nearly a mile down 
the Emmtsburg Road. 

Lieut. R (1st Lieut.), take the 1st squad ahead as the point. 
Move rapidly until you have gained a distance of 400 yards, when 
the company will follow you. 

Approaching crossroads 580, the captain called up his 
2d lieutenant, and at 4 :40 a. m., directed : 4:40 a. m. 

The company will take station near the crossroads a few hundred 
yards ahead. 

Take the last six squads, and Sergt. L, by the road to the right 
to a station, as Picket No. 1, about midway between Willoughby Run 
and this road. Secure from Willoughby Run to the first ridge west 
of the Emmitsburg Road, inclusive. Stop hostile patrols. If the 
enemy advances in strength, the company will fall back to Seminary 
Ridge through the timber to our right rear. You will join us near 
the southern corner of that timber (pointing to the patch 600 yards 
northwest of J. Smith). 

The captain then had word passed up by the connecting 
files to the point for Lieut. R to join him ; and at crossroads 
580 directed that officer: 

The company takes station here. Post Corporal Y's squad (the 
point) on the next ridge, as outguard No. 2, and then rejoin. Lieut. 
S (2d Lieut.) has taken the road to the right to secure from the first 
ridge west to Willoughby Run. D Company will probably have troops 
on Round Top, and at Devils Den. The corporal will fire on any 
Red detachment. If the enemy advances in strength, he will fall back 
on the company. 

The captain directed the leading corporal of the main 
body: 



56 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Station your squad, as outguard No. 3, at the southern corner of 
this orchard, east of the Lmmitsburg Road and south of the road lead- 
ing from this crossroad to the east. Prevent any hostile patrols from 
working through the timber from the south. Corporal Y has a squad 
on the next ridge of the Emmitsburg Road (pointing toward J. Rose), 
the company will be on this knoll (587), and D Co. will probably have 
men within 3 or 4 hundred yards east of you, and at Devils Den and 
on Round Top. 

He next conducted the company to the road just north of 
knoll 587, on which knoll he intended to deploy if resistance 
towards the south became necessary; posted a sentry 
thereon, and signallers to get connection by flag with Round 
Top, and by semaphore with Lieut. S (Picket No. 1). He 
started a patrol of 2 men by the road to the east, to get con- 
nection with D Company and learn of its nearby dispositions. 
A sergeant with a couple of men was sent to reconnoiter the 
line of retreat across country to the north, and then by the 
unimproved road towards Seminary Ridge; and to cut all 
fences that might interfere with the company's withdrawal. 
The remainder of the company stacked arms and rested 
nearby. 



Dispositions and Orders, Picket No. 1 

Lieut. S (2d Lieut.) turned his six squads to the right 
at crossroads 580, and clearing the Emmitsburg Road, halted 
them. He directed the leading corporal: 

Get two hundred yards distance to the west with your squad, at 
double time, as point of this detachment. Take the left hand road at 
the fork ahead. 

When clear of the woods southwest of knoll 589, the 
lieutenant halted the detachment, and directed : 

Corporal R (who had the point), take your squad to a station near 
the western edge of this timber (the patch 300 yards south of east of 
PItzer S. H.) and south of this road, from which you can watch the 
road along the stream (Willoughby Run) 6 or 7 hundred yards west 
of us. Fire on any hostile patrols that attempt to work north. I am 
going with the bulk of the platoon beyond the timber to the south. 

Corporal L, take your squad to the southern edge of that clump 
of t'mber (pointing to the one on the 589 ridge to the southeast) . Es- 
tablish semaphore connection with the company at the crossroads 
where we left them, and with me in the timber south of this point. 
Prevent the advance of any hostile patrols from the south. 

Corporal M, double time ahead with your front rank through the 
timber directly south of us. Halt when you reach open ground on the 
other side. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 57 

Leaving one man in the road to direct messengers to 
iiim, he then conducted the remainder of the detachment to 
the southern edge of the timber on the small nose 600 yards 
northeast of J. Biesecker. There he posted one man up a 
tree with glasses in observation to the south, a double sentry 
at the bend in the road through the timber 200 yards east 
of the platoon, one man north of the road to connect v^ith 
the squad on the ridge to the east, and one at the timber 
corner 200 yards to the west to connect with the squad 
watching Willoughby Run. The remainder of the men were 
in the farm road where it crosses the nose located above. 



Dispositions and Orders, Company D 

D Company marched at 4:00 a. m. straight south on 
the Taneytown Road, and halted to question the outpost 
if anything further had been heard of the enemy. 

At the outguard near roadfork 545, the captain as- 
sembled his officers and non-commissioned officers, and 
ordered : 

The Red regiment defeated by us on the 17th has retreated in 
disorder to Emm.tsburg. Two fresh hostile regiments marched from 
Emmitsburg yesterday afternoon and camped at Fairplay, about 5 
miles to the southwest. We are to be reinforced by the remainder of 
the brigade today. 

Our regiment is preparing a defensive position north of us. 

Companies C and D outpost the command; C Company has the 
sector west of us. 

This company will secure the line Peach Orchard, exclusive, 
Round Top, wooded knoll I mile to the left front (532 near J. Ecken- 
rodes). 

The first six squads, and Sergeant M, under Lieut. J (1st Lieut.) 
will proceed rapidly down the Taneytown Road and will take station, as 
Picket No. 2, on Round Top. Secure the sector from Devils Den, ex- 
clusive, to the Taneytown Road, inclusive. 

Lieut. K (2d Lieut.) will take the next four squads by the farm 
road to the right to the knoll above Devils Den, as Picket No. 1, and 
will secure from the nose just east of the Peach Orchard, inclusive, 
to the eastern fork of Plum Run. 

I will take station with the rest of the company at the J. Musser 
farm about I mile south of this point. 

Hostile patrols will be prevented from penetrating the screen. 
Watch the Emmitsburg Road for opportunities to check the enemy by 
long range fire. Upon a hostile advance in strength, the outpost will 
retire at the major's order. D Company will rendezvous at this 
roadfork. 

Battalion headquarters is going to Ro^md Top. 

Semaphore connection will be established with J. Musser. I will 
put a relay station for Picket No. 1 on Little Round Top. 



58 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The two pickets moved out at once on the routes as- 
signed to them, each throwing out a point of one squad by 
orders similar to those used in C Company. The right 
picket (No. 1) sent one squad to knoll 548, just west of the 
wheatfield, and one on to the nose and near the western 
branch of Plum Run, due west of knoll 561 (Devils Den). 
The lieutenant and 3 men took station on knoll 561, one 
watching Round Top, and one the country to the southwest. 
The remainder of the picket was posted in the timber in- 
side the fence corner just west of the crest of knoll 561. A 
patrol of two men was sent to connect with C Company. 

The picket on Round Top had an extended view in all 
directions. The lieutenant there posted one man in obser- 
vation of the ground from the Hoffman farm to Rock Creek, 
and another watching from the Hoffman house to Willough- 
by Run, paying particular attention to the Emmitsburg 
Road. He sent one squad due west to the nose 400 yards 
from the summit of Round Top, directing its leader : 

Take station on the nose about 400 yards west of this summit 
to prevent any hostile patrols from passing between Plum Run, below 
us, and this point. Fire on any Red patrols that you see. The enemy 
is likely to appear soon on the Emmitsburg Road over there. When 
he does, I shall open fire from this hill. 

The lieutenant and his range finders estimated the dis- 
tance to the J. A. Wolfe and the Vaughan farmhouses, and 
to crossroads 540 and 450. He noted the mean of the esti- 
mates obtained to each for use if the enemy appeared in 
the vicinity. 

Battalion headquarters was established just north of 
the crest. Two signal stations were posted, for concealment 
a short distance down the northern slope. One quickly es- 
tablished semaphore connection with D Company's station 
on the J. Musser house, and the other by wigwag with C 
Company at crossroads 580. The sergeant major was in 
charge of these stations, the remainder of their personnel 
being furnished by the detachment of D Company on the 
hill. The horses of the battalion were held a little farther 
down the slope, and the two orderlies were kept in readiness 
to deliver messages mounted, if for any reason, there was a 
hitch in the signals. 



SKETCH NO. 6. Outpost. A. M. Juno 19. 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 59 

The captain of D Company marched the six squads left 
with him about 500 yards behind the detachment going to 
Round Top. Approaching the J. Musser farm, he detached 
two men to the top of Little Round Top to relay messages 
from the Devil's Den knoll. He sent a sergeant, two mu- 
sicians, and a private to the top of the J. Musser house. One 
musician there maintained connection with Round Top, and 
one with Little Round Top. The sergeant watched the 
Taneytown Road and country to the south. A messenger 
was to be left on the ground, but he went first with the 
company to locate its station. 

The company halted in the road between the orchards 
west of knoll 532, stacked arms, and rested except for one 
sentry thereat, and a cossack post on knoll 532 which ob- 
served the sector Taneytown Road — J. Eckenrode farm. 

The entire outpost was in position by 5 :20 a. m. (See 5:20 
Sketch No. 6). 



In this outpost we find dispositions differing radically 
from those for the night of the 17th. Then, there was a 
beaten enemy whose only thought apparently was to escape. 
Three sentry squads in observation on the three roads by 
which the enemy might return, with an occasional patrol 
between these detachments, and a single mounted patrol to 
hang on to the defeated regiment, furnished ample strength 
for the first line. Now, with a superior enemy who can be 
expected to advance aggressively, no such simple measures 
will suffice. The present outpost has not only the duty of 
furnishing sufficient warning to the main body of a hostile 
approach, but, since the whole desire of the regiment at 
present is to gain time, must interpose an effective screen 
against the reconnaissance of his detachments. These 
greatly different conditions require both much greater total 
strength in the outpost and a very different distribution of 
troops therein. With no intention of resisting the deter- 
mined advance of any large body of the enemy, no particular 
strength is required on the line of supports, and no reserves 
at all are necessary. But since every effort must be made to 
prevent the small patrols of the enemy from breaking 
through, the first line to offer resistance, that is, the line of 



60 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

observation, must be relatively strong and its parts well 

connected up. 

The ground very much favors this work of screening. 
By the occupation of the Round Tops, and the ground east 
and west of the northern one, the enemy can tell nothing of 
what is happening beyond them until he has penetrated or 
broken this line. Round Top, itself, if rather strongly held, 
should alone cause the enemy considerable delay. For no 
large body can march by without first taking it, because 
long range fire therefrom will reach the Emmitsburg Road, 
and the most convenient roads and crossroads directly south 
of it. The ground likewise facilitates withdrawal without 
loss. By dropping back a few yards, all of the detachments 
can place themselves under cover, and the companies find 
convenient routes by which to pass by the flanks and uncover 
the front of the main position. 

The outpost commander has also taken an unusual posi- 
tion, in front, rather than behind his line of supports. His 
important duty is the determination when to withdraw. 
Unless that withdrawal is accurately timed, and the detach- 
ments move off practically together, some will be caught by 
the enemy and lost. The major has taken the position 
which most favors a proper decision, and concerted move- 
ment. 

Exact coordination of this movement requires a sys- 
tem of prompt and unfailing communication. Great care 
is therefore taken in the establishment of such throughout 
the outpost. The flag will well serve to both companies. 
The semaphore, at 900 or a 1,000 yards, will have no diffi- 
culty in transmitting from battalion headquarters to D Com- 
pany, and the larger flag using the Morse Code, at about 
1,900 yards to C Company. No attempt will be made, 
after once getting communication, to send any lengthy 
messages. The first appearance of the enemy will be re- 
ported from Round Top, and then the system kept clear for 
the withdrawal signal. If for any reason, there is the 
slightest hitch with the flags, the major has the mounted 
messengers in reserve. 

The supports at crossroads 580, and at J. Musser, are 
there not to reinforce the line of observation, or to fight 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 61 

where they are ; but simply by their fire to assist the with- 
drawal of their outguards, if any of the latter require such 
assistance. 

But little patrolling is required until the enemy begins 
to appear. Then patrols will be used to ambush or drive off 
hostile patrols that are threatening to penetrate the screen. 

Actions and Orders, 2d Battalion 

The 2d Battalion was formed, in march kit, at 4 :00 a. m. 
A Company reported. The major had previously directed 
the senior captain to divide the tools obtained from the 
quartermaster among the companies, and then to march 
the battalion by the farm road west of camp to that road's 
southernmost end. The major with his adjutant and order- 
lies galloped ahead for a hurried reconnaissance of the 
ground. That made, he sent his adjutant to meet the bat- 
talion, halt it south of the farm road it was marching on, and 
direct its captains and the officer commanding the machine 
guns to join him on Seminary Ridge, and to order the issue 
of ammunition. 

The major on that ridge (he is about at "n" in the word 
Seminary, 3-inch map), at 4:20 a. m., issued the following 4:20 a.m. 
orders : 

The hostile regiment we defeated on the 17th has retreated in 
bad shape to Emmitsburg. But two fresh Red regiments marched 
from Emm.tsburg yesterday afternoon, and camped last night near 
Fairplay, about 5 miles south of this point. 

The remainder of the brigade begins to arrive in Gettysburg by 
rail at 10:00 o'clock this morning. 

Our regiment prepares a defensive position extending a little 
so""th of east from this point. The 3d Battalion is on our left with its 
right in that large orchard (pointing to the one 350 yards to the 
east). The 1st Battalion (less 2 cos.) is outposting an east and west 
line a mile or more to the south. 

This battalion will prepare a position from the southern point of 
the large orchard, exclusive, to this ridge, inclusive. 

Company E will intrench the low rise with its right about 250 
yards southeast of this point. It will be prepared to fire to the south 
towards that low knoll (572) and up the draws to the southeast. It 
will also be able to bring the fire of not less than one platoon to the 
west into the draw south of this point. 

Company F will intrench across Seminary Ridge at this point to 
fire to the south. 

The machine guns will be posted in the F Company line at the 
crest of the ridge and be prepared to bring fire over the whole sector 
from the wooded knoll (586) due west to the railroad line to the east. 



62 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Company G, with its left about 100 yards west of this point 
("n" in Seminary), will intrench to fire to the south and southwest. 

Standing trench will be dug. 

All axes of these three companies will be turned over to H Com- 
pany v/hich will clear Seminary Ridge in front of F Company to the 
cross fence north of the ravine. H Company will send one squad to in- 
trench the Battalion Headquarters. It will also send a combat patrol 
of two squads to the bare knoll (522) a thousand yards to the west. 

Company A will start at the cross fence north of the ravine and 
clear to the south. Fill the ravine with timber. Construct a strong 
obstacle along the stream line to the junction 400 yards west of the 
ridge. Station a small security patrol well to the south of your work- 
ing parties. 

Battalion Headquarters will be established at the fence corner one 
hundred yards north of this point. Get semaphore connection there- 
with. 

The major then directed the adjutant to send the empty 
combat wagons back to the camp ground, to intrench the 
headquarters station, to arrange the system of communica- 
tion with each first line company and with H Company, 
which will probably be stationed north of the hedge to the 
right rear of G Company ; and by semaphore or wigwag with 
regimental headquarters at the E. Trostle farmhouse. The 
major then rode the line from left to right to make certain 
the company commanders had understood and were locating 
their trenches in accordance with his orders. He also care- 
fully reconnoitered the timber and orchards on Seminary 
Ridge, north of the battalion's position, with a view to with- 
drawal, if to do so became necessary. 



Orders and Arrangements, Company E 

The commanding officer of E Company stacked arms 
and removed packs a few yards back of the position as- 
signed that organization ; and with his platoon commanders 
roughly marked out the line to be intrenched. He then 
issued the following orders to his officers and non-commis- 
sioned officers: 

The Red regiment we defeated on the north side of Gettysburg 
has retired in disorder to Emmitsburg. Two fresh hostile regjnents 
came out of Emmitsburg yesterday afternoon and camped last night 
about five miles southwest of us. 

The remainder of our brigade will reinforce us today. Our 
regiment prepares a defensive position along this line. Two com- 
panies of the 1st Battalion have an outpost a mile or more to the 
south. F Company is on Seminary Ridge to our right, and the 3d 
Battalion on our left. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 63 

This company will dig a standing trench along the indicated line, 
by platoon, in order from the right: First, Second, Third and Fourth. 

Dig squad trenches first, and then connect around traverses. 

The First platoon will be prepared to fire into the ravine to the 
right, and the Fourth towards the farmhouses to the southeast (N. 
Codori). The Third platoon will send a squad to construct shelter 
for the company commander. 

Corporal K with three men of his squad will take station on the 
low knoll to the front (572) in observation of the co.mtry to the south 
thereof. A Company will probably have a security detachment to 
your right. 

Sergeant M, with the remainder of Corporal K's squad, will 
measure and mark distances to the crest to the south and southeast, 
and into the ravine to the west. 

The musicians will get semaphore connection with Battalion 
Headquarters, which is to be established near that fence corner 
(pointing to one near "y") on Seminary Ridge. 

The captain then indicated to the squad from the 3d 
Platoon where shelter, about 20 yards back of the center of 
the line, was to be constructed for the captain, and for 
the musicians about 3 yards to his right and his left. The 
right musician was entirely protected from the front, his 
whole business being to communicate with battalion head- 
quarters. The left musician watched the platoons and con- 
stituted the agent of communication therewith. The chiefs 
of platoon were similary intrenched 4 or 5 yards behind the 
centers of their respective platoons. Having watched the 
beginning of work, the captain, after the major's visit, went 
to the company of the 3d Battalion, which could be seen at 
work in the orchard, to find out if any other arrangements 
for support were desirable beyond the flanking fire of the 
left platoon already provided for. 

The orders and arrangements in the other companies 
of the battalion resembled those in E Company, and there- 
fore need not be noted here. 



Actions and Orders, 3d Battalion 

As soon as the major of the 3d Battalion received the 
regimental order, he directed the senior captain to form the 
battalion at 4:00 o'clock, receive the tools from the quarter- 
master, and then march the battalion to E. Trostle. Like 
the commander of the 2d Battalion, he then rode foi-ward 
with his adjutant and orderlies to reconnoitre the ground. 
The battalion reached E. Trostle at 4 :25 a. m. The captains, 4 :25 a. m. 
including B Company's, and the commander of the machine 



64 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

guns, were assembled at the farmhouse on the western side 
of knoll 606, ammunition being issued during their absence 
from the battalion. Orders were issued as follows : 

The regiment we defeated on the 17th, has retreated to Emmits- 
burg in disorder. Two fresh regiments came out of Emmitsburg yes- 
terday afternoon and camped some five miles south of us last night. 

The remainder of our brigade will reinforce us today. The regi- 
ment intrenches an east and west line through this point. The 2d 
Battalion is on our right. Two companies of the First are covering 
us in the vicinity of Ro and Top. 

This Battalion will intrench from the large orchard to the right, 
inclusive, (pointing to the one 600 yards to the west) to this knoll 
(606), inclusive. 

Company I will intrench near the southern end of the orchard to 
fire to the south and southwest. 

Company K will intrench the nose to our right rear, with the com- 
pany's left about 100 yards west of the Emm.tsburg Road, to fire to 
the south. 

Company L, with the machine guns, will intrench the southern 
end of this knoll (606) to fire over the sector included between the 
Emmltsburg and Taneytown Roads, both inclusive. The machine 
guns will also be prepared to bring flanking fire across the front of all 
trenches clear to Seminary Ridge. 

Company M will intrench the south slope of Cemetery Hill so as 
to be able to fire on both sides of the Taneytown Road, and across the 
left of L Company's trenches. This company will send one squad to 
battalion headquarters. 

Company A will clear the foreground of L Company to the south 
and southeast. 

Empty ammunition wagons will return to the camp ground. 

Battalion Headquarters at this house. Semaphore communica- 
tion therewith-. 

The major then directed the adjutant to arrange bat- 
talion headquarters, and open communication with the com- 
panies and regimental headquarters. Starting with L Com- 
pany, he inspected the locations selected by the companies. 



Orders and Arrangements, Company L 

Upon receipt of the major's order, the captain of L 
Company sent the musician, that had accompanied him, back 
to guide the company and the machine gun platoon to the 
southern part of the orchard on knoll 606. The captain 
went himself to look over the ground. When the company 
approached, he had arms stacked, and packs removed. He 
called up several men with picks and rapidly drew out on 
the ground the line to be occupied ; and marked the limits of 
the two sections into which he proposed to divide the line. 
He then assembled his officers, non-commi ssioned officers, 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 65 

and the commander of the machine gun platoon, and di- 
rected : 

The Red regiment defeated by us north of Gettysburg has retreated 
to Emmitsburg in bad shape. Two other Red regiments marched from 
Emmitsburg yesterday and camped last night about five miles south- 
west of us. 

We are to be reinforced by the remainder of the Brigade today. 
Our regiment is preparing a defensive position extending to the west 
from this knoll. 

Part of the 1st Battalion has an outpost near Round Top. The 
2d Battalion is on our right. I Company is in the large orchard west 
of us, and K Company on the nose 500 yards to our right rear. 

This company will construct standing trench on the line I have 
marked out: The machine guns in the center, the 1st and 2d Platoons, 
under Lieut. K, on the right, the 3d and 4th Platoons, under Lieut. L, 
on the left. The right half will be prepared to fire over the ground 
from the low knoll to our right front (584), inclusive, to the one to 
the south (566), exclusive. The left half, from the draw to the south 
(towards A. Trostle's) to include the farmhouse southeast of us (Mrs. 
Buck). 

The machine guns will be intrenched to bring fire from the ravine 
through Seminary Ridge due west of us to the farmhouse southeast 
of us (Mrs. Buck). 

Sergeant B, with four men from the 2d Platoon, will mark the 
ranges to the wooded knoll (592) to the south, and the low one with 
the farmhouse and orchard thereon to the southwest (pointing to 
J.Smith). 

The 3d Platoon will send six men to this point to intrench the com- 
pany commander's station. 

The musicians will establish semaphore connection with Battalion 
Headquarters at the yellow farmhouse (pointing to the one south of 
E. Trostle). 

Events of the Morning to 9:30 o'clock 

Hostile troops were seen from Round Top shortly be- 
fore 6:00 o'clock marching north on the Emmitsburg Road 
through Greenmount. By 6:30, the enemy's leading ele- 
ments were west of Round Top. The detachment thereon, 
shortly afterwards, opened fire with combined sights on 
what appeared to be the support of a battalion in advance 
guard. It seemed to obtain a few hits, and halted the ad- 
vance guard in some confusion. At 6:40, two or three Red 6:40 a. m. 
companies started towards Round Top from the direction of 
J. A. Wolfe. By 8:00 o'clock, hostile detachments of some 8:00 a.m. 
size were working up the southern and western slopes ; while 
firing over on the Emmitsburg Road, indicated that the ene- 
my was also pushing his reconnaissance against C Company. 
The major then signalled "F.B" to each of his companies. 
The companies in turn signalled their detachments to with- 



6 :30 a. m. 



66 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

draw, and the entire outpost began a nearly simultaneous 
movement straight to the rear along the previously selected 
and reconnoitered routes. The right company, C, moved 
rapidly in column due north to the orchard, two hundred 
yards from crossroads 580 ; and then under its cover, down 
the draw into the timber, 700 yards northwest of J. Smith. 
The squad that had been stationed as an outguard at J. Rose, 
followed as a rear point, deployed as skirmishers at 5 yards. 
The rear point halted on reaching the timber. The company 
moved up the road a couple of hundred yards, and waited for 
the six squads that had been on the 589 ridge to come in ; 
then continued the march by the wood road and the draw, 
west of Seminary Ridge. 

The left company, D, moved immediately upon receiv- 
ing the signal to withdraw by the Taneytown Road to cross- 
roads 545, and there waited for the detachments at Devils 
Den and Round Top, which came in promptly and without 
loss. The march was then continued north, leaving a single 
squad on knoll 592 to remain in observation until a hostile 
advance should compel further withdrawal. 

The Red patrols closely followed the Blue outpost, and 
9:30 a. m. by 9 :30 a. m. were feeling out, and had drawn fire from, the 
Blue position from Seminary Ridge to the Taneytown Road. 
All of the Blue covering detachments to the front had come 
in. The working parties in front withdrew upon the ap- 
proach of the outpost companies. 

Regimental Commander's Orders for Defense of the Position 

As soon as Major B (outpost commander) was certain 

that his companies were starting the withdrawal, he and his 

staff rode rapidly north on the Taneytown Road and to reg- 

8:25 a. m. imental headquarters at E. Trostle. There at 8 :25 a. m. he 

received the following verbal orders from the colonel : 

We will defend the position we have prepared. Assemble your 
battalion in reserve at the race track. Put a squad in observation on 
Culp's Hill. Have them connect by flag with this building (E. 
Trostle). Send a platoon to the vicinity of Willoughby Run on the 
Hagerstown Road. Get semaphore connection from your battalion 
with this building. 

8:30 a.m. At 8:30 a. m., the colonel had manifold copies of the 

following delivered by mounted orderlies, to the 2d and 3d 
Battalions: 



SKETCH NO. 7 Defence Position June 19. 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 67 

1st Inf., E. TROSTLE, 

19 June, 8:30 a. m. 8:30 a.m. 

F. O. No. 10. 

1. Our outpost has withdrawn before strong hostile forces ad- 
vancing on EMMITSBURG ROAD. 

2. We will defend the position as prepared. 

The 1st Bn. will assemble in reserve at the racetrack. It is 
sending patrols to gulp's hill and to WILLOUGHBY RUN on the HAGERS- 

TOWN ROAD. 

A, 
Colonel. 

1st Inf., E. TROSTLE, 

19 June, 8:45 a. m. 8:45 a. m. 

Captain Q. (Regtl. Q. M.) 

Enemy advancing in force on EMMITSBURG ROAD. We defend posi- 
tion. Send Band and combat wagons, 2d and 3d Bns., to central 
SQUARE, GETTYSBURG, at disposal Surgeon. Conduct field train by 
westernmost streets GETTYSBURG to BOYD S. H. 

By order, Colonel A: 
X, 

Adjt. 

Note : Band had been left at the camp of the preceding night. 
Actions and Orders, Battalion Commanders 

Upon receipt of the colonel's verbal instructions at 
8 :25 a. m., Major B (1st Bn.) said to his adjutant: 

Ride over to Seminary Ridge. Direct A and C Companies to 
proceed to the racetrack, where the battalion assembles in resei*ve. 
Have C Company send a platoon to Willoughby Run, on the Hagers- 
town Road, to cover our right flank. Send your orderly with that 
platoon for messenger duty. I will direct B and D Companies to go to 
the race track. 

B Company was found on the Taneytown Road, east of 
knoll 606, and directed to proceed to the racetrack. It was 
told to send immediately one squad with a flag to Gulp's Hill 
to remain in observation to the south and west. This squad 
was to communicate directly by flag with regimental head- 
quarters at the E. Trostle house. 

The major of the 3d Battalion received F. O. No. 10 at 
8 :32 a. m. At 8 :35 a. m. he had signallers semaphore simul- 
taneously to the three first line companies, and immediately 
afterwards to M Company : 

Enemy advancing. Occupy trenches. 

The 2d Battalion received the order at 8:35 a. m. A 8:35 a.m. 
and H Companies had quit work and were then under cover 



68 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

300 yards northwest of the station of battalion headquarters, 
and their captains were with the major, where they had gone 
for instructions. The major had his three first line com- 
panies (the machine guns are with the center company) 
semaphored: Enemy advancing. Occupy trenches. He then 
read F. 0. 10 to the officers with him, and said : 

Captain A. Go on to the racetrack. Captain H. Your company 
will take station in support north of the hedge to the right rear of G 
Company. Bring in your patrol from the right flank, as soon as the 
1st Battalion gets a platoon out there. 

(See sketch No. 7 for details of position.) 



WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION 



At 10:15 a. m., the colonel received the following mes- iO:ir> a. m. 
sage: 

Mt. Holly Springs, 

19 June, 9:30 a. m. 
Colonel A, 

Gettysburg, 
Mountain Creek bridge down. Am detraining at Mt. Holly 
Springs. Cannot move south before tomorrow, 

B, 
Brig. Gen. 

By 10:20 a. m., the Reds had deployed a practically io:20 a.m. 
continuous firing line extending from knoll 566, west of the 
Taneytown Road, south of the N. Codori houses, over knolls 
572 and 577, and into the large orchard southwest of Semi- 
nary Ridge. (Sketch 8). Over nearly the whole front, 
the opposing firing lines were rather hotly engaged. 

The message above leaves Colonel A no choice but to 
withdraw. His chances for victory against at least twice 
his strength, if he should fight to a decision, would be any- 
thing but good. In trying to save Gettysburg, he must not 
run the risk of a failure in his true mission, which requires 
him 'to keep an unbeaten regiment between the enemy and 
the rest of the division. Since he is going to withdraw, he 
must start to do so at once. The more closely he allows his 
command to become engaged, the more difficult and costly 
will be the withdrawal when finally made. 

His orders follow: 



At 10 :20 a. m., by messenger : 



1st Inf., E. TROSTLE, 

19 June, 10:20 a. m. io:2(^ a. m 



Major B: (1st Bn.) 
Regiment withdraws. Place 1st Bn, vicinity hagerstown road, 
west of SEMINARY RIDGE, to cover withdrawal remainder regiment. 

A, 

Colonel. 
69 



70 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

1st Inf., E. TROSTLE, 

19 June, 10:25 a. m. 
10:25 a.m. Captain Q: (Regtl. Q. M.) 

Regiment withdraws. Conduct field trains at once via west 
branch Carlisle road to north side conewago. 

By order, Colonel A : 
X, 
Adjt. 

1st Inf., E. TROSTLE, 

10:30 a. m. 19 June, 10:30 a. m.. 

F. O. No. 11. 

1. Remainder our Brigade delayed north of Gettysburg. 

2. Regiment will withdraw to- boyd s. h. 
•S. (a) 3d Bn. at once via Gettysburg. 

(b) The 2d Bn. will withdraw when 3d Bn. clears gem. 

HILL. 

(c) 1st Bn. takes station on hagerstown road, west of seMt 
INARY ridge, to asslst withdrawal 2d Bn. 

4. Regtl. Hq. will accompany the 3d Bn. 

A, 
Colonel. 

Manifold copies of Field Orders, No. 11, were delivered 
b}^ mounted messengers to the 2d and 3d Battalions, receipt 
being acknowledged at once by semaphore. 

The colonel then verbally directed the surgeon, who had 
heard these orders read before signature : Start what wounded 

you have collected at once to the north. 

It seemed best to the colonel to break off the action 
rather in the custom.ary manner, that is, by starting first the 
troops of the fighting line that were farthest from the ene- 
my, in this case the 3d Battalion. If, on the contrary, he 
10 :2<t a. m. had caused the 2d Battalion to lead, the enemy, who at 10 :20 
a. m. was only a few hundred yards from it, by following- 
its retiring lines closely, would almost immediately have 
found himself on the flank of the 3d Battalion. The right 
companies of the 3d Battalion then would have had con- 
siderable difficulty in getting away. But with the 3d Bat- 
talion retiring first, the enemy's lines behind that battalion 
had much farther to go, and consequently much more time 
must elapse before they could pass the flank of the 2d Bat- 
talion. He might have started the two battalions at the 
same time, but the 2d Battalion, from the nature of the 
ground, would probably have gotten away a little earlier than 
the 3d, with a somewhat greater chance, consequently, of 
trouble for the 3d Battalion. By moving off a battalion at a 



SKETCH NO. 8. Si+ua+ion At lOio a. M. June 19. 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 71 

time, the regiment will more naturally and promptly take up 
the march in retreat from Boyd S. H. under cover of a regu- 
larly constituted rear guard By leaving the battalion most 
closely engaged to the last, he is continuing the troops now 
having the hardest duty, in the most responsible and diffi- 
cult position. But of course. Colonel A's thought must be 
for the security of the greatest number. If to save two 
battalions it is necessary to sacrifice the third, he must not 
hesitate to do so. In the case at hand, however, he is not 
making any such choice. By reason of the favoring ground 
behind most of its companies, and the assistance of the 1st 
Battalion, there should be no particular difficulty in the 2d 
Battalion hanging on for some little time, and yet in get- 
ting away finally without much loss. The colonel, of course, 
might have made the escape of the 1st and 3d Battalions 
absolutely safe, by starting those at once straight to the 
north, leaving the 2d to extricate itself as best it could. 
That, however, would have jeopardized the 2d Battalion to 
an entirely unnecessary extent. The 1st Battalion can 
quickly be gotten into position well out on the threatened 
flank, from which it can bring fire against the enemy as he 
comes into the present position of the 2d Battalion, and 
thereby be of the utmost assistance to the latter. The 1st 
Battalion in turn will find the ground behind it well fitted 
for an orderly retirement. 

It will be noted that the colonel ordered his regiment 
to retreat to Boyd S. H., or, in other words he named that as 
the rendezvous or assembly point. Boyd S. H. is about 3^ 
miles away. By the time the bulk of the regiment reaches 
that point, they should have shaken off the enemy to the ex- 
tent at least, that an orderly retreat with a regular rear 
guard will be practicable thereafter. Such a point must be 
at a considerable distance, or the enemy may make it im- 
possible for the fractions of the command to stop there. 
On the other hand, it should be no farther away than is 
necessary to make sure it will serve its purpose, since the 
command, as quickly as possible, should be reassembled and 
brought under control. 

That distance will naturally vary w^ith the size of the 
command, aggressiveness of the enemy, ground^ etc. 



72 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

No route to Boyd S. H. is assigned to the 2d Battalion. 
What will be best for that battalion depends very largely up- 
on what the enemy does, and therefore should be left to its 
immediate commander. 



Actions and Orders, 3d Battalion 

10:32 a.m. The Order for withdrawal was received at 10:32 a. m. 
The major had I and K Companies semaphored : Withdraw 
at once to racetrack, and L Company : I and K withdraw. L and 
guns cover movement, and finally, M Company : Bn. withdraws. 
M covers movement. 

The major watched the withdrawal of I and K Com- 
panies. When the last men of I Company cleared the or- 
chard which that company had defended, he semaphored L 
Company: L and guns withdraw. 

He then sent his adjutant to the racetrack to bring I 
and K Companies into the Taneytown Road east of the race- 
track, while he personally directed the captain of L Com-^ 
pany: 

You will move rapidly on with your company to the Taneytown 
Road east of the racetrack, pick up I and K Companies, and continue 
the march with them to Boyd S. H. I am going to direct M Company 
to secure the Battalion's march, and then I'll join you. Send the 
machine guns to M Company on Cemetery Hill.. 

Crossing over to M Company he directed its captain : 

The regiment is withdrawing to Boyd S. H., this Battalion lead- 
ing. I and K Companies are now near the racetrack. L Company 
is passing your right. The machine guns have been ordered to join 
you. Follow L Company as rear guard at one half mile. 

From Cemetery Hill the major watched the enemy's 
advance for a few minutes, and then galloped north in time 
to join the battalion shortly after the three companies had 
united. 

The movement of the 3d Battalion to the rear might 
have been expedited by starting M Company at the same 
time as I and K. But that would have left L Company to 
shift for itself ; and if the enemy happened to realize at once 
what was being done, and advanced rapidly from the N. 
Codori houses, unless he was checked by fire from the di- 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 73 

rection of E. Trostle or Cemetery Hill, L Company would 
have been placed in serious straits. 

Actions and Orders, I Company 

The trench of I Company was almost entirely within 
the large orchard, and about 10 yards back from its southern 
edge. 

The captain, at 10:40 a. m., signalled his platoon com- i0:4(« a. m. 
manders : Assemble personally. They ran in quickly to with- 
in earshot. The captain directed : 

The company withdraws. Detail one experienced man in each 
squad to remain behind under Lieut. X (1st Lieut). Lieut. X will 
cover our retirement by taking up rapid fire with these men until the 
company has been gone 5 minutes, and will then follow. When you 
have made up your details signal "ready." The company will move 
to the rear at my signal "Cease Firing, To the Rear." 

At 10:45 a. m., the company started back, moved a ]0:4^ a.m. 
hundred yards in line of skirmishers, then in squad columns 
at a walk to the north edge of the orchard, and thence to the 
northeast. The main body of the company assembled in 
column of squads 400 yards northwest of H. Bishop and 
marched to the racetrack. Lieut. X's party followed at 
some 600 yards, deployed as skirmishers at six paces. 

K Company's movement to the rear was similar, cover 
being obtained at once behind the crest immediately north 
of the trenches. The machine guns with L Company were 
turned on the hostile lines in front of I and K to check any 
hostile tendency to follow them. When L Company received 
the signal to start, the machine guns w^ere carried by hand 
to the animals, which were in the timber east of battalion 
headquarters. L Company followed almost immediately 
under cover of accelerated fire from a thin line left for a 
few minutes in the trenches. 

Actions and Orders, M Company 

The trenches of M Company were high up the south- 
ern slopes of Cemetery Hill — just below the 620 foot contour 
— ^with the timber in front well thinned out. Upon receipt 
of the semaphore message from the major to cover the 
withdrawal of the remainder of the battalion, the captain 
directed his 1st lieutenant: 



74 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The battalion is withdrawing; this company covers the movement. 
Take your platoon to the Emmitsburg Road ne^r that farmhouse 
(pointing to E. Trostle). Open fire whenever the enenly offers a 
target. I'll remain here for the present. 

The captain assembled the remaining platoon comman- 
ders, told them of the withdrawal and M Company's task, 
and then with them watched its progress. Immediately 
after the major had detailed the company as rear guard, the 
machine guns were brought up at a trot. The captain then 
11:07 a.m. at 11 :07 directed : 

The machine guns will take station on the crest of this hill 
(Cemetery), and open fire at once upon any hostile target that is 
offered to the southwest or south. 

Lieut. K (2d Lieut). Move north under cover east of the crest 
(of Cemetery Hill) with the 3d and 4th platoons to the nearest house 
of Gettysburg on the Baltimore Turnpike. Be prepared to support 
our withdrawal by fire when we move from this hill. ,; 

The 2d platoon will remain in the trenches. Open fire at once 
on any hostile detachments that appear to the south. 

I'll remain here. 

11:18 a.m. At 11:18 a. m., L Company disappeared in the streets 
of Gettysburg. The captain of M Company immediately 
directed the machine gun commander to trot north on the 
Baltimore Pike and go ahead of Lieut. K (the 2d lieut.) 
through Gettysburg, and to tell Lieut. K to keep moving 
directly on Boyd S. H. He semaphored the 1st lieutenant : 
Withdraw, follow L Company; and when the movement had 
begun, directed the 2d platoon to follow the bulk of the com- 
pany by the Baltimore turnpike as rear party. The captain 
then met the first lieutenant near H. Bishop, and directed 
him to continue as right flank guard by the Taneytown Road 
and on through Gettysburg. The captain hurried ahead to 
join his 3d and 4th platoons. 



It will be remembered that the 1st Battalion had a 
patrol of eight men on Gulp's Hill. These saw the first 
movements of the regiment in retreat. The non-commis- 
sioned officer in charge realized, however, that his position 
facilitated observation of the hostile movements, and that 
he had an excellent covered line of retreat up Rock Creek, 
which would probably not be cut by the enemy for some time. 
Or, when that was cut, he could cross Rock Creek and rejoin 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 75 

by a somewhat greater detour. He therefore remained in 
observation until the enemy's leading detachments were 
actually entering Gettysburg and a hostile patrol ascending 
Stevens Hill. No difficulty was then experienced in with- 
drawing along Rock Creek and joining, finally, his proper 
battalion some miles to the north. 



Actions and Orders, 2d Battalion 

The commander of the 2d Battalion received the regi- 
mental order to retire at 10 :35 a. m. He immediately sema- lO-'^s a.m. 
phored: E withdraw to north; then directed his adjutant: 

Meet E Company near the orchard to the northeast (pointing to 
the one at Q. McMillor house). Direct Captain E to continue north 
to the railroad crossing of the Mummasburg Road. Then go on 
yourself to the nose west of the National Cemetery. I am ordered to 
withdraw when the 3d Battalion clears the National Cemetery. I 
want you to keep track of its progress and semaphore me when its 
last company passes the Cemetery. Report your arrival on the nose. 

He next semaphored to F Company : 
Guns help withdrawal E Co. and 3d Bn. 

The following message was carried by the major's or- 
derly to F and G Companies in turn : 

2 Bn., 10:45 a. m. 10:45 a.m. 

Captains F and G: 

The regiment is withdrawing — 3d Bn. leading. 1st Bn. takes sta- / 
tion to our right rear to cover our withdrawal. 

Machine guns will assist retiring companies 3d Bn. by heavy 
fire on the enemy in front those companies. 

F and G Cos. will withdraw at my signal "To the Rear." I will 
semaphore the machine guns to go just before the companies. 
Acknowledge receipt by semaphore. 

C, 
Major. 

The major watched the withdrawal of I and K Com- 
panies, and saw enough of the movement of L Company to 
know when that company started. The Red firing lines 
were unable to 'make much progress between the N. Codori 
houses and knoll 572 to the west thereof, because of the very 
effective flanking fire of the machine guns with F Company. 

At 11 :00 a. m. he sent the following message to H Com- n :oo a. m 
pany, which by this time was firing against a considerable 
extension of the Red lines to the west : 



76 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

2d Bn., 11:00 a. m. 
Captain H: 

Regiment withdraws. 1st Bn. is west of seminary ridge ou 
HAGERSTOWN ROAD to cover movement. Start your company at once 
bv route near seminary ridge to hagerstown road. 

C, 
Major. 

11:30 a.m. At 11:30 a. m., he semaphored F Company: Guns with- 
draw; and three minutes later he signalled: To the Rear, to 
Companies F and G. 

E Company moved promptly to the rear upon receipt 
of the major's semaphored order to withdraw, in line of 
skirmishers at a walk, under cover of the very rapid fire of 
two men from each squad, and of the machine guns on Sem- 
inary Ridge, When the company reached shelter along the 
railroad to the north, the covering party followed, opening 
out to 4 or 5 paces between men. Nevertheless the company 
suffered severely, losing ten men during the five or six 
minutes required to reach cover. The major wished he 
could get this company into position on the nose southwest 
of the racetrack to check the enemy with its fire if the Reds 
should follow F and G Companies too closely, but he recog- 
nized that E Company must drop many men in its move- 
ment to the rear, and that an attempt to stop a shaken com- 
mand prematurely, might lead to an entire loss of control. 
He therefore placed its rendezvous point a good two milec 
to the rear. 

When the time came for the machine guns to go, they 
were carried by hand under shelter of the timber along the 
ridge crest to their animals, which were south of the Q. 
McMillor house. The platoon then trotted ahead to the 
Lutheran Seminary. 

At the major's signal, to the rear, F and G Companies 
went rapidly back into the timber behind their trenches, 
taking advantage of the small folds in the ground for partial 
protection, and covered like most of the other companies by 
the rapid fire of a thin line, left in this cas^ to follow at a 
couple of hundred yards only. In the timber the companies 
formed squad columns, and continued rapidly along the 
ridge. 

After starting these companies, the major hurried north 
to the horses near Q. McMillor, found H Company, and or- 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 77 

dered it to continue near the railroad towards Boyd S. H. 
At the Lutheran Seminary he directed F and G Companies 
to follow the first two (E and H), F Company leaving the 
the equivalent of a platoon 600 yards behind as a rear guard. 
North of the Mummasburg Road he halted the leading com- 
panies until the four had closed, and then continued, still 
with the small rear guard, to Boyd S. H., where the battalion 
arrived at 12 :40 a. m. 12 :40 p. m. 

Near roadfork 560, the major met the adjutant of the 
1st Battalion, from whom he learned of that battalion's dis- 
positions. The major then placed the machine gun platoon 
at the disposal of the 1st Battalion. At the suggestion of 
the adjutant the machine guns continued north to join A 
and B Companies. 

Actions and Orders, 1st Battalion 

Major B received the order at 10:30 a. m. The com- i^ -^^^ ^ "^• 
pany stacks were east of the racetrack, in close line facing 
south. The major had the battalion fall in and assembled 
his captains; then ordered: 

The regiment is withdrawing. This battalion covers the move- 
ment from the Hagerstown Road west of Seminary Ridge. Lieut. Y 
(Bn. Adjt.), take my orderly and trot ahead to Seminary Ridge. We 
will issue ammunition at once. 

The issue made, he directed the empty wagons to pro- 
ceed at once to Central Square in Gettysburg, and report to 
the surgeon or his representative thereat. The major then 
conducted the battalion in column of squads straight for 
roadfork 560. 

At roadfork 560, the major directed his adjutant, who 
was waiting there, to examine the ground to the west to in- 
clude knoll 559; and the captain of A Company, at 10:50 
a. m. : 

C and D companies will deploy on the rise a half mile west of 
this point to check the enemy. Take A and B Companies north by 
the Lutheran Seminary to the Chambersburg Road, and to a position 
for firing dovni the draw west of us in support of C and D Companies 
when they withdraw. 

At 11 :00 a. m., when the center of C and D Companies 11 :00 a. m. 
was directly north of hill 559, the major halted the battalion, 
assembled the captains on the crest, pointed out the indica- 



78 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

tions to the south of the 2d Battalion's engagement, and 

directed : 

Captain C : Take command of these two companies. Deploy them 
along this crest (559), and open a heavy fire in support of the 2d 
Battalion as soon as the enemy gives you a target. Send parties from 
each company to reconnoiter and prepare routes for your withdrawal 
through the timber to the north (pointing it out). Notify your pla- 
toon on our right to fall back along Willoughby Run when you retire. 
I am going to place A and B Companies at the head of this draw (the 
one immediately east of 559) to support you, and will return to you 
in a few minutes. 

The major then galloped north to knoll 574, which A 
and B Companies were then approaching from the south- 
east. After a hurried reconnaissance of the vicinity, the 
major assembled the captains and directed: 

The right of our 2d Battalion is about 2000 yards down this draw 
near the short strip of timber. C and D Companies, from the knoll 
where they now are (pointing to 559) will check the enemy and then 
withdraw through the timber to our right front. I want you, Captain 
A, to assist the retirement of C and D by the fire of these companies. 
Place an observation station on the wooded knoll east of us to watch 
Gettysburg and to the south. I want information of the progress of 
the 3d Battalion through Gettysburg, and of the 2d Battalion, 
which will probably come north by the Lutheran Seminary. Have that 
post also keep careful track of the enemy's progress in pursuit. I will 
leave you an orderly (mounted) to bring me word of what is seen. I 
am going to reconnoiter the ground behind us and then go to C and 
D Companies. 

The orderly left was the one that had been with C Com- 
pany's platoon near Willoughby Run. The major rode rap- 
idly back to J. Forney, He promptly decided to bring 
C and D Companies, upon retirement from knoll 559, into 
positions east of, and about the J. Forney house to assist 
A and B Companies, which would retire from 574 by covered 
routes a little west of north. He then galloped back to the 
small knoll north of 559, where the sergeant major estab- 
lished battalion headquarters, and opened semaphore com- 
munication with both wings of the battalion. The adjutant 
was sent with the remaining orderly to roadfork 560 to re- 
port the passing of the 2d Battalion. 
13 :io a. m. The deployed companies on knoll 559, about 11 :10 a. m. 
saw H Company start north along the western edge of the 
timber on Seminary Ridge, and hostile lines about the same 
time moving north across the farm road west of the southern 
point of the ridge. Fire was opened in a few moments on 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 79 

the hostile lines, using combined sights at twelve and thir- 
teen hundred yards. 

At 11 :40 a. m., the adjutant semaphored from the road ii:40 a. m. 
bend west of the Luthern Seminary Tail Past. Red lines 
were about 800 yards away down the draw, but the enemy 
was evidently gaining ground more rapidly in the timber 
on Seminary Ridge. The flanking platoon, whose fire had 
15een heard for the last twenty minutes, was crossing the 
Hagerstown Road in retreat. At 11:47 a. m., when the hai a.m. 
enemy had gained another hundred yards in the draw, and 
was nearing the Hagerstown Road to the southwest, the 
major signalled : To the Rear. The companies immediately 
moved back in one line due north to the timber, and through 
it, by the routes previously reconnoitered. Each company 
was covered by half a dozen scouts who remained on 559 till 
the company reached the timber, and then followed in a 
wide deployment. 

The major conducted these companies at a rapid pace 
up the draw west of knolls 574, 576 and 577. When the bat- 
talion (2 companies) approached the Mummasburg Road, 
the machine gun platoon that had been with the 3d Battalion, 
reported, its commander saying, that the colonel had ordered 
it out from Gettysburg by the Mummasburg Road. The 
major, at 12:12 p. m. directed: 12:12 p.m. 

A and B Companies have an observation station at the wooded 
knoll (582) to the south. D Company will take station at the orchard 
east of this draw prepared to fire to the south, and to the southeast. 
C Company will take station near the house (J. Forney) west of us, to 
fire towards the knoll on which A and B Companies now are. The 
machine guns will go to the knoll to the north (642) and into position 
for firing on the sector from Barlow knoll east of us to Willoughby Run 
to the west. I am going to A and B Companies, which will withdraw 
under cover of the nose west of us. 

By this time the observation station on knoll 582 had 
reported that both the 2d and 3d Battalions were past the J. 
Forney position, and that only small parties of the enemy 
had come north of Gettysburg. A and B Companies and the 
machine guns therewith were engaged with hostile lines 
south of them. The major galloped back to the vicinity of 
knoll 574, directed the commander of the machine guns 
to move rapidly north under cover (west) of the J. Forney 
nose and join the remainder of the company on knoll 642. 



80 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

He caused the companies a few minutes later, to retire to 
the heavy timber to the north (the timber northwest of J. 
Forney). This withdrawal was made in much the same 
manner as that of the other two companies from knoll 559. 
12:36 p. m. By 12 :35 p. m., A and B Companies were on the Mum- 
masburg Road 300 yards northwest of J. Forney, with a 
sentry squad in observation at the southwest "angle of the 
woods thereat, and a cossack post on the Mummasburg Road 
at their western extremity. The machine guns and C and 
D Companies were, as the major had ordered, on and south 
of knoll 642. The enemy had not yet appeared in an> 
strength in front of the J. Forney position. Battalion head- 
quarters was on knoll 642. The major sent the following : 

1st Bn., J. FORNEY farm 

n. W. GETTYSBURG, 

19 June, 12:40 p.m. 
Colonel A: 

1st Bn. and machine guns in position on J. FORNEY farm. Have 
had few casualties. Enemy has to present time only patrols north of 
GETTYSBURG, and has not yet advanced in any strength against my 
position here. If compelled to withdraw, shall do so along oak ridge. 

B, 
Major. 



THE RETREAT 



Regimental headquarters had retired with the 3d Bat- 
talion. When the northern limits of Gettysburg were reach- 
e3, the colonel directed the major of that battalion to send 
the machine guns out on the Mummasburg Road to Oak 
Ridge, to find and join the 1st Battalion. Even before the 
2d Battalion reached Boyd S. H., it was evident that the 
regiment, as had been anticipated, could be assembled there 
and marched thence in route column under the protection 
of a regular rear guard. The field wagons, combat wagons 
and ambulances with the wounded, had long before disap- 
peared in the direction of the Conewago. At 12:50 p. m., 
the 2d and 3d Battalions were resting at Boyd S. H., under 12:50 p. m. 
the immediate protection of three small detachments, when 
Major B's (1st Battalion) report of 12:40 came in. The 
follwing order was then issued verbally to the battalion com- 
manders present : 

Orders, Regimental Commander 

The destruction of a railway bridge near Mt. Holly Springs has 
compelled General B to detrain there. The 1st Battalion and machine 
guns have withdrawn without much difficulty and ten minutes aia:o 
were at the southern end of Oak Ridge. 

The Regiment will retire in the direction of Biglerville. 

The 2d and 3d Battalions, in that order, will march at once. 

The 1st Battalion and machine guns will follow as rear guard. 

I will march at the head of the 2d Battalion. 

Form your battalions. 

The message below was returned by the orderly that had 
brought the 1st Battalion's report: 

1st Inf., BOYD S. H. 

19 June, 12:55 p. m. 12:5^ p.m. 
Major B: 

The destruction of a railway bridge near mt. holly springs has 
compelled General B to detrain there. 

The regiment is retiring towards biglerville. 
1st Bn. and machine guns, as rear guard, will follow upon receipt 
of this message. 

Leave patrol to maintain contact with the enemy. 

A,* 
Colonel. 
81 



82 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Orders, Commander Rear Guard 

When the major received the coloneFs message, the 
enemy had two or three companies deployed along the 
fence through knoll 577, and in the timber east of 577 ; C and 
D Companies were partially deployed and firing on these 
troops, while the machine guns were holding several Red 
companies by fire on the 522 — Almshouse ridge. The cap- 
1:10 p.m. tains assembled on knoll 642. At 1:10 p. m., the major 
ordered: 

The destruction of a railroad bridge near Mt. Holly Springs has 
compelled General B to detrain there. The Regiment marched about 
fifteen minutes ago from Boyd S. H. towards Biglerville. 

We form the rear guard. 

Company A, the Machine Gun Company, and Companies B and 
C, will constitute the reserve, and will march at once, in the order 
named, along the crest of Oak Ridge and the railroad, to come into 
the Carlisle Road a mile and a half north of Boyd S. H. 

Company A will send a strong officer's patrol along the Mummas- 
burg Road to the ridge half a mile west of this, and then north by 
the road on that ridge. 

Company D, as support, will follow at 500 yards. It will leave 
a patrol of 4 men to remain in contact with the enemy. 

I will be at the head of the support. 

D Company had one platoon deployed at the southern 
edge of the orchard west of the M. McLean farmhouse. The 
remainder of the company was in support on the north side 
of the orchard. The captain assembled his officers and the 
non-commissioned officers of the three platoons in support, 
1:17 p.m. and at 1:17 p. m. directed: 

General B has been compelled to detrain at Mt. Holly Springs 
by a broken railroad bridge. Our regiment is retiring towards Bigler- 
ville. The 1st Battalion constitutes the rear guard. A company is 
sending a strong patrol along the ridge half a mile west of this one. 

The rest of the battalion is marching north along this (Oak) ridge. 

This company forms the support. 

The 1st Platoon will constitute the rear party and will follow the 
company at 200 yards. 

Sergeant B, take the 5th squad under cover to the farmhouse 
(J. Forney) west of us. Check any hostile troops that may attempt 
to advance from the south or southwest. Retire at the same time as 
the rear party and join it on top of the ridge north of us. 

The captain had the company fall in, started connect- 
ing files to keep in touch with the reserve, and then marched 
through the orchard west of knoll 642. When near the 
crest he directed Sergeant M : 

1 want you to remain in touch with the enemy with three men of 
the 6th squad. Retire north along the ridge only as his advance 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 8S 

compelis you to, and no farther than is necessary. Continue on, how- 
ever, to join the company at dark. The regiment is marching by the 
west branch of the Carlisle Road. Information is wanted not only 
of the hostile movements on this ridge, but of the enemy's movemewt^ 
to the east as well. 

The rear party sent connecting files, about 30 yards 
apart, to follow the company, and moved to the rear at the 
prescribed distance. 



A Halt — Orders and Actions, Regimental Commander 

At 2:00 o'clock the 2d and 3d Battalions were passing- -'^^* p- "^• 
over the eastern nose of Hill 707. The field and combat 
trains had been reported as halted in column just north of 
the Conewago. The rear guard seemed to be a couple of 
miles behind. One message had been received from its com- 
mander, sent after passing west of Boyd S. H., which re- 
ported that although the rear gu^rd had had no difficulty 
so far in its retirement, yet hostile troops were following 
both directly along Oak Ridge and on the Carlisle Road. 

The colonel decided to halt, not only to let his rear guard, 
which was becoming dangerously isolated, close up, but 
also to get a better idea of the enemy's intentions. He 
had no idea of continuing to run if there was not to be 
an aggressive pursuit by superior forces. Moreover, the 
ground that had been reached, was well suited for adminis- 
tering a check to the enemy if necessary to help out the rear 
guard, or to make trouble for an in-expert pursuer. 

He accordingly massed the regiment in the field to 
the east of the road north of the 707 ridge, and directed the 
majors : 

We will halt here for at least one hour. The 3d Battalion will 
place a squad in observation on the hill to the west (707) and another 
beyond the timber east of us. 

The colonel then sent the following message : 

1st Inf., 1 mile south of Texas 

19 June, 2:05 p. m. 
Major B: 

The regiment is halting for at least one hour. 

Close up the bulk of your rear guard to the crossroads h mile 

west of GOLDENVILLE. 

A, 
Colonel. 



84 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The adjutant then notified the quartermaster that the 
regiment would halt for at least one hour. 

A March Outpost — Orders, Commander of the Rear Guard 

Major B received the order when near the Hamilton 
farm. For some time the battalion had seen no hostile 
detachments. The major dropped back at once to the 
captain of D Company, and directed : 

The regiment is making a long halt northwest of the large hill 
(pointing to 707). 

This battalion will halt at the crossroads a mile north of us. 

Leave a platoon on this ridge, and join the Battalion with the 
rest of your company. 

I will direct one of the mounted orderlies to remain with that 
platoon for messenger duty. 

At crossroads 621, he turned the battalion west into 
the scattered trees nearby, formed close column, stacked 
arms, called out that time would be given here for lunch, 
and assembling the captains, when D Company came up, 
directed : 

The regiment halted beyond the crest north of us. D Company 
has left a platoon on the ridge a mile to the south. 

D Company will also send a squad to the crossroads 500 yards 
west of this point, and one to the nose a half mile east of Goldenville. 
It will place an observation station at the crossroads (621), and one 
oh the hill (707) north of us. 

With the excellent view obtainable from hill 707 for 
a long distance to the south, very little is required for proper 
security. Nothing would be gained under the circumstances 
by leaving a company to the south, anywhere short of the 
Hamilton Ridge, since it could see nothing from a sta- 
tion north of that ridge that cannot be seen from hill 707. 
The major had no intention of offering resistance to a hos- 
tile advance in strength south of the Goldenville-Mummas- 
burg Road. The platoon at Hamilton was simply a patrol 
to keep in touch with the enemy, made strong enough to 
maintain its position in the face of the enemy's reconnoiter- 
ing patrols, but not so strong that it would be tempted 
to remain in the face of larger hostile forces. The two 
squads, east and west, were sent out, directly from the sup- 
port, to stop any Red patrols that might work around the 
platoon at Hamilton's and escape detection from hill 707. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 85 

In addition, the colonel covered the flanks of the main body 
of the regiment by two small detachments, the western one 
of which will now be relieved by the party Major B has or- 
dered to hill 707. 

A Halt for the Night 

At 3:10 p. m., report was received from the lieutenant 3:io p. m. 
at Hamilton's that the enemy, except by small patrols, had 
made no advance north of the stock farm, or the knoll 
(636), one-half mile w^st of it. 

Whatever may be the intentions of the enemy, whether 
Gettysburg simply is his objective, or he intends ultimately 
to continue farther to the north, it is hardly likely that he 
will do the latter today. The colonel decides, therefore, to 
put his tired regiment into camp. To obtain somewiiat 
greater safety for the main body, and also to give the men 
the benefit of the Conewago for bathing, he will take the 
main body to the north side. While that stream is not 
much of an obstacle, the division's advance later will still 
be facilitated if he can hold its crossings open. The colonel 
consequently will leave a strong outpost south of the stream. 

He issued, at 3 :20 p. m., the following verbal orders to 3:20 p. m. 
the three majors : 

Lieut. X, who is down near the Hamilton farm, reports that the 
enemy has not come north of the Stock Farm with anything stronger 
than small patrols. 

We will go into camp. 

The 1st Battalion and the Machine Gun Company will camp near 
Texas and secure the heights (hill 707) south of us. If attacked, 
these heights will be held. 

The remainder of the regiment will camp in the field north of the 
Conewago, and west of the Carlisle Road. 

Captain A (adjutant) will ride ahead to place the company flags. 

The wagons will join the troops. 

Form your battalions. 

The colonel then marched the regiment to camp. At 
4:30 p. m., he directed the majors of the 2d and 3d Bat- 4:30 p.m. 
talions to send their adjutants to report for an all-night 
patrol. To them, he said : 

The enemy seems to have made no advance north of the Stock 
Farm, except in small patrols. 

I want to know his strength and dispositions near Gettysburg, 
and whether other troops are following the detachment we met this 
morning. 



8^ STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Lieut. K, get three orderlies from the detachment commander, 
and proceed at 6:00 p. m., by routes well to the east of Rock Creek 
until east of Gettysburg, tp obtain this information. 

Lieut. L, you will also take three orderlies and proceed at the 
same time, by routes generally west of Oak Ridge until west of Get-. 
tysburg, for the same purpose. 

Let me have reports by 5:00 a. m. tomorrow. 

The colonel started his reconnoitering patrols at this 
hour, 6:00 o'clock, so as to allow time for the care and rest 
of the animals, and for the men to get their supper. The 
necessity for such improvisation of mounted patrols for 
an infantry regiment is, of course, by no means frequent. 
This regiment is in a very abnormal situation in civilized 
warfare, first, in being detached; and second, when de- 
tached, in not having some cavalry with it. 

The colonel forwarded the following telegraphic report 
from Biglerville: 

No. 2 
1st Inf., Camp just north of Conewago, 
South of Biglerville, 

19 June, 5:00 p. m. 
General B, 
Mt. Holly Springs. 

Two hostile regiments attacked my position south of Grettysburg 
this morning. Upon receipt your No. 1, I started withdrawal. Ef- 
fected with little loss. Enemy followed only some two miles north of 
Gettysburg. 

Have my outpost south of Conewago. Unless hard pressed will 
keep open nearby crossings that stream. 

My combat wagons are empty. Request at least two hundred 
thousand rounds ammunition be sent to Biglerville. 

A, 
Colonel. 

Outpost 

Major B, after receiving the coloneFs halt order, re- 
turned to his battalion near crossroads 621, assembled his 
SMI p.m. captains, and at 3:30 p. m., directed: 

Lieut. X reports that no hostile detachments larger than patrols 
have come north of the Stock Farm. Our regiment is moving into 
camp just north of the Conewago. 

This Battalion and the Machine Gun Company outpost the com- 
mand. 

Company C, and one platoon of the machine guns, will take 
station on the ridge north of this point (the 707 ridge) to secure the 
sector Goldenville— 5 forks, 1500 yards west of the Carlisle Road. 
In case of attack, the company will hold the 707 ridge. Signal com- 
munication from the 707 hill to Texas will be established. A platoon 
will be sent to relieve D Company's post at the Hamilton farm. The 
mounted orderly now there will remain all night. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 8T: 

The remainder of the outpost will camp at Texas. : 

C Company's rations and baggage will be sent to the Company. 

Return the wagon immediately to Texas for the night. 

The major marched the battalion to Texas, and campe^ 
in the field northwest thereof. He had A Company place a 
cossack post on the unimproved road towards Table Rock 
Station at the bend 250 yards east of Texas, and one at 
the 703 roadfork southwest of camp. He also placed a sig- 
nal station on one of the houses of Texas for communication 
with hill 707. 



Actions and Orders, Support Commander 

The captain of C Company at 3 :40 p. m. assembled his 3:40 p. m. 
officers and non-commissioned officers, and the lieutenant in 
command of the machine guns, and directed : 

Lieut. X reports that no hostile detachments larger than patrols 
have come north of the Stock Farm. The regiment camps north of 
the Conewago ; the remainder of the battalion at Texas, three-quarters 
of a mile north of this point. 

This company and the platoon of machine guns, as the support of 
the outpost, take station on the ridge to the north. 

The following outguards will be posted at once: 

Corporal B, with his squad, as No. 1, at the five forks (679) three- 
quarters of a mile west of us. 

Corporal C, with J, K, and L, as No. 2, at the crossroads (648) 
500 yards west of this point. 

M, with the remainder of Corporal's C's squad, as No. 3, at the 
roadfork (621) on the Carlisle Road. 

Corporal D with N, and P, as No. 4, at the railroad crossing 
in Goldenville. 

Lieut. B with the 4th platoon will relieve Lieut. X at the Hamilton 
farm, a mile and a quarter south on the Carlisle Road. The mounted 
orderly will remain all night with this post for messenger duty. Get 
flag communication also with hill 707. Send small patrols as far south 
as Boyd S. H. 

Lieut. R. (M. Gun Platoon) will reconnoiter positions on hill 707 
for sweeping the approaches from the south. 

Corporal R will take four signallers to the hill top (707), and 
establish communication with Texas, each of the outguards, and Lieut. 
B's detached post. 

The captain then conducted the company and the ma- 
chine gun platoon to the north side of the small grove north- 
east of hill 707. Arms were stacked. One observer with 
glasses was put on the house, wuth a messenger below. The 
animals were taken, one-half at a time, to water west of 
Texas. Water for the men was obtained from the farm- 
house well, over which a sentry was posted. Fires for cook- 



88 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

ing were screened in the northern edge of the timber. The 
captain directed the first lieutenant to make camp, and then 
explain the situation to the men. The captain, himself, 
looked over the ground to decide upon positions for defence, 
and then visited the outguards beginning with No. 1. At 
each station, he made sure that the men understood the situa- 
tion, that the outguard was posted to best advantage; he 
indicated routes for messengers, patrols, and lines of re- 
treat if driven in ; and pointing out the station on hill 707, 
saw that the outguard had semaphore connection therewith. 
Returning to the company, he prepared the following 
report, and the sketch accompanying it (No. 9) : 

Co. C, 1st Inf., 
19 June, 4:30 p. m. 
Major B: 

Outpost as shown on sketch herewith. Detached post at Hamil- 
ton's instructed to send small patrols to boyd s. h. 

C, 

Capt. 

This message was delivered by messenger to Major B 
who forwarded it to Colonel A, adding : 

1st Bn. camped in field northwest of Texas. Will reinforce C Com- 
pany in case of attack- Cossack posts east and west of Bn. camp for 
local security. 

The reserve does no patrolling at all. Until dark none 
is done by the support. At night one patrol of 3 men goes 
each hour by Goldenville, crossroads 608, to the east, then 
towards Gettysburg by the east branch of the Carlisle Road 
to the farm road, and by knolls 651 and 654 to Hamilton, 
roadfork 630 and crossroads 648. A second patrol, also of 
three men, goes hourly by crossroads 648, roadfork 644, five 
forks 679, and roadfork 703. 

The machine guns are on the Carlisle Road during the 
night. 

On the night of the 17th, with a beaten enemy in front, 
one company, or less than one-twelfth of the regiment, con- 
stituted its outpost. Tonight, in a retreat, and with a nu- 
merically superior enemy in front, considerably more than 
one-third of the regiment is on the duty of security. But 
even in this case only one company, the one in support, is 
actually losing much rest, and of it, only about one-third of 



SKETCH NO. 9. Dispositions Night June 19-20. 




AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 89 

its members are on duty at a time. The three companies 
and a half at Texas will have about as good a night as those 
in the regiment north of the Conewago. But their presence 
there, with a comparatively short distance to go to reinforce 
the company in support, adds very greatly to the security of 
the remainder of the regiment, and to the prospect of hold- 
ing the position south of the Conewago. From these ex- 
amples, it is evident how little any set forms or rules can 
be applied to the dispositions of outposts, but on the con- 
trary, how absolutely these must depend upon the circum- 
stances of the particular case. 

Sanitary Arrangements 

When the regimental surgeon received the information 
of the advance of the hostile force from Emmitsburg, he 
immediately requested that all civilian transportation that 
could be collected, be ordered to report at the County Alms- 
house at 6 : 00 a. m., June 19th. 

On the morning of June 19th, one medical officer and 
six men were left with the wounded thereat, and with the 
approval of the colonel, the regimental surgeon distributed 
the remaining personnel as follows: 

One medical officer with the 1st and 2d Battalions. 

Two enlisted men with each company on the line. 

He, with the remaining two enlisted men, and the pack 
mule loaded with supplies necessary for an aid station, 
halted at E. Trostle. No aid station would be established 
at that time. 

The three ambulances and the combat wagons were or- 
dered to proceed to the Central Square, Gettysburg. When 
the band reported, he sent the principal musician and 9 men 
to report to the officer left in charge at the temporary hos- 
pital to assist in moving the patients, when evacuation be- 
came necessary. Of those remaining, 10 men were ordered 
to report to the surgeon of the 2d Battalion and 8 men he 
retained at regimental headquarters. 

When word was received that no more trains would 
come through to Gettysburg, the regimental surgeon im- 
mediately sent orders to the officer in charge at the County 
Almshouse to evacuate to Holly Springs, in the impressed 



950 STUDIES IN MINOE TACTICS 

transportation, all patients able to travel, leaving with the 
non-transportable cases only sufficient personnel to care for 
their immediate wants. (Nearly all of the wounded on the 
17th, of course, went out by rail on the 18th) . 

The surgeon, himself, remained with the regimental 
commander, but ordered two ambulances to advance to the 
2d Battalion, as safety would permit. The remaining am- 
bulance he ordered to E. Trostle. 

As soon as the 3d Battalion, in its retirement, reached 
the latter place, the wounded who had been brought back 
with the command, were loaded in this ambulance and it 
proceeded north in advance of the retreating force. 

On the retirement of the 2d Battalion, all wounded who 
could be transported were placed in the two ambulances 
with that section of the command. 

The six men of the band and six sanitary soldiers, then 
on duty with the 3d Battalion, were ordered to report to the 
surgeon of the 1st Battalion. 

When the outpost line was formed that night, the sani- 
tary personnel on duty with the 1st Battalion, remained 
with the battalion headquarters at Texas. 

Comment 

The advance of the new Red force immediately aroused 
fears for the safety of the remaining wounded of the 1st 
engagement ; and the regimental surgeon had to make provi- 
sions for their evacuation by road. Of course, he could 
transport a large number on the combat wagons, etc. be- 
longing to the regiment, but he desired to keep them as free 
as possible for the probable additional wounded expected. 

The assignment of the sanitary personnel to the dif- 
ferent elements of the intrenched command was made in 
such a way, that each company would be provided with sani- 
tary assistance. With such distribution, it was, of course, 
impossible to remove some of the wounded from the field, 
but at least they received first aid treatment. 

The regimental surgeon, himself, remained at headquar- 
tei's, but this location was such, that he also acted as surgeon 
of the 3d Battalion. 



AN INFANTRY REGIMENT 91 

The band was distributed in such a way that their 
services as litter bearers could be employed to the best ad- 
vantage. The ambulances and wagons, being placed in Get- 
tysburg, were out of danger during the actual fighting and 
were so placed, that they could be sent to either flank with- 
out delay. 

No aid station was established, as the line was so loca- 
ted that no one point could be selected for this work. The 
battalion detachments had to collect the wounded to such 
points as were convenient to the actual firing line. 

The regimental surgeon by ordering the immediate 
removal of the wounded by road, as soon as he was informed 
that the railroad was interrupted, provided for their safety ; 
and at least all of the transportable cases could be removed 
to the rear. Every effort must be made to prevent wounded 
from falling into the hands of the enemy. The necessary 
attendants for wounded unable to be moved, must always 
be provided for before a retirement takes place. 

By reinforcing the sanitary personnel with the 1st Bat- 
talion, provision was made for the care of the wounded in 
the section of the command which was most liable to be en- 
gaged on the retreat. A larger number of men than is 
normally provided for was detailed, so that all the wounded 
possible could receive first-aid and be removed from the 
field in advance of the rearguard. 



Part 11^ — A Battalion of Infantry 



ESCORTING A CONVOY 

On May 5, a Blue Army moving northeast in hostile 
territory has reached the line Hunters Run — Newville 
(Sketch No. 10), where it is confronted by the main Red 
forces. 

A depot for the service of the Blue army's right is 
being established at Center Mills. The 1st Battalion, 1st 
Blue Infantry, has been collecting supplies therefor south- 
east of Littlestown. It camped for the night of May 5-6, 
about 9:00 p. m., near 558 W, north of Littlestown, with a 
hundred impressed and heavily loaded wagons, whose poor 
teams are practically exhausted. Recent heavy rains have 
put all roads in bad condition. That of the Baltimore Turn- 
pike is exceptionally poor. Its bridge over Rock Creek is 
out. The nearest Blue troops are at Center Mills. The 
battalion came to Littlestown from Center Mills by way of 
Hunterstown and Boneauville. 

The feeling of the inhabitants is bitter against the 
Blues. Numerous small partisan corps exist. Otherwise, 
except for a garrison at York, no Red troops are known to 
be nearer than those of the main Red army. 

About 10 :00 p. m.. Major A, commanding the battalion, 
learns that a Red battalion marched in from Hanover and 
camped at Brushtown late in the evening. 



Battalion Commander's Estimate of the Situation 

Major A was sent out to bring to Center Mills such sup- 
plies as he could gather. He intends to accomplish that mis- 
sion if it is practicable to do so. 

In country exceedingly hostile to the Blues, the Reds 
are, without doubt, well informed of the Blue battalion's 
movements. Consequently, the Red detachment at Brush- 
town, very probably, has for its mission the capture of the 
92 



SKETCH NO. 10- 



ONewville 



Hunters o 
Run 



N 



O Center 
Mills 



O Hunterstown 



O 

Gettysburg 



O Hanover 



Littlestown 



10 



OYork 



20 25 M 
_i 1 



< 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 93 

Blue convoy. That battalion may be. alone, or it may be 
the advance of some larger command. But at best, if the 
battalion is operating alone, the Reds have still a very con- 
siderable advantage over the Blues, hampered as the latter 
are by their slov^ moving and unwieldy convoy. 

From Brushtown by Felty S. H. to knoll 647, northeast 
of Pleasant Hill S. H., is three miles ; by crossroads 601 to 
the Small farmhouse, east of Whitehall, is about 3^ miles ; 
by Square Corner to the roadfork north of the Shebley farm 
is about 4 miles ; and to the houses midvi^ay between Square 
Corner and Boneauville is also about 4 miles. With Red 
troops at any of these points, the convoy could not pass on 
the Pleasant Hill S. H. — Boneauville road. On this road, 
from 558 W to roadfork 598 is one mile ; to Whitehall is 2i 
miles; to roadfork 637 is slightly under Sh miles; and to 
Boneauville is 4f miles. The convoy is roughly a mile long. 

If the enemy starts at the same time as the convoy and 
goes at the same rate, marching by Felty S. H., he will 
reach knoll 647 twenty minutes after the tail of the convoy 
passes roadfork 598; marching via roadfork 606, he will 
reach knoll 607, southeast of the Small farmhouse, five min- 
utes before the convoy's tail enters Whitehall; via Square 
Corner, he will reach the roadfork northeast of the Shebley 
farm a few minutes before the tail of the convoy passes 
roadfork 637; via Square Corner again, he will reach the 
houses midway between Square Comer and Boneauville 
while the head of the convoy is still east of Sweet Home 
S. H. The enemy's best route for cutting off the convoy is, 
therefore, via Square Corner on Boneauville. Since this 
hostile action promises most trouble for the Blue battalion, 
it is well for Major A to make his own dispositions with 
it primarily in view. 

Now, all of these calculations are based upon the as- 
sumption that the convoy and the Red battalion start at the 
same time and proceed at the same rate. But Major A is 
well aware that the enemy, with a single unencumbered 
battalion in friendly territory, may start at a very early 
hour, or may, in fact, make a night march ; and when started, 
the Red battalion should march very much faster than the 
scratched up and unwilling train in his charge. Notwith- 



94 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

standing the bad condition of the roads, the Reds are likely 
to do a full three miles an hour, while the convoy is having 
great difficulty in doing two. From all of these considera- 
tions, it is evident that, if the enemy's objective is the con- 
voy, the latter can hardly continue by Boneauville, without 
finding some means for delaying the enemy east thereof. 

The first idea of Major A is to hook up and pull out at 
once; but that plan has to be rejected immediately. His 
animals are nearly exhausted. Some hours' rest must be 
permitted before they start once more with their heavy 
loads through the mud. Moreover, the difl^iculties of a night 
march, even if the teams could stand it, would be almost in^ 
surmountable, through the favorable conditions extended by 
darkness for intentional delays and impediments upon the 
part of the impressed teamsters. To go at once is out of 
the question. But on the other hand the march must begin 
in the morning at the earliest practicable hour. Sunrise 
will be at 5:22; dawn about an hour earlier, or at 4:22. 
To get teams ready requires the men to be up from an hour 
to an hour and a half before the starting time. To move 
much before dawn would be very difficult with such a con- 
voy. Major A accordingly concludes that 4:00 o'clock is 
the very earliest practicable hour. 

If the convoy goes by Boneauville, the Blue battalion 
will probably have to fight to obtain the time required for 
the convoy's escape. Can any other route be used that will 
avoid the necessity for fighting? The Baltimore turnpike 
is impracticable. If it were not, since the convoy is only 
half a mile nearer the center of Gettysburg than is Brush- 
town, the Reds could easily cut it off at that point. Any 
route south of the Turnpike adds to the length of the detour. 
Any such route would probably also be found in worse con- 
dition than the turnpike, and the farther down Rock Creek 
a crossing is attempted the greater the chance there is of hin- 
derance by broken bridges. While broken bridges would 
stop the convoy, they would have little effect upon the pur- 
suing Reds, who could undoubtedly cross almost anywhere. 

To send the convoy by Germantown, Two Taverns, and 
the Low Dutch Road, while marching with the greater part 
of the battalion by Whitehall and Boneauville, if the roads 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 96 

were good, at first sight would seem to offer a chance of 
escaping without a fight. But the Baltimore Turnpike is 
known to be in particularly bad condition. It crosses three 
considerable streams, Alloway and Plum creeks and Littles 
Run. The Low Dutch Road crosses a fourth. Each of 
these is an argument against the use of that route. 
Major A came down by Boneauville and Whitehall. He 
knows that road, and can make a pretty good estimate of its 
present condition. It runs along a ridge, crossing the 
streams near their sources. It should consequently suffer 
comparatively little damage under the rains, and its surface 
should dry out quickly. Major A would hardly dare to start 
his convoy over the Baltimore Turnpike — Low Dutch route 
without previous reconnaissance. That reconnaissance 
perhaps could be made tonight by one of his staff officers; 
but even if the partisans permitted the officer's return, there 
would be little left in his horse for the necessarily hard work 
of tomorrow. 

To the junction of the Low Dutch and Hanover roads, 
by Germantown and Two Taverns, from the convoy's camp 
is about Si miles. To the same junction from Brushtown 
is less than 7 miles. While the distances to Boneauville, 
from the Blue and the Red camps, slightly favor the Blues, 
these distances to the junction of the Low Dutch and Han- 
over roads are considerably against them. The route by 
Germantown and Two Taverns would consequently require 
the enemy to be engaged by a delaying force for a much 
greater period. 

Another disadvantage of the Low Dutch route is the 
fact that for some hours the convoy, and the bulk of the bat- 
talion marching by Boneauville would be separated by 
several miles, which in this very hostile territory might lead 
to the convoy's destruction by partisan corps. 

There are no continuous intermediary routes to con- 
sider. 

Has Major A a reasonable prospect of getting by Bon- 
eauville with his convoy? For, if the convoy does not get by 
Boneauville without meeting the enemy, it v^^ill not be in 
much danger of being caught thereafter. Starting at 4 : 00 
o'clock, and averaging two miles an hour, the convoy, having 



96 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

41 miles plus its own length, one mile, or 51 miles to go, will 
clear that village a few minutes before 7:00 o^clock. If 
the enemy also starts at 4 : 00 o'clock his advance, if uninter- 
rupted, would reach there, at 2^ miles an hour, at 6:00 
o'clock. For the convoy to escape, the enemy, therefore, 
must be delayed for something over an hour at the very 
least. Can this be done? 

In answering the question it is necessarj^ first to find 
out what Major A will have for a delaying force ; and this 
requires the determination of the number of men that must 
be left directly with the convoy. The convoy is divided into 
four sections of 25 wagons each. Starting before daylight, 
every single driver must be carefully watched, or some will 
find means for seriously delaying the march. This requires 
a soldier for each wagon, or 100 men for this duty alone. 
Then each section should have in addition at least one squad. 
In furnishing the wagon sentries, the service squads of the 
companies — ^the quartermaster sergeants, cooks, clerks, and 
artificers — are available, and will help to the extent of some 
twenty men altogether. By using these men, it is evident 
that a single company might furnish the police details enu- 
merated above and in addition scratch up a couple of squads 
for the absolutely necessary advance and rear guards. De- 
tailing one company only with the convoy would, however, 
leave the troops with it available for security entirely too 
few, and nothing in reserve for meeting an emergency. 
There must be something at hand to meet the unexpected, 
otherwise delays in the convoy's march are almost certain 
to occur. Major A believes it better therefore to detail one 
company plus a platoon of another as the immediate escort. 

That leaves 2f companies to be thrown towards the 
enemy to hold him up for something over an hour. If he 
has only four companies, and the Blue companies can get 
between them and the convoy and have room for one or 
two delaying actions; to gain the required time should not 
be found impossible. 

Having decided to interpose the bulk of the battalion 
between the enemy and the convoy, the first objective and 
the route thereto must be selected. For the battalion to 
march by Felty S. H. on A. Rifle would be to run the risk of 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 97 

the enemy's passing A. Rifle first, when Major A would find 
the enemy between him and his convoy. Moreover, Major 
A does not wish to get any closer to Brushtown than is 
absolutely necessary, because the chances of a fight are con- 
stantly increasing as he approaches that village, and he does 
not want to fight if a fight can be avoided. If the Blue 
battalion were to select the route at the other extreme, by 
Whitehall on Square Corner, the enemy might pick up the 
convoy behind the battalion by a march directly on White- 
hall. This might also happen if the battalion, marching by 
roadforks 610, 611, 606 and 609, were to continue on to 
crossroads 601. But if the battalion marches to crossroads 
609, near the Font farmhouse, and waits there in readiness, 
it will be able to stop the enemy if the latter marches by 
crossroads 601, or can quickly oppose him if he marches 
south by Felty S. H., or west towards Whitehall. 

Crossroads 609 can be reached in a few minutes over 
an hour. While the animals of the convoy are desperately 
tired, the men of the battalion are not necessarily so, and 
anyhow, they can be counted on to recuperate more rapidly 
with a little rest. The battalion, therefore, can start con- 
siderably before the convoy. If it were to start at the same 
time as the convoy, that is at 4 :00 o'clock, it would be 5 :00 
o*clock before it reached crossroads 609. Meantime, the 
enemy without an excessively early start could have marched 
by on the Hanover Road. Three o'clock, therefore, is the 
latest that the Blue battalion can start and have a reasona- 
ble prospect of arriving in time. Any earlier than that hour 
seems out of the question if the men, who only reached 
camp at nine o'clock and will have to be up at least an hour 
before they march in the morning, are to have any real rest. 

Having considered all the ways of escaping with the 
convoy. Major A now asks himself : Is the convoy worth the 
necessary sacrifice? Saving the convoy almost certainly 
means an engagement with the enemy ; and an engagement, 
no matter how well conducted, means the loss of valuable 
lives. Are the stores worth so much ? Would it not be bet- 
ter to destroy the convoy, and then with his unencumbered 
battalion quietly slip away to the west? The major answers. 
No. The depot must be established, and supplies therefor 



98 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

must be gathered. If a collecting detachment stops its work 
and runs every time an enemy threatens to interfere, not 
many supplies will get into the depot, and no very high opin- 
ion of Blue courage will be formed in the minds of the enemy. 
The major may yet come to the destruction of the convoy, 
but not until he has at least made an attempt to get away 
with it. 

Whether any troops are back of the battalion in Brush- 
town must be learned, and the enemy's movements must be 
watched. It is, of course, particularly important to know 
when and in what direction he marches. Major A has only 
the prescribed battalion mounts with him. These should 
be fresh tomorrow to perform the important duty of main- 
taining communication between the battalion and the con- 
voy. There is nothing left but a dismounted patrol; and 
notwithstanding the great distance to the hostile camp, a 
dismounted patrol will have to be sent. 

Major A expects to divide his command, tomorrow, into 
two main detachments : a right flank guard, and the convoy 
itself. If the whole command were larger, it would probab- 
ly be better for Major A to appoint a commander for the 
flank guard, and content himself with the general command 
of the two detachments. But he will, in any event, be with 
the flank guard as the more important detachment and, 
while there, he prefers to retain the command in his own 
hands rather than to detach a captain therefor from that 
officer's company. 

His decision consequently is: 

Three companies (less 1 platoon) to march at 3:00 
a. m., via roadforks 610, 611, 606 to crossroads 609 ; 

The convoy, under the immediate escort of IJ com- 
panies to march at 4 : 00 a. m. via Whitehall and Boneauville ; 

To send an officer's patrol at once to Brushtown. 

Except to the patrol, no orders will be issued tonight, 
because the enemy, by a night march, may make all of Major 
A's intended dispositions impracticable and leave nothing 
for him to do but turn to the west or destroy the convoy. He 
will simply have the troops quietly aroused at 2 :00 a. m. 

Before proceeding with the major's orders, it will be 
well to see what were his camp arrangements for security. 



SKETCH NO. II. Conv oy Night, May 5-6. 




a(X\"-X-"-F7I?x. 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 99 

A large body of troops obtains most of its security to the 
flanks by the lateral extension of its outpost line, and fre- 
quently by bending it towards the rear. With such exten- 
sion the detour required for any large hostile body to pass 
by an extremity of the outpost line and reach the main 
body is prohibitive. With a small body, however, that de- 
tour may not be very great, and for proper protection a 
small command may, therefore, not simply outpost towards 
the enemy, but may have to bend back the flanks of that line 
until it is practically surrounded by its security detach- 
ments. In the case at hand, because of the Red partisans, 
Major A's enemies are on all sides; moreover, he has 
them in his own camp in the persons of his impressed 
drivers. When his outposts were established, he knew of 
nothing to make the direction toward York very much more 
dangerous than any other. 

The wagons of the convoy were in a square, with the 
poles and animals inside, immediately west of the clump of 
timber north of 558 W. The square was about one hundred 
and ten yards on a side. Eight sentries were posted about 
it. The battalion was camped north of the convoy. Four 
pickets of two squads each were stationed : one on the nose 
northwest of Pleasant Hill S. H. ; one on the knoll 621, south 
of camp ; one two hundred yards northeast of 558 W ; and one 
west of the clump of timber west of camp. The timber along 
the stream lines east and west of the camp and Ash Grove 
S. H. were frequently visited by patrols. One company fur- 
nished all details. No change was made in these dispositions 
after learning of the Red battalion's camp at Brushtown. 
(See sketch No. 11). 

An Infantry Patrol 

As soon as Major A learned of the hostile battalion at 
Brushtown, he directed the captain to send him Lieutenant 
B of A Company for patrol duty. When that officer re- 
ported, the major directed : 

A Red battalion came from the east into Brushtown this evening 
and camped there. 

I want you to verify the Red strength, and find out whether they 
are followed by other troops. Also I particularly want to know when 
they march from their present camp and by what route. 



100 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Select five men from your company to go with you; and get this 
information. 

Messages will reach me at this camp until 3:00 a. m.; after that, 
with the Battalion which will march at that hour by Pleasant Hill 
S. H. and roadforks 610, 611, and 606 to crossroads 609. 

Lieut. B immediately reported the orders he had re- 
ceived to his captain, and asked by name for a sergeant, a 
corporal, and three privates. He asked also to have the 
packs of these men carried the next day by wagon. He 
caused the men to take their rations, including one cooked 
meal, and to march in the light kit. In addition to the pre- 
scribed equipment, the lieutenant took an electric torch, by 
which to read his map and write messages. The patrol 
10:30 p. m. assembled at 10 :30 p. m. The lieutenant inspected to make 
certain that the mess equipment had been so covered that it 
would not rattle. He then instructed the men as follows : 

A Red battalion camped this evening at BrushtowTi, about four 
miles northeast of us. 

This patrol is ordered to Brushtown to verify the enemy's reported 
strength, learn if any other troops are behind that battalion, and in 
particular, when the enemy marches and by what route. 

Messages are to be sent to this camp up to 3:00 o'clock; after 
that, to the Pleasant Hill S. H.— roadforks 610, 611 and 606 road, 
along which our battalion marches at that hour. 

The lieutenant issued this order with his map spread. 
He pointed out places and roads as they were named, trying 
to leave a general idea of the lie of the important roads in 
the men's minds. He then marched the patrol to the picket 
north of Pleasant Hill S. H. The picket could tell him noth- 
ing new about the enemy. There he said to the members 
of the patrol : 

We will take the road to the right (the one passing over knoll 
647). 

Sergeant B, with K, will march in advance. I will follow with S 
at ten paces ; Corporal L, with M, will follow as rear point at ten paces 
from me. 

Take about a 34 mile gait. Move quietly on the side of the road. 
Be particularly careful when passing houses, the advance leaving the 
road whenever it seems best, in order to avoid awakening the occu- 
pants. Every one should note the roads and landmarks as we go on, 
so as to be able to find his way back with messages. 

The patrol halted enroute from time to time to listen. 
Communication between its advance guard and main body 
and with its rear guard was maintained verbally in low 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 101 

tones. At crossroads 633 the lieutenant halted, passed the 
word for all to join him, then directed : 

We will move down the right-hand road to the east about a mile 
and a half until we reach the Littlestown — Hanover Electric road. 

Three improved roads branch off before coming to the electric. 
The first one goes to the north a few hundred yards from this point; 
the second one to the south a half mile out; and the third, near the 
electric, to the north. 

About half a mile west of us is a road which, with several big 
jogs, runs generally north and south. Our battalion marches by 
that road in the morning. Note the surroundings, as messages may 
have to be delivered to the battalion while thereon. 

Except for the excitation of some dogs, the march of 
the patrol to the vicinity of the electric road was without 
incident. In two or three places enroute where the tele- 
phone lines could be reached they were cut. At the electric, 
the lieutenant, about 11 :30 p. m., halted his men long enough H :30 p. m. 
to bring Sergeant B back, to direct him to take the railroad 
tracks to the vicinity of the Little Conewago, nearly a mile 
to the northeast. 

Opposite 525 W, the lieutenant signalled to move to the 
left of the railroad. Then he halted the patrol, whose mem- 
bers immediately kneeled or sat down, and going quietly up 
to Sergeant B, in a low tone directed : 

The railroad bridge is probably occupied by the enemy. Work 

quietly over with K to find out. Don't be gone more than fifteen 

minutes. I'm going to send Corporal L to investigate the wagon 
bridge east of us. I'll remain here then until you return. 

He then dropped back to the rear point and gave its 
corporal similar instructions for the investigation of condi- 
tions at the wagon bridge. The sergeant returned shortly 
and reported: 

There are several men on the east end of the bridge. I could not 
see anyone, but I heard movements, and some talking. The stream 
seems to be twenty to thirty feet wide, and has a sandy bottom. I 
didn't go into it to learn its depth. 

Corporal L also reported that 525 W was occupied by 
at least a squad. He had seen seven or eight men and 
heard a little talking. There was nothing to indicate that 
either the sergeant or the corporal had attracted the ene- 
my's attention. The lieutenant then directed : 



102 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

We will move down the stream three or four hundred yards be- 
low the railroad bridge, and ford it. 

No particular difficulty was experienced in effecting a 
crossing of the stream, which was found to be about waist 
12:10 a. m. deep. At 12 :10 a. m., the patrol was in the timber just east 
of the stream, with the point at the timber's eastern edge, 
some thirty or forty feet in advance. The private of the 
point came back to the lieutenant to report : Some men are 
coming through the field to our left. The lieutenant directed his 
men to remain absolutely quiet where they were, while he 
went up to the point. There he watched three Red soldiers 
file by a few feet outside of the timber and disappear in the 
direction of the railroad bridge. Needless to say, no effort 
was made to capture or molest any of the Red patrol, for 
firing or even shouting or a struggle, would have attracted 
attention to the presence of the Blue patrol, which, of course, 
was about the last thing desired by Lieutenant B. Even 
if it had been possible to make a certain capture of all three 
Reds without any commotion, nothing would have been 
gained to offset the burden so acquired. He then said to 
the sergeant: 

We are evidently on their outpost line. Brushtown lies about 
off there (pointing) and cannot be far away. We will go ahead in 
that direction, as quietly as possible. 

After proceeding a few hundred yards, they caught the 
sheen of some small fires behind scattered buildings immedi- 
ately ahead, and the outlines of a grove of trees to the left 
(those west of roadfork 547). The lieutenant turned the 
patrol towards the timber and halted fifty yards outside, 
while the point w^ent in to learn whether or not it was oc- 
cupied. Upon its report of no enemy therein, the patrol 
took station in the southwestern corner. The lieutenant 
then directed the sergeant: 

Take charge of the men here. Post one man in observation to the 
south, and keep everyone alert and quiet. Those fires are probably 
at the Red camp. I am going to take L with me to find out. If we 
don't return in half an hour, you will proceed to learn whether there 
are any other Red troops between Brushtown and Me Sherry stown; 
and then return to watch this camp and report when and how the Red 
battalion marches tomorrow. When we come back one of us will halt 
out there (pointing south) and whistle so (illustrating). Answer by 
a low whistle. 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 103 

Then to L, who had heard the directions to the sergeant: Follow 
me at about seven paces. 

The lieutenant moved rapidly, generally in a crouching 
attitude, but halting every few minutes to watch and listen 
for hostile sentries and patrols, by a route to the south, and 
well outside of the Brushtown enclosure. He distinctly 
made out four company streets, and as many vehicles, south 
of the V shaped streets of the village. One sentry was seen 
in the street west of the camp, and one south of it. He con- 
tinued far enough to the east to make certain that all of the 
camp south of the Hanover Road had been seen, and then 
north across that road until he was sure there were no fires 
towards the west. A faint moon, which came up about 
12:40, helped in this reconnaissance. Returning then by 
•the same route to the remainder of the patrol, which had not 
seen or heard anything during his absence, the lieutenant 
wrote the following message, lying flat on the ground, well 
within the wood, and screening his electric torch by several 
hats: 

No. 1 
200 yds. west brushtown, 1:00 a.m. 

6 May, 1:00 a. m. 
4 companies are camped in angle streets brushtown. No other 
Reds immediate vicinity. No indications yet of an early march. 

B, 
Lt. 

This was read to M and K. The lieutenant then di- 
rected M: 

You M, in charge, and K will take this message to Major A. 
Go back to camp by the route we came. You should reach camp be- 
fore the battalion marches out at 3:00 o'clock. Tell the Major I am 
going east from this point to see if there are other Red troops follow- 
ing this battalion. 

Because of the possibility of the message falling into 
the hands of the enemy, the sending detachment was not 
named therein, nor any address given, and the lieutenant did 
not put his further intentions in writing. Two messengers 
were sent. One alone, with such a distance to go in very 
hostile territory, would have too small a chance of getting 
through. 

The lieutenant said to the remainder of the patrol: 



104 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

We will now go on to the east to find out whether there are any 
other troops behind these. Sergeant B, move ahead as the point. 
Pass the Red camp about 300 yards to the south. They have a sentry 
in the street east of us, and one immediately south of their camp. S 
and I will follow you at 10 paces. Corporal L will follow us at the 
same distance. 

East of Locust Grove S. H. the patrol took the Brush- 
town — McSherrystown road. The outskirts of McSherrys- 
town were reached without discovering any indication of 
other enemies. The patrol then returned by the same route 
2:30 a.m. ^^ ^^e timber west of Brushtown, where it arrived at 2:30 
a. m. 

The patrol had obtained some negative information of 
value, i. e., that there were no other troops east of Brushtown 
at a distance to be expected if the Red battalion were simply 
the advance guard of a larger body. Shall the patrol leader 
send this in at once, or wait until he has learned something 
to indicate when the enemy is going to march? His patrol 
is, of course, in a very dangerous situation. Its presence 
may be discovered at any moment, and the entire patrol may 
be captured, with the result that its news never gets back. 
But under the conditions no message can be carried by less 
than two men, and there are now only four left in the patrol. 
He has two important bits of information yet to obtain, 
when the enemy marches, and his route. Each of these will 
. probably require a separate delivery, and such can only be 
made if he does not now weaken the patrol's numbers. If 
the enemy is going to move at all near dawn, his camp must 
soon be astir. The news then of his preparations for march- 
ing and that no other Reds are near Brushtown can be sent 
back in the same message. The lieutenant decides to keep 
the entire patrol together a little longer in the wood west of 
Brushtown. 

Within a few minutes after half past two, it was evi- 
dent that the fires were being rebuilt. The patrol believed 
the Red cooks were at work. 

At this time the patrol was lying in the southeastern 
corner of the wood, with the leader watching towards camp, 
and a sentry in observation of the ground to the south. 
Men were heard approaching through the timber from the 
northwest. From the sounds, they seemed to be only two 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 105 

in number, to be somewhat intoxicated Red soldiers, and in 
some uncertainty as to where their camp lay. The sergeant 
suggested that these men were probably unarmed, could 
easily be captured without noise and could furnish consider- 
able information. The lieutenant promptly vetoed the 
proposition. While he would like to question the men, the 
chances of capturing them without attracting the attention 
of other Reds were too small, and the difficulties of dispo- 
sing of them thereafter were too great. He therefore got 
his men to their feet and under cover close together, with 
instructions that he had no intention of bothering the Reds 
unless they noticed the Blue patrol; therefore the men 
would remain absolutely still except at his command, when 
the two Reds were to be jumped and secured by hand as 
quietly as possible. Fortunately, the Reds managed to find 
their way out of the wood without actually stumbling upon 
the Blue patrol. 

By 3:00 a. m., it was evident that the Red camp had 3:00 a.m. 
been aroused, and that the men were striking tents and get- 
ting ready to march. But to make certain that the latter 
was the case, Lieut. B remained in observation till about 
3:20. Then, since his messengers would have little chance 3:20 a.m. 
of getting through the enemy's outpost after daylight, he 
decided to take the whole patrol to ground more favorable 
for escape, west of the Little Conewago, and send the infor- 
mation so far obtained back to Major A. 

Accordingly, he started back along the rail fence lead- 
ing to the southwest, with the sergeant seven or eight yards 
in advance, and the corporal as many yards in the rear. The 
lieutenant and Private S constituted the main body. Near- 
ing the southwestern end of the fence, the sergeant sudden- 
ly crouched and a moment later told his officer that several 
men, moving north along the timber from the south, were 
then immediately in front of the Blue patrol, while another 
party coming from the north was within a hundred yards 
of them. Some movement of the patrol in the moonlight 
must have attracted the Red attention, for there was a 
challenge from the party in front promptly followed by a 
shot. The lieutenant signalled the corporal to come up, 

and then in low tone said : We'll charge these people in front 



106 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

and assemble west of the Conewago. Don't shout. A few seconds 
after the hostile shot, the Blue patrol, as skirmishers at two 
or three yards, went forward at a run, without shouting, 
broke through the Red patrol and kept going till the men 
were across the stream. In the open field west of the 
Conewago, and south of the small stream that joins it a half 
mile fromi the Hanover road, the patrol assembled. The 
sergeant was absent. After calling for him a few times, the 
lieutenant decided he could not delay any longer, since the 
enemy's patrols appeared to be searching the whole neigh- 
borhood. So he directed: 

We will cross this stream (the small one half a mile south of the 
Hanover road) , and move rapidly across country due west. Corporal 
L will lead, I will follow him, and S will come last. Take five paces 
between files. 

4:00 a.m. At four o'clock, the patrol reached hill 607 between the 

Rebert and G. Martz farmhouses, where one man took 
station, while the lieutenant, assisted by the remaining man 
in the timber west of the hill's crest, wrote the following 
message : 

No. 2 
Hill 607, n. e. felty s. h., 

6 May, 4:05 a. m. 
My No. 1 reported 4 Red companies at brushtown. These 
started to break camp about 3:00 a. m. Have been into outskirts 
MCSHERRYSTOWN. No indications Red troops beside battalion at 
BRUSHTOWN. Remain here in observation. My signal "N" will mean 
enemy takes hanover road, "S" he goes by felty s. h. 

B, 
Lt. 

Lieut. B repeated the information of his first message, 
because very possibly his messengers did not get through. 
He then took the patrol due west into the open field north 
of the H. Felty farmhouse, pointed out to the corporal the 
direction of crossroads 609, and directed him to deliver 
the message to Major A, who should appear very soon in 
that neighborhood with the battalion. After a few minutes 
he returned with Private S to hill 607. There the lieuten- 
ant climbed a tree near the crest, and as soon as it grew at 
all light began searching with his glasses the ground to the 
east. He quickly made out the Red battalion on the 
4:25 a. m. Hanover road. By 4 :25 a. m., its advance guard was a hun- 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 107 

dred yards west of the A. Rifle roadfork marching toward 
Square Corner. It being still too dark to signal crossroads 
609 from his tree, the lieutenant, leading the private by 
ten yards, started at a steady double for crossroads 609 
through the field north of H. Felty. Northwest of that 
house he was able to get his semaphored "N" acknowledged 
from one of the buildings at the crossroads. 

Orders, Battalion Commander 

Let us now go back to the battalion near Littlestown. 
Major A had the cooks awakened, breakfast started at 1-30 a.m. 
1:30 a. m., and the battalion awakened at 2:00 o'clock. 
The adjutant personally gave the following order to each 
company commander and to the quartermaster: 2:00 a.m. 

The Battalion (less Company D) will march at 3:00 a. m. D 
Company and the convoy at 4:00 a. m. All preparations will be made ^,on 
with the least possible noise. The major will issue orders at 2:30 ■'•^^ a.m. 
a. m. 

At 2 :30 a. m., the major issued to his captains and staff, 
verbal orders as follows : 

A Red battalion came into Brushtown from the east last evening 
and camped at that place. 

Lieut. B started for Brushtown at 10:30 p. m., in charge of a 
reconnoitering patrol. 

This Battalion (less Company D and one platoon of Company C) 
will march at 3:00 o'clock on crossroads 609, to cover the passage of 
the convoy by Whitehall and Boneauville. 

Lieut. X (the Bn. Adjt.), with my orderly, will proceed rapidly 
by Felty S. H. towards the A. Rifle farm. I want the earliest possible 
information whether the enemy turns west or south at the A. Rifle 
crossroads. 

Company C (less one platoon) will constitute the advance guard, 
marching by Pleasant Hill S. H. and roadforks 598, 610, 611, and 606. 
C Company will send one platoon to report to Captain D for duty with 
the convoy. 

Companies B and A, in the order named, will follow the advance 
guard at 300 yards. 

The convoy, directly escorted by. Company D and one platoon of 
Company C, will march at 4:00 o'clock by Whitehall, Boneauville and 
Hunterstovni. The march of the convoy will be expedited in every 
possible way. Let me know promptly when the convoy passes White- 
hall and again when it passes Boneauville. Captain D will take the 
horse of the battalion adjutant's orderly. 

The field train will march at the head of the convoy. 

I will be between the advance guard and the main body. 

We will form the battalion at 2:55. 

When the companies reported at 2:55, the major di- 2:55 a. m 
rected C Company : Get your distances, and take up the march. 



108 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

A Company as Advance Guard 

The captain of C Company assembled his officers and 
2:40 a.m. non-commissioned officers and, at 2:40 a. m., ordered as 
follows: 

A Red battalion came into Brushtown from Hanover last night 
and camped in that village. We have two reconnoitering patrols out 
in its direction. The convoy marches on Boneauville at 4:00 a. m. es- 
corted by Company D and one platoon of this company. The remain- 
der of the battalion marches to the north to cover the convoy. 

This company constitutes the advance guard. 

Lieut. R with the 1st squad as the point will precede the remain- 
der of the company by 150 yards. March by Pleasant Hill S. H. and 
roadforks 598, 610, 611 and 606 (pointing out the route on the map) . 

Sergeant K (left guide) will be on the alert for signals from the 
rear. 

Sergeant M with the 3d Platoon will report to Captain D for 
duty with the convoy's escort. 

Chiefs of platoon will tell the men of the situation at the first 
opportunity. 

The company will be formed 7 minutes before 3 : 00 o'clock. 

All distances were shortened because of the darkness. 

When the major directed that the march be taken up, 
the captain ordered the point to move out, following it by 
connecting files at every thirty yards. The company 
marched as soon as the point had its distance. 

Arrangements and Orders, Commander of the Convoy 

Captain D made sure, at once upon receipt of his orders, 
that the battalion quartermaster, who was in direct charge 
of the convoy, had provided all necessary arrangements to 
have it ready by four o'clock, including continual inspection 
to prevent intentional delays on the part of the teamsters. 
The convoy was parked in a square, each side formed by a 
section. The First section was- on the north side ; the Second 
on the east ; the Third on the south ; and the Fourth on the 
west. 

The captain sent for his officers and sergeants, who 
were pretty well scattered among the pickets of the outpost. 
Sergeant M reported with his platoon from C Company. 
3:20 a. m. Verbal orders were issued at 3 :20 a. m., as follows : 

A Red battalion, coming from the direction of Hanover camped 
last night at Brushtown, about 3i miles northeast of us. Our bat- 
talion (less this company and a platoon of C Company) has gone to 
a position a mile northeast of Whitehall, from which to cover the pas- 
sage of the convoy. 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 109 

We escort the convoy by Whitehall and Boneauville on Hunters- 
town. 

The 1st Platoon (it then had two squads near Pleasant Hill S. H.) 
of D Company, under Lieut A, will constitute the advance guard, pre- 
ceding the main body by three-quarters of a mile. It will march from 
Pleasant Hill S. H. at 3:50 a. m. It will station patrols of four men 
each, successively, on knolls 647 and 627 north of Pleasant Hill S. H., 
near the Schild farmhouse southeast of Whitehall S. H., and near the 
Small farmhouse east of Whitehall, to remain until the convoy has 
passed and then join the rear guard. It will send a patrol of four men 
to march opposite the center of the convoy by the road roughly one-half 
mile west of the Pleasant Hill S. H. — Whitehall road. 

The main body, in the order: 1 squad of the 3d Platoon of Com- 
pany C, field train of the battalion, 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th sections of the 
convoy, and one squad of Sergt. M's detachment, will march from 
camp at 4:00 a. m. 

Details for the immediate guard of sections of the convoy will be 
as follows: 

First Section — Platoon of C Company, and service detachment of 
C Co. (Q. M. Sergt., cooks, artificer, clerk). 

Second — Sergeant K, 5th , 6th and 7th squads of D Company, 
and service detachment of A Company. 

Third — Sergeant L, 8th, 9th and 10th squads (8th and 9th were 
then in the picket east of camp), and service detachment of B Com- 
pany. 

Fourth— Sergeant M, 11th, 12th and 13th squads (11th and 12th 
were then in the picket west of camp), and service detachment of D 
Company. 

The non-commissioned officer in charge of each section will be 
responsible that his section moves exactly on time, and in its proper 
place. As soon as this order is finished he will locate his section at 
once. On the road he will require wagons to keep closed at all 
times. Sections will follow the preceding one at 20 yards. In each 
section one man will be detailed to walk beside and be responsible for 
the conduct of each wagon. 

The rear guard, composed of the 14th, 15th and 16th squads (the 
14th and 15th are now on knoll 621), Lieut. S, commanding, will follow 
the main body at 1000 yards. The rear guard will send a squad at 
once to the R. Sell farmhouse to remain there till the convoy has passed 
Pleasant Hill S. H., and one to relieve picket No. 4 (west of camp). It 
will have the timber along the stream, heading north of Pleasant Hill 
S. H., examined immediately. 

I will remain here till the convoy is on the road and then ride near 
its center. 

There may be criticism of the above order upon the 
ground that it trespasses upon the province of subordi- 
nates by instructions in too great detail. It is believed, 
though, that the peculiar circumstances of the case require 
such detail. The commander of the advance guard is told 
just where to post and route certain patrols. But it will 
be noticed that these patrols are to be used not for the or- 
dinary purpose of advance guard patrols, in reconnaissance 
to the front, but entirely for flank protection, which unless 
specifically mentioned in the order, the advance guard com- 



110 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

mander may consider lies outside of his province and is 
to be attended to by some one else. The matter is of too 
great importance to have any doubt whose duty it is, and 
therefore is provided for in the order. Similarly with the 
rear guard, which is now^ largely taking over the functions 
of the outpost until the convoy has cleared camp, there must 
be no doubt whatever as to who is responsible for security 
in certain important directions. . Finally, the police detach- 
ments with the convoy require very definite instructions for 
the organization of the march in order to prevent confusion 
in the unwieldy mass of wagons, where experience shows de- 
lays are so likely to arise. When the convoy is moving out 
of park, particularly as in this case before daylight, is a pecu- 
liarly favorable time for attack. If there happen to be no Red 
regulars yet in this vicinity, still some partisans may, very 
well, be lurking near for a favorable opportunity. Not to 
give such a chance, the movement must proceed smoothly, 
upon a very definite and uniform plan throughout the sec- 
tions, and that, of course, must be the plan of Captain D. 

A Battalion in Defense 

Major A received Lieut. B's first message from Brush- 
town just before leaving camp. The second report with its 
indications of an early Red march reached him near cross- 

4:20 a.m. roads 609 at 4:20 a. m. He halted the advance guard com- 
pany at the above crossroads, except its leading squads which 
were hurried on to crossroads 601 ; and caused B and A Com- 

4:30 a.m. panies to close on C Company. About 4:30 a. m., an obser- 
vation station, on the house north of the crossroads, reported 
that a Blue officer was running in across the field to the east 
and had semaphored ''N" a number of times. Almost im- 
mediately thereafter the detachment of C Company sent on 
to crossroads 601, opened fire. A few minutes later the bat- 
talion adjutant raced in from the east to report that the 
hostile battalion had turned west at A. Rifle. 

The Battalion Commander's Estimate of the Situation 

There remains for the major but little time to spend 
in further consideration of the situation. In fact, imme- 
diate action must be taken, for the two battalions, the Red 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 111 

and the Blue, are already in contact. This does not mean, 
however, that the major is surprised by the developments 
of the morning, or has not given the matter of the orders 
now to be issued, the most careful consideration. In fact, 
he has thought of little else during the preceding march. 

The reports from his patrols, Lieut. B's signals, and 
the firing to the north indicate the exact situation the major 
had expected. The enemy's strength seems pretty accur- 
ately determined as one battalion; that battalion appears 
to be entirely alone; and its objective from its early march 
is evidently the major's convoy. The major's mission is 
just as definitely to defend the convoy, and get it away, or, 
if to do the latter is found impossible, then to destroy it. 
The major, of course, long ago determined to have a try at 
its defense. 

The only question now to be answered is the manner 
thereof. In answering this he is sorry he has not had 
a little more time for a daylight reconnaissance of the 
ground. Had he arrived well before the enemy, he would 
have taken up a position in readiness with the battalion at 
this crossroads, while he made a careful personal reconnais- 
sance of the ground to the north, where he knew the enemy 
was most likely to come ; and then back to the southeast, to 
decide upon his action in that direction if the enemy hap- 
pened to move that way. 

From crossroads 609, the major notes, in the rapidly 
increasing light, that his map has given a very correct im- 
pression of the actual lie of the ground. Before him for 
three-quarters of a mile to the northwest, north, and north- 
east are long gentle slopes practically unbroken, except for 
the two houses in the foreground. Near the 600 foot con- 
tour to the east, the ground falls away rather suddenly ; and 
would afford some cover for an attack from that direction. 

If the battalion were to continue its march, it could 
probably get into position squarely across the enemy's line 
of advance at crossroads 601. A position there, however, 
has many disadvantages. The field of fire is short because 
the ground near the stream to the east drops away more 
rapidly that near 601, with dead spaces, consequently, not 
far out. Several folds north and south of the Hanover Road 



112 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

facilitate the covered advance of enveloping columns. The 
light timber east of Trostle enables an envelopment of the 
northern flank to get on that flank, and very close at hand 
under perfect cover. A force enveloping the southern flank 
would tend to separate the battalion from the convoy and 
lay the latter bare. Finally the position is a very poor one to 
withdraw from because of the long glacis-like slope behind it, 
which would have to be crossed under the enemy's flre. In 
Major A's situation a position which facilitates withdrawal 
is of importance, because nothing is gained by continuing 
the engagement after the convoy has safely passed St. 
Luke's church. 

A much better position is to be found right at hand, 
one facing northeast at the crossroads 609. It has an ex- 
cellent field of fire to its front and to both of its fianks. No 
advance towards Square Corner, except by a wide detour, 
can be made without attacking it. The road on which the 
convoy is passing lies directly behind it more than a mile 
away. Any advance against this position will tend to drive 
the battalion towards its convoy, and not to separate the 
two. Withdrawal is made very easy by the groves of tim- 
ber immediately behind, and the rolling ground and lightly 
timbered stream lines farther to the west. An envelop- 
ment of its left is almost impracticable because of the wide 
expanse of perfectly open ground in that direction. An 
envelopment of the right is easier, and would be the natural 
movement in attacking, unless the hostile battalion advances 
too far before learning where the Blues have taken position. 

Besides, if the enemy's combat reconnaissance is so in- 
sufficient that he fails to locate the battalion in this flank- 
ing position, and starts his attack straight towards Square 
Corner, his incorrectly directed firing lines may be thrown 
into serious confusion, and much valuable time thereby 
be gained by the unexpected flanking fire from the Blue 
main position. The Beds should, if possible, be led into this 
error by a very wide deployment of the detachment at 
Crossroads 601, and its early development of a heavy fire. 

The right flank is the weakest part of the position, be- 
cause rather easily approached under cover from the east to 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 113 

close ranges. The support will, accordingly, be posted be- 
hind this flank. 

It is, of course, a further advantage, that the position 
can be occupied at once, and by covered routes. 

The major has 2f companies with which to defend it. 
To obtain from the outset a strong development of fire in 
this delaying action, he requires two full companies in the 
firing line. The advance guard company will then be drawn 
back into support. It is most convenient to send its leading 
units to crossroads 601 to check the enemy's direct advance, 
in retiring therefrom to cover the battalion's left, and to 
hold off any small detachment the enemy may make to get 
at the convoy in that direction. This company will also 
have to send a squad to roadfork 582 to cover the right 
flank. 

There is no time to entrench. In fact any movement 
to do so now would simply invite hostile attention to the 
real position. 

If the battalion can hold until the convoy has passed 
the Shebley farm, the latter can then be considered safe. 
At 4:30 a. m., the convoy's head is nearing roadfork 598, 
almost 2i miles from Shebley. To pass that point it will 
have to go 2^ miles, plus one mile, its length, or 3^ miles. The 
battalion then, with the convoy making 2 miles an hour, will 
have to hold its position for nearly two hours. Whether it 
can do so, without fighting to a decision, will depend very 
much upon the time taken by the hostile reconnaissance in 
locating the Blue position. 

To be able to sweep the fold along the 600 foot contour, 
the major is compelled to extend his right company to the 
first road bend southeast of the Font farmhouse. The left 
company will be astride the 601 — 609 road. 

His decision is to defend the position described above 
with A and B Companies in the first line, and C Company 
in support. 

The Battalion Commander's Actions and Orders 

Major A directed the commander of the advance guard 
company at 4 :20 a. m. : 4 :20 a. m. 



114 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The enemy will very probably appear soon on the Hanover Road. 

The battalion halts at this crossroad. 

Send your two leading squads to the crossroads to the north on 
the Hanover Road to check the enemy when he appears. Halt the 
remainder of your company at this point and post small security de- 
tachments east and west of the battalion, which will be closed on C 
Company. 

When A and B Companies came up, they were halted, 
and directed to take cover in the timber west of the 601 — 
609 road. The captains and staff were assembled at the 
crossroads. 
4:32 a.m. ^"^ ^'^^ ^' ^•' ^^^ major issued orders to those officers 

as follows : 

The enemy is marching west on the Hanover Road. His ad- 
vance is already engaged with C Company's detachment at the cross- 
roads to the north. 

We will defend this crossroads. 

B Company will deploy between the Font farmhouse (pointing to 
it) and the first road bend to the southeast, to fire on the sector from 
the farmhouse to our right (the one northeast of roadfork 594) to 
the one to the right front (pointing to the one 400 yards southeast of 
crossroads 601). 

A Company will deploy on both sides of this road (indicating the 
609 — 601 road), to fire on the sector from the farmhouse to the right 
front (400 yards southeast of crossroads 601) to the one to the left 
front (Wentz). 

Both companies will take every care to avoid attracting hostile 
attention in occupying the position. Do not open fire until ordered 
by me. 

C Company will withdraw under cover to a station in support at 
the farmhouse south of us (Gebhardt). It will send a squad across 
the stream east of that farmhouse to cover our right, and will direct 
the detachment now on the Hanover Road, upon withdrawing to cover 
our left from the vicinity of the orchard to the left front (Noel). 

Issue ammunition at once. Empty combat wagons and the am- 
bulance will take station in the drawhead 400 yards west of this point, 
at the disposal, thereafter, of the surgeon. 

Battalion headquarters at this point, with which semaphore com- 
munication will be maintained. 

The major then told the battalion adjutant to describe 
the situation to Captain D in charge of the convoy, and to 
impress upon him the necessity for permitting no delay in 
the convoy's march. 

He notified the battalion surgeon that he would with- 
draw as soon as the convoy was safely by, and that any 
wounded must go with the battalion. (See sketch No. 12) . 

The Withdrawal From Action 

The two squads of C Company had been in position at 
crossroads 601 but a few minutes, when a hostile detachment 



SKETCH NO. 12, Situation at 5ft5 A.M. May 6 




A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 115 

came over the rise west of the Rebert farm. Fire was 
opened at once upon the Reds. The latter promptly sent 
parties under cover north and south of the Hanover Road 
so that by 5 :00 a. m., the Blue detachment was flanked and 
compelled to fall back to the Noel house. The enemy oc- 
cupied the crest at 601 and opened fire upon the retreating 
Blues. 

A Red patrol from the direction of the H. Felty house 
ran into the position of B Company, and the enemy conse- 
quently became aware that the Blues had something at cross- 5 .qo a. m. 
roads 609. From 5:00 a. m. to 5:40, the Red patrols de- 
veloped an intense reconnaissance, the enemy evidently be- 
ing in some doubt whether the Blues were to be found in 
strength towards Square Corner, or towards the Font farm. 
At 5:45 a. m., Red firing lines began to appear to the east. 5:45 a.m. 
Shortly thereafter, three of their companies were deployed 
and firing. 

Reports from the convoy indicated that its center was 
by this time (5:45) near St. Luke's Church. It was time 
to withdraw. 

The major accordingly issued orders as follows : 

1st Bn. 
6 May, 6:00 a. m. 6:00 a. m. 

F. O. No. 9. 

1. The convoy has passed Whitehall. 

2. The Bn. will withdraw to ST. luke's church. 

3. (a) The ambulance and combat wagons by farm road southwest 

of them and Whitehall at once. 

(b) Co. C via Whitehall at once. 

(c) Cos. B and A, due west across country, at my signal "to the 
rear". 

B, 

Major. 

This order was prepared between 5:30 and 6:00 a. m., 
the hour simply being left to be put in at the last. Copies 
were started simultaneously for the 3 companies and for 
the surgeon. 

As soon as C Company and the ambulance and wagons 
had gained a few hundred yards, the signal was given to B 
and A Companies, in turn, to start. A Company did not re- 
receive its signal till B Company was due south of 609. Each 
company was followed by a small rear guard. At roadfork 
637, the battalion assembled ; and continued the march under 
the protection of A Company as its rear party. 



Part III A Battalion of Infantry 



ATTACK OF A CONVOY 

On May 5, Red and Blue armies are confronting each 
other in Red territory, on the line Hunters Run — Newville 
(sketch 10 and Guide Map). The Blue invading army has 
advanced from the southwest. 

Blue line of communication troops have been collect- 
ing supplies southeast of Littlestown. 

The 1st Battalion, 1st Red Infantry, marched May 5 
from York and camped at Brushtown about 8 :00 p. m. It 
has been sent to drive off the Blue troops engaged in the 
work of collecting, and to recapture any supplies they may 
have gathered. While the battalion is a regular organiza- 
tion, its men are nearly 70 per cent recruits. The twenty- 
mile march has pretty well exhausted these new men. 

By 9:00 p. m., through an extensive use of the tele- 
phone, the major in command has learned that the Blues, 
whose total strength is reported as five or six hundred men, 
passed through Littlestown earlier in the evening with a 
long convoy of impressed wagons, that they made camp a 
mile to the north of that town, and that the Blues came into 
Littlestown two days before from the northwest, via Hunt- 
erstown and Boneauville. 

Heavy rains have put all roads in bad condition. 

The Red outpost consists of a squad at the Little 
Conewago crossing on the Hanover Road, another squad 
at 525 W, and a cossack post at the railroad bridge near 
525 W ; all from D Company. 

The Battalion Commander's Estimate of the Situation 

The major's mission was clearly stated in his orders. 
Nothing has arisen to cause any change therein. 

Of the enemy, he has reports that the hostile strength 
is five or six hundred men, and that the convoy is large. 
The estimate of the Blue strength, rendered by civilians, 
116 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 117 

may be very far from the truth. Having come into Littles- 
town by way of Boneauville and Hunterstown, the Blues 
will be likely, in strange and hostile country, to return by 
the same route, unless they learn of the presence of the Red 
battalion. From Brushtown to Littlestown is about four 
miles as the crow flies. Since the Reds reached Brushtown 
late in the evening, and the Blues likewise passed Littles- 
town late in the evening, it is very possible that the latter, 
in hostile country, have not learned of the Red battalion's 
presence. If so, the Blues will probably move out at a 
customary hour tomorrow morning, and along the route 
over which they came. If they learn of the Reds presence, 
they may march at a very early hour, and perhaps by Get- 
tysburg. In this case, Major A will fail to catch the convoy, 
unless he, too, marches tonight, or at an exceedingly early 
hour in the morning. 

To march at once, however much he would like to do so, 
with his very tired troops, is out of the quesion. They have 
done from 20 to 22 miles over muddy roads, and are largely 
recruits. Even to march at dawn, which comes about 4 :25 
a. m., will work considerable hardship, since experienced 
men would have to be up an hour beforehand, and these 
recruit organizations will need perhaps half an hour more 
for preparation. The major concludes, that if he starts at 
four o'clock, he will require about all that is practicable 
from his men. 

More definite information about the Blue strength, dis- 
positions, and intentions must be obtained tonight. His men 
are too tired to send a dismounted patrol. The adjutant 
and two mounted orderlies must, therefore, go on that duty. 

Assuming that the location of the hostile camp has been 
correctly reported ; and having decided that he will march at 
four o'clock, the major must next decide what is to be the 
immediate objective of that march. If he proceeds directly 
towards Pleasant Hill S. H., or towards Whitehall, the 
enemy, by moving early, may get by before the Red battalion 
arrives. If he marches towards Boneauville, he will have 
the best chance of intercepting the convoy, provided the 
Blues return as they came. If they go instead via Gettys- 
burg, and both Reds and Blues start at the same time, and 



118 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

march at the same rate, the first, having lOJ miles to go, and 
the latter 9i, the Reds, considering the probable length of the 
convoy, should be able to cut it off at Gettysburg. The Reds 
should have no difficulty, in reality, in moving very much 
faster than the convoy. There would, however, be great 
danger for the Reds in working so far in towards the rear 
of the main Blue army. 

It seems best, though, to determine upon the route now, 
only as far as crossroads 601 ; to send out tonight a mounted 
patrol to remain in touch with the enemy ; and to start dis- 
mounted patrols at an early hour to strike the enemy's most 
likely line of march by Whitehall and Boneauville at the 
salient points, in the expectation that by the time crossroads 
601 is reached, information will be at hand to determine the 
best course thereafter. If, at this point, the enemy seems to 
be still in camp, the Red battalion will march on Whitehall 
S. H. When Whitehall S. H. is reached, if the convoy is 
still in camp, the Red battalion will turn south to attack it. 
If it is then marching on Boneauville, the Reds will remain 
in position at Whitehall S. H. If the Blues start west, on the 
Baltimore Turnpike, from their camp, there may be time to 
cut the convoy off by marching southwest between Alloway 
and Plum Creeks. If when crossroads 601 is reached, the 
enemy seems to have started for Gettysburg, the Reds will 
hurry their march by Square Corner and Boneauville. If he 
has started for Boneauville, the Red battalion, unless pre- 
vented by hostile covering parties, will continue via Square 
Corner. 

The major decides, therefore, to send a mounted patrol 
at once towards Littlestown, and three dismounted patrols 
at 3:00 a. m. for the Littlestown — Whitehall — Boneauville 
road, and to march the battalion at 4 : 00 a. m., provisionally 
on crossroads 601. 

The Battalion Commander's Actions and Orders 

The major and his adjutant were together at the tele- 
phone central in Brushtown, when the information of the 
Blue movements was obtained from Littlestown, and they 
noted the houses that have telephone connections north of 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 119 

Littlestown, and along the Hanover road. The major at 
10:00 p. m. directed the adjutant: 10:00 p.m. 

I want you to take both our orderlies and proceed via Littlestown 
to learn the hostile strength and dispositions. It is particularly im- 
portant to find out whether he will march tomorrow by Whitehall and 
Boneauville, or by the Baltimore Turnpike towards Gettysburg. The 
Battalion will march at 4:00 a. m. to crossroads 601. Its action there- 
after will depend upon the movements of the Blues. Maintain tele- 
phone communication with me. I will leave messengers at each 
farmhouse as we pass. 

The major had the cooks awakened at 2 :00 o'clock, and 2:00 a. m. 
the battalion at 2 :30. At two o'clock, the major sent for the 
captain of A Company, and directed him : 

Littlestown reports that the enemy camped with a large convoy 
north of that tovirn last night. We will march at 4:00 o'clock towards 
Boneauville. Your company will be the advance guard. I want to 
send three patrols of six men each, one under an officer, and all from 
your company, ahead at 3:00 o'clock. They will go by Square Corner 
towards St. Luke's Church, by crossroads 601 on Whitehall S. H., and 
by Felty S. H. towards Pleasant Hill S. H.— the officer by the central 
route. Have them ready to march at 3:00 o'clock., and send their 
leaders to me for instructions about ten minutes before that hour. 

At 2:50 a. m., he instructed Lieutenant M, and Ser- 2:50 a.m. 
geants K and S, as follows: 

Five or six hundred Blues, in charge of a large convoy, are re- 
ported to have camped last night north of Littlestown. Lieut. K (Bn. 
Adt.), with two mounted orderlies started via Littlestown at 10:00 
o'clock last night to reconnoiter the hostile camp. This battalion will 
march at 4:00 o'clock, provisionally on crossroads 601, about two miles 
west of Brushtown on the road to Gettysburg. I want your patrols to 
proceed at 3:00 o'clock to within sight of the Littlestown — Boneau- 
ville road and keep me informed of the hostile movements. Lieut. M 
will start the three patrols together. At the A. Rifle farm, about a 
mile west of Brushtown, he will detach Sergeant S, with his five men, 
by Felty S. H. towards Pleasant Hill S. H.; at crossroads 601, a mile 
farther to the west, he will detach Sergeant K, with his five men, by 
Square Corner towards St. Luke's Church; and will himself proceed, 
with the remainder, by the Font farm towards Whitehall S. H. Make 
every practicable use of telephones in reporting information obtained. 
I will station messengers at all telephones we pass on the Hanover 
Road. 

At 3:00 a. m., the major assembled his captains and 3:00 a.m. 
staff, less the adjutant, and ordered: 

Littlestovni reports that five or six hundred Blues camped last 
night, in charge of a large convoy, about a mile north of that town. 
Lieut K (Bn. Adj.), with two mounted orderlies, left at 10:00 o'clock 
last night to reconnoiter the enemy's camp. Three dismounted pa- 
trols from A Company are now starting towards St. Luke's Church, 
Whitehall S. H., and Pleasant Hill S. H. 



120 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

We will march at 4:00 o'clock, provisionally on crossroads 601, 
two miles west of Brushtown on the road towards Boneauville, to at- 
tack that convoy. 

Company A will constitute the advance guard, and will clear the 
Brushtown roadfork at 4:00 o'clock. This company will place men at 
each farm telephone, as passed, to receive and transmit messages from 
our patrols. 

The main body of the battalion in the order: B, C, and D Com- 
panies, will follow at 600 yards. 

The outpost detachments will close in on the Hanover Road in 
time to join their company at the crossing of the Little Conewago. 

The field train will be assembled in camp as soon as the battalion 
has gone, and will await orders. 

I will march with the advance guard. 



Orders, Commander of the Advance Guard 

The captain of A Company assembled that organization 
3:50 a.m. at 3 :50 a. m., marched it to the Brushtown roadfork, halted 
it with its tail at that point, and directed: 

Littlestown reports that five or six hundred Blues, escorting a 
large convoy, camped last night about a mile north of that town. Our 
Battalion is marching to attack the convoy. We have one mounted 
and three dismounted patrols out to the west and southwest. 

This company is the advance guard. 

The 1st Platoon, as advance party, will precede the remainder of 
the company by 400 yards, marching by the Hanover Road towards 
Boneauville. It will get its distance at once. 

The 1st lieutenant immediately set his platoon in march. 
When he had gained 400 yards, he halted the platoon, and 
directed his sergeant : 

Take the 1st squad forward as the point. Get 200 yards distance 
and halt until I signal, Forward. 

Both the lieutenant and the captain sent connecting 
files forward at about 30 yards apart, for although there was 
a moon, it was not bright. Exactly at four o'clock the cap- 
tain signalled, Forward March. 

At the A. Rifle roadfork, a patrol of four men was sent 
south to crossroads 581, thence west by the H. Felty farm 
and crossroads 609, to come back to the Hanover Road at 
crossroads 601. 

An Infantry Patrol 

For the first hour, the march of Lieut. M's reconnoiter- 
ing patrols was without particular incident. The one, whose 
route led by Square Corner, arrived in the vicinity of the 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 121 

roadf ork between St. Luke's Church and the Shebley farm at 
4 :20 a. m. ; and the one by Felty S. H., in the vicinity of 
crossroads 633, northwest of Pleasant Hill S. H., at 4:10 
a. m. Enroute, this patrol was passed by two Blue horse- 
men, one an officer. The Red patrol heard the enemy's 
horses in time to clear the road, and permitted the hostile 
patrol to pass without attempting a capture; but the fact 
of the Blue's passage was reported in the first message 
sent back. 

Lieut. M, with the central patrol, came to crossroads 609 
about 3 :50 a. m., and finding a countryman already up milk- 3:50 a. m. 
ing the cows at the nearby house, learned from the man that 
no Blues had been seen in the neighborhood, and that the 
night had been a quiet one. The patrol marched south from 
that point, with an advance guard of the corporal and one 
man, followed at ten yards by the lieutenant and one man, 
while the other two, as the rear guard, were ten yards be- 
hind the lieutenant. At roadfork 606, as the patrol turned 
towards the Small farmhouse, its passing disturbed some 
dogs at the house near 606. Their barking died away 
after the patrol had passed a hundred yards or so, but 
a few minutes later started up again most persistently. 
The lieutenant decided something was happening behind him 
which required investigation. He immediately signalled 
his patrol to move into the field to the north. After waiting 
quietly there for a short time, without anyone's passing to- 
wards Whitehall, and yet with the barking continuing at the 
crossroads, the lieutenant directed his patrol to stay where 
it was, while he with one man, moved across the fields to the 
east. Crouching within a few yards of the 606 — 609 road, 
he watched some 100 Blue soldiers move north thereon, fol- 
lowed at two or three hundred yards by a couple of com- 
panies, three escort wagons and an ambulance. The 
lieutenant waited fifteen minutes to see whether other 
hostile troops were following them. By this time, 
4:20 a. m., it was evident that dawn was near at hand. 
The patrol could not remain many minutes longer in the 
open field without great risk. The information the lieuten- 
ant had just obtained was of the greatest importance, and 
must be sent to the major as promptly as possible. To get 



122 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

that information back would not, however, warrant his re- 
turning with the whole patrol. His mission was by no means 
completed. He had not yet located the convoy, and did not 
know where the Blue battalion was going. The first thing, 
though, to do before proceeding to obtain more information, 
was to get his patrol into some sort of cover, then write and 
forward his report of what had just been seen. To find out 
where the convoy was, would require a movement w^estward 
while the Blue battalion was marching north, and his reports 
had to be sent to the east. To split his patrol in the three 
directions while attempting to attend to all of these matters 
at once, was highly inadvisable, as upon his personal obser- 
vation and leadership must very largely depend the value of 
the information obtained, and the likelihood of its getting 
safely back. The most important immediate duty was to 
get his message started to the east, and it would seem to 
have a better chance of safe arrival, if he moved the whole 
patrol east of the hostile line of march before detaching his 
messengers. But before starting to put this decision into 
effect, on the chance of being able to telephone, he moved 
back to the farmhouse, 400 yards northwest of 609, where 
he learned not only that they had no telephone, but that none 
was to be found in any of the nearby houses. Returning 
then to the main body of the patrol, he conducted it rapidly to 
the south of the 606 — Small road, and thence east into the 
light timber, southeast of roadfork 611. The patrol worked 
into the northern part of the grove. One man climbed 
a tree a few yards south of the 611 — 582 road, to observe to 
the north, in the direction the enemy's battalion had gone. 
And one man was stationed, some ten yards out, on each of 
the remaining sides. The lieutenant, in the center of the 
group, wrote the following message: 

No. 1, Near roadfork 606, one mile 

east of WHITEHALL, 

6 May, 4:30 a. m. 
Three Blue companies passed roadfork 606 marching towards 
609 at 4:10 a. m. 

M, 
Lt. 

Two of the men were directed to take this to the bat- 
talion, by moving along the stream line heading east of the 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 123 

timber in which the patrol was then. They were to tell the 
major that Lieut. M intended to follow the enemy. 

Within five minutes after the departure ,of the 
messengers, the lookout called to the lieutenant that he 
could see the hostile transportation halted a few hundred 
yards up the road to the north. The lieutenant joined the 
lookout. As it grew lighter, he made out two Blue companies 
in the road southwest of crossroads 609. A little later these, 
evidently, drew their extra ammunition; then the wagons 
and ambulance disappeared in the timber west of the road, 
while one company deployed across the road east of the 
crossroads (609), and another deployed farther to the east, 
with its left at the Font farmhouse. Presently a weak com- 
pany came back from the crossroads and took station in the 
clump of timber east of the enclosure about the Gebhardt 
farmhouse. This was the Blue situation as the Red patrol 
leader saw it at 4:45 a. m. He had obtained very definite 4:45 a.m. 
information of the greatest possible value, provided it could 
be got to the major without delay. He had seen the enemy 
take up a position that flanked the proper line of advance of 
the Red battalion, and which might cause the battalion a 
maximum of trouble unless promptly detected. Lieut. M 
must, of course, hurry in his report. Shall he take his whole 
patrol back to effect the delivery, or simply send another pair 
of messengers? Two men should be able to slip through 
with less chance of detection than four men, and the lieuten- 
ant has yet a part of his mission to accomplish. While the 
convoy is probably coming by Whitehall, he has not seen 
it, and the major will want facts from him, not guesses. He 
decides to send a written message by two men, and then 
work over to the west with the remaining man, to locate the 
convoy. 

No. 2, Near roadfork 606, one mile 

east of WHITEHALL, 

6 May, 5:00 a. m. 
Two Blue companies have deployed on line crossroads 609 — font 
farmhouse. A third company is in support at gebhardt farmhouse. 
Sketch on back. Am moving west to locate convoy. 

M, 
Lieut. 

The corporal and one man were sent with this by the 
route of the first messengers. They were cautioned that 



124 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

they were likely to meet hostile patrols, but that it was of 
the utmost importance, not only to get through, but to get 
through very promptly, or the information would reach the 
major too late to be of value. 

The lieutenant, with the one remaining man, moved to 
the southern part of the wood, then up the draw to the south- 
west, and into the timber west of roadfork 599, where he 
5:10 a.m. arrived at 5:10. Climbing a large tree, he saw the whole 
mile-long convoy stretched out on the Littlestown — Boneau- 
ville road with its head nearing Whitehall. He had now ob- 
tained all of the information he had been sent for, and 
there seemed nothing further to be learned, that would war- 
rant his delaying a moment in starting back with what he 
had just acquired. To use a single mesenger, even in this 
very friendly country, would not be advisable, because any 
route by which the message could be carried without a wide 
detour, must be made very dangerous by the enemy's pa- 
trols. The lieutenant started back via the wood and stream 
southeast of the Gebhardt farm. Near roadfork 599, he 
found an intelligent farmer who told him the telephone 
lines in the vicinity had been cut by the Blues, but that he 
would be glad to go to the houses to the south, and try to get 
the lieutenant's message through from there. The follow- 
ing was hurriedly penciled and handed him : 

Major A: 

HANOVER ROAD between wentz and rebert farms. 
Convoy moving on BONEAUVILLE. Head nearing Whitehall at 
five ten a. m. 

M, 

Lieut. 

The lieutenant, proceeding rapidly along the route de- 
cided upon, fell into an ambuscade that the Blues had set for 
him near roadfork 582, was captured with the soldier fol- 
lowing him, and sometime later had the mortification of join- 
ing his second pair of messengers near the Gebhardt farm. 

He had obtained definite insight into all of the enemy's 
dispositions, but, as will be so frequently the case,was un- 
able to get the information to the headquarters where it was 
needed. It is one thing to obtain information, but another, 
and frequently a much more difficult matter, to transmit it. 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 125 

A Battalion Attack — Advance Guard Reconnaissance 

At 4:30 a. m., the battalion's point, coming over the 4:30 a.m. 
rise west of the Rebert farm, received such a fire from the 
crest half a mile to the west, that the men were compelled to 
take cover from and return it. The lieutenant in command 
of the advance party deployed a second squad alongside the 
first, and started his remaining one and one-half squads, 4 
men of his platoon had been sent south at A. Rifle, in two 
patrols to work west under cover of the stream lines, north 
and south of the Hanover road. The rest of A Company 
turned up the southern stream line, and followed the left 
patrol, which by that time was some 400 yards up the draw. 
At 4:50 a. m., this patrol reached the house and orchard 4:50 a.m. 
400 yards southeast of crossroads 601, immediately de- 
ployed, and opened fire towards 601. By 4:55 a. m., when 
the company was about a hundred yards east of the farm- 
house, the captain ordered his second platoon into the or- 
chard to reinforce the patrol then there. Upon the de- 
ployment of this platoon, the enemy's fire at once slackened, 
and by 5:00 o'clock had entirely stopped. The Second 5:00 a.m. 
Platoon advanced a hundred yards beyond the crossroads, 
and again opened fire towards the west. From the farm 
house, the captain, a few minutes before this, had seen one 
man of his flanking patrol, in the field north of the H. Felty 
house. He concluded, therefore, that if the enemy had 
anything near crossroads 609, that fact would be deter- 
mined before many moments by the flanking patrol. 
Meantime, and until the leading platoon had also gained 
a little more ground to the west, he would hold the com- 5:10 a.m. 
pany under cover east of the farmhouse. About 5 :10 a. m., 
a single man came running in from the southeast to report 
that the other three men of his patrol had been captured by 
a number of Blues, about BOO yards southeast of crossroads 
609; that he had been the patrol's rear point, and by hard 
running had escaped, although several shots were fired 
at him. A non-commissioned oflficer, from crossroads 601, 
also reported that, when the platoon went over the crest, 
from twelve to fifteen widely extended Blues were in rapid 
retreat about six hundred yards west of that point, that 
these disappeared immediately in an orchard (Noel), from 



126 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

which fire was opened a few minutes later, and that the 
2d Platoon was now gaining some ground in that direction, 
but not at all rapidly. 

The captain of the advance guard company, although 
much time had been lost already, had so far not been able 
to do verjr much towards clearing up the situation. The 
enemy might have only a strong patrol in front of him, and 
another towards crossroads 609. And yet, since the enemy 
might be in strength in either of these directions, the bat- 
talion could hardly advance till more had been learned. 
5:12 a.m. The captain, accordingly, issued orders, at 5:12 a. m., to his 
first lieutenant, who had come up with the bulk of the ori- 
ginal advance party, to Sergeant Y, and Corporals B and C, 
as follows : 

The Second Platoon is driving a party of Reds along the Hanover 
Road towards Square Corner. Our left flank patrol found a number of 
Blues near that farmhouse (Font) to the southwest. 

We must determine at once where the enemy's strength is. 

Sergeant Y will reinforce the Second Platoon with the 9th and 
10th squads. 

The First Platoon will move up this draw west of us, and advance 
straight towards the crossroads (609) to the southwest. 

Corporal B with 3 men of his squad will work rapidly over to the 
house (Wentz) a half a mile west of us, and thence to the southwest. 

Corporal C, with 3 of his men, will move by the house due south 
of this point (indicating the one northeast of roadfork 594). 

Messages to this house (400 yards southeast of 601). 

5:25 a.m. The Second Platoon, by 5 :25 a. m., began to gain ground 
towards the west by long rushes; the First Platoon had 
reached the house 350 yards southwest of crossroads 601 
and was stopped there by heavy fire from both sides of the 
601 — 609 road; the patrol working southwest from the 
Wentz house also was stopped by fire from the enclosure 300 
yards northwest of crossroads 609, and the patrol to the 
south had not been able to get beyond the house 200 yards 
northeast of roadfork 594. 

The Battalion Commander's Estimate of the Situation 

Turning now to the battalion commander, we find that 
the major received reports somewhat as follows : At four 
o'clock, from the battalion adjutant by telephone, that the 
hostile battalion marched north at 3:00 o'clock; and about 
5:00 o'clock, also by telephone, that the convoy marched on 



A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 127 

Whitehall at four o'clock. No reports were received from 
either of the dismounted patrols by Square Corner or by 
Felty S. H. At 5:10 a. m., Lieut. M's No. 1 came in, re- 
porting that three hostile companies had passed roadfork 
606 at 4:10 a. m. 

During the advance guard reconnaissance the main 
body was assembled west of the stream line west of the 
Rebert farm. The three captains joined the major at the 
farmhouse 400 yards southeast of crossroads 601. 

The latter, by 5 : 10 a. m., had a pretty clear idea of the 
enemy's general dispositions. The Blues had apparently 
sent three companies out to meet the Red battalion while 
the convoy was passing by Whitehall and Boneauville. At 
first, while the enemy still held the 601 crest, there was con- 
siderable doubt but that he would be found with the greater 
part of his three companies directly in front of the Reds. 
As soon as the flanking patrol to the south reported that a 
number of Blues were in the direction of crossroads 609, 
and that the crossroads at 601 had been cleared of the enemy, 
the major concluded that they were probably in strength 
at 609. 

It would not do to wait much longer for exact informa- 
tion. The hostile convoy had been on the road for more 
than an hour, and would soon be beyond reach. 

If the major attacks towards crossroads 609, and the 
Blues happen to be in the direction of Square Corner, no 
harm will be done, because he should still be able, by a rapid 
advance, to strike the convoy on the Whitehall — Boneauville 
road. But on the other hand, if the Blues are in strength 
at 609, and he attempts to march by, towards Square Corner, 
the battalion will be stopped by the fire from the enemy's 
position. Any thought of a detour to the north, with the 
idea of striking the convoy somewhere north of Boneauville, 
is at once dropped. The best way to get at the convoy is to 
beat its escort, and that escort appears now to be offering 
an engagement. 

While the major is considering the matter, the platoon of 
A company starts towards 609, and draws a heavy fire there- 
from. That removes the last doubt in the major's mind 
that the Blue battalion is at 609. 



128 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

An envelopment of the hostile left would require too 
great a detour to get troops in position for attacking, and the 
ground in front of that flank is open to long ranges. An 
envelopment of the hostile right is favored by the stream 
line, which permits the attacking column to get fairly close 
in, under good cover. But it has the disadvantage that the 
two attacks will be separated by too great a distance, since 
the weak advance guard company should continue its attack 
down the 601 — 609 road. It seems better, therefore, to 
make a frontal attack with three companies, while causing 
the fourth company to follow along the stream to envelop, 
if to do so becomes expedient as the attack proceeds. 

In attacking a convoy, it is usually advisable to make a 
detachment whose sole function is to get the convoy. While 
everyone's attention is attracted by the events of the en- 
gagement, that detachment will, quite frequently, find its 
opportunity somewhere. The present case does not diifer 
in this respect from the normal. A Company has six squads, 
under an officer, that are rapidly driving an inferior Blue 
force towards Square Corner, in which direction, there 
should now also be the patrol of six men that left Brushtown 
at 3 : 00 o'clock. If assigned the mission of getting the con- 
voy, this detachment may, very likely, assisted by the timber 
along the stream lines south and southwest of Square Cor- 
ner, be able, at least seriously to delay it. 

The major decides to attack frontally with three com- 
panies. 

To have the fourth follow the left of the attacking line 
along the stream by H. Felty ; and 

To assign the reinforced Second Platoon of A Company 
the mission of stopping the convoy. 

The Battalion Commander's Attack Order 

He accordingly issued orders to the four captains, at 
5:20 a.m. 5 :20 a. m., as follows : 

The enemy appears to have three companies in position from the 
crossroads (609) southwest of us to the roadbend 200 yards southeast 
of the red (Font) farmhouse. The convoy marched towards Boneau- 
ville at 4:00 a. m. 

We will attack at once. 



SKETCH NO. 13. Situation at 615 a. M. May 6 




A BATTALION OF INFANTRY 129 

Company A (less its reinforced Second Platoon) towards the 
crossroads (609) to the southwest. I will order that reinforced 
Second Platoon to move rapidly west to get the convoy. 

Company B, deploying with its right 50 yards southeast of this 
house (one 400 yards southeast of crossroads 601), will attack the red 
(Font) farmhouse. 

Company C will advance up the draw 400 yards southeast of this 
house (one 400 yards southeast of crossroads 601), to attack in the 
direction of the yellow house (Gebhardt). 

Company D, in support, will follow C Company at 200 yards along 
the stream line to the south. 

Issue ammunition at once, and move out promptly. Empty am- 
munition wagons will assemble at the Rebert farmhouse (the sergeant 
major attends to this). 

I will go with the support. 

1st Bn. 
6 May, 5:25 a.m. 
Comdr., 2d Plat., 

Co. A. 

Blue Bn. is in position on font farm. Convoy left camp at 4:00' 
a. m., and is marching via Whitehall. Our Bn. attacks Blue Bn. 
Your reinforced platoon will proceed rapidly west and stop the convoy. 

B, 

Major. 

The captains started for their companies at 5 :25 a. m. 
Extra ammunition was issued by 5 : 35 a. m., and the deploy- 
ment began. A Company did not attempt to draw ammuni- 
tion. By 5 :45 a. m., three companies were deployed on the 
line of the farmhouse, 400 yards southwest of crossroads 
601, and H. Felty, and had opened fire. Twenty minutes 
later it was plain that the hostile lines were withdrawing. 
The major urged everything forward, but the ground fa- 
vored the hostile retirement too greatly to permit the attack 
to bring them again to bay. (See sketch No. 13). 



5:45 a.m. 



Part IV Cavalry Patrol 



Situation : 

A foreign (Red) Army has taken possession of Baltimore 
and Washington. A Blue Army is being assembled to the 
northwest of the territory occupied by the Reds, and has 
sent forward covering detachments, one of which is at 
Carlisle, thirty miles north of Gettysburg. 

On June 30th, the commanding general at Carlisle sent 
for Lieut. A, 1st Cavalry, and gave him the following order 
at 5:00 p. m. : 

Small hostile parties, probably all cavalry, were reported to be 
very active in the general vicinity of Gettysburg this morning. All 
wire communication with that place ceased at noon today, and inhab- 
itants sent south in automobiles have been either held or, learning of 
hostile parties on the road they were on, have turned back. The Car- 
lisle — Center Mills road, as far as Center Mills, was free of the enemy 
at the last report a few moments ago. Your squadron will be as- 
sembled this evening at Carlisle and will march on Center Mills early 
in the morning. 

Your troop will be relieved of its present duties and will go with 
the squadron. 

In the meantime, you will take two non-commissioned officers and 
eight men of your troop and patrol toward Gettysburg, starting as 
soon as you can get ready. I desire accurate information of the 
strength and movements of the enemy that has appeared around Get- 
tysburg. Send reports to me here. Return when you have cleared 
up the situation. 

The weather is warm and clear ; roads dusty ; streams 
low; moon rises at 10:00 p. m. 

The main road from Carlisle to Gettysburg runs 
through Center Mills. 

Required : 

(a) Details of the assembly and march of the patrol 
till Center Mills is reached, no enemy being encountered up 
to that time. 

(b) Lieut. A's reasons for the action taken. 



Lieut. A first obtained from his Captain the men and 
horses that were to accompany him. The horses were next 
130 



CAVALRY PATROL 131 

inspected to see that they were in good physical condition 
and well shod, the captain's assistance being requested in 
replacing poor horses and in substituting suitable animals 
for those of conspicuous color; or those that were known 
to neigh, when alone. The horses finally selected were then 
inspected, and the captain requested to have the horseshoer 
tighten or reset all loose shoes. 

The horses were then watered and fed, and the men 
instructed to get their supper. 

As soon as they had finished eating, the men were in- 
structed to obtain a cooked meal to take with them, to 
fill their canteens with coffee, and to provide themselves 
with a half feed of grain, to be carried in nose-bags; to 
leave their extra clothing, toilet articles, and shelter tent 
equipment tied up in bundles in charge of the troop Q. M. 
Sergeant; but to take with them their slickers and one re- 
serve ration each. 

While the men were making these preparations, Lieut. 
A ate his supper and then tried to secure for his men as 
many as possible of the following articles : 

Six wire cutters, so that he and every other man 
would have a pair. 

For each of his non-commissioned officers, the follow- 
ing : pad of message blanks, pencil, compass, map, and field 
glasses. 

All of these articles were obtained, except the field 
glasses and maps; however, Lieut. A made, for each non- 
commissioned ofl^cer, a tracing of his own map which indi- 
cated the roads and streams and the higher hills. 

Lieut. A had his own kit complete, including a pocket 
flash-light. The patrol then saddled up and mounted, and 
the lieutenant inspected each man to see that he carried 
just the articles he was told to take, and no others ; and that 
arms and equipments were so disposed that they would not 
rattle. 

The situation and Lieut. A's intentions were then ex- 
plained to the whole patrol. 



132 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

We will assume that these preparations were completed 
by 6 :30 p. m. 

Just before starting, Lieut. A inquired at headquarters 
whether any further information had been received. 

The patrol then moved out by the main road in the 
following order: 

Point, Corpl. X and one private — distance 200 yards^ 
Lieut. A and the remainder of the patrol less two privates 
— distance 100 yards — two privates. 

The march to Center Mills was made at a rate of 5 to 
Similes per hour, the distances being reduced by half 
as darkness fell. 

Reasons 

Lieut. A is starting on a ride of indefinite duration. 
He must take the time for careful preparation before start- 
ing, in order to insure physical conditions that will admit 
of accomplishing his mission. More time would even- 
tually be lost than gained by rushing off with men 
and horses hungry, and otherwise unprepared for extreme 
exertion. If the men had already eaten supper, and horses 
had been fed, as would frequently be the case at 5 :00 p. m., 
a much earlier start could be made. 

Lieut. A has no authority to exchange unfit horses or 
men, or to take the horseshoer from the work assigned him 
by the captain, or to add to the load of the troop baggage 
wagon. For these arrangements he must consult his cap- 
tain, who will render all the assistance the situation of the 
troop, as a whole, warrants. 

Should Lieut. A's patrol be gone for several days, as 
seems not unlikely, he will have to subsist his men and 
horses off the country; but this will not be difficult in 
friendly farming country, and will be better than bur- 
dening the horses with the weight of rations and grain. 
On the other hand, it is best always to have one meal for 
men and horses ready, so it may be consumed when needed 
without delaying to procure it. It will then be replaced 
at the first favorable opportunity. 

The time of year, state of the weather, and conditions 
of the march thus enable the horses to be relieved of 



CAVALRY PATROL 133 

much weight, which will increase their speed and endur- 
ance. 

As the road, as far as Center Mills, is reported free 
of the enemy, Lieut. A will not w^aste time and energy 
in elaborate measures for the protection of his march, 
but will proceed by the main route, merely putting out 
a couple of men in advance so he will not be surprised 
and captured, should conditions have changed before he 
reaches Center Mills. This will require no extra exer- 
tion of horses and men, and is a necessary precaution. 

Over this rolling country, in hot weather, a gait of 
5 to 5^ miles per hour is as fast as the horses can go and 
still retain sufficient energy for a long continued march, 
or a burst of speed in an emergency. 

Situation (continued) : 

Lieut. A reached, without incident, the northern out- 
skirts of Center Mills at 10:15 p. m., and found the village 
quiet, and most of the houses dark. 

Required : 

Conduct of the patrol at Center Mills. 



On approaching Center Mills, Lieut. A sent a man 
forward to his point with this order: 

Join Corporal X and tell him that his party is to trot straight 
through the village, while the patrol halts here. He will then halt 
as a march outpost and send you back with a message, if all is clear, 
in which case the patrol will move into the village and halt there for 
a few minutes, while Corporal X and companion remain on watch at 
the first roadfork south of the creek that runs through the village. 

On return of the man from Corporal X, Lieut. A rode 10:30 p.m. 
with his patrol into the village, dismounted it, after 
posting one man as a lookout, called and questioned some of 
the inhabitants, and telephoned to detachment headquar- 
ters at Carlisle a report of his arrival at Center Mills, a 
summary of the statements of the inhabitants, and a state- 
ment that the patrol would continue south at once. 

Mail in the post office was not examined as the people 
were friendly and willing to give all possible information. 



134 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The owner of two good horses was found and instruc- 
ted to hide the horses, so that no hostile patrols could find 
them, and to be ready to turn them over to any messengers 
Lieut. A might send back. The above was done in case the 
telephone failed to work, and the messengers' horses should 
be exhausted. 

The telephone office and the place where the owner 
of the horses could be found was then pointed out to all 
the members of the patrol. 

Situation (continued) i 

At Center Mills it was learned that all wire connec- 
tion south of the Conewago had ceased during the after- 
noon, and that farmers living just north of the Conewago 
had reported seeing numerous small parties of the enemy 
late in the afternoon, but that no hostile party seemed 
to have come closer than about two miles to Center Mills. 
10:45 p.m. ^^ ^^ -45 p. m., Lieut. A is ready to proceed. 
Required : 

(a) Conduct of the patrol from Center Mills to the 
Conewago. 

(b) Reasons for action taken. 



Lieut. A moved the patrol forward till he was in touch 
with Corporal X, and then ordered: 

To Pvt. Z : 

Fall back until the patrol is about 100 yards in front of you and 
retain that position. Watch to the rear so that we shall not be sur- 
prised from that direction and should the patrol encounter the enemy, 
keep out of the fight. Should the patrol be ambushed and captured, 
you will hasten to Center Mills and telephone a report of the matter 
to headquarters at Carlisle, and then proceed back along the route we 
have come, and join our squadron. 

Do not rush off with a report that the patrol has been captured 
till you are sure that no part of the patrol, which you could join, has 
escaped and gone off in a different direction. Repeat your instruc- 
tions. All right. Take your place. 

ToSergt. Y: 

Take charge of these six men, as the main body of the patrol, and 
follow the point at about 150 yards. Have the men ride on the grass 
at the side of the road, so the horses will make little noise. Talking 
and smoking are forbidden. I will be with the point. Should the point 
hastily fall back toward you, you will gallop to the rear till I can 
join you and reorganize the patrol. 



CAVALRY PATROL 135 

Lieut. A then joined Corporal X and his companion 
and, having directed them to move noiselessly on the turf 
beside the road, proceeded south on the main road, at a 
walk. 

Reasons 

Lieut. A moves at a walk because the enemy may soon 
be encountered, and he does not wish to be ambushed. Trot- 
ting horses can be heard for a considerable distance, and 
thus, at night, when hearing is the sense most used, the 
enemy would know the patrol was coming in time to lay 
a trap for it. Furthermore, when riding at a trot, one's 
own horse makes so much noise, that one can hear nothing 
else unless the sound be very loud. 

Until he knows the direct road is barred, Lieut. A 
will keep to it, as being shortest and but little more danger- 
ous than any other; besides, it is necessary to know just 
where the enemy does bar this main road, and by keeping 
on it the possibility of getting lost is removed. On meeting 
the enemy, the patrol may be fired upon, but night firing is 
generally ineflfective. 

To patrol to the right and left at each crossroad be- 
fore proceeding, would greatly delay the patrol, which, 
moreover, passes such a point in a short time and does not 
stand so much in need of this precaution as would a lon- 
ger column. 

Situation (continued) : 

At 11:20 p. m., Lieut. A's patrol reached crossroad ^^'^^ ^'^' 
600 (near hill 646, three-quarters of a mile north of Table 
Rock) without incident. Here Lieut. A dismounted and, 
using his pocket-light, made a careful study of the tracks on 
the road. He could tell that a few mounted men had passed 
along each of the road branches in both directions, but 
could not determine how old the tracks were, because the 
artificial light made their color quite different from the 
appearance of tracks in daylight, and the dew had not yet 
affected the dust in the road. As farmers in this vicinity 
seldom ride, and it was known that no Blue troops were 
near, Lieut. A judged that hostile mounted patrols had been 



136 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

on these roads during the afternoon or evening. The pa- 
trol then proceeded to the top of hill 646. Here Corporal 
X and his companion were sent as a march outpost, 300 
yards south on the road, the patrol was halted, and the in- 
habitant of the house on the hill was wakened and ques- 
tioned. The latter stated that a few hostile patrols had 
been seen late in the afternoon, going sometimes in one 
direction and sometimes in the other. A small party of the 
enemy had entered his yard and house and looked about; 
but, except for stealing a few edibles and destroying his 
telephone, had not molested the inhabitants. The last hos- 
tile party seen had passed toward Table Rock at about 8 :00 
p. m. No inhabitants had come north since about 4:00 
p. m., when the first hostile party had appeared. 

Lieut. A mounted his patrol and led it to where Corpor- 
al X had halted. The corporal reported nothing observed, 
except that there was a loose horse grazing along the road 
about 100 yards to the south. The corporal stated that he 
had been much exercised about the movements of this 
horse, had finally investigated and found that the animal 
was lame and wore no harness or equipment of any kind. 

The patrol, in its previous formation, then proceeded to 
road- junction 553, the old horse keeping just ahead of the 
patrol as it advanced. Here Lieut. A directed Sergt. Y : 

Halt here with the patrol. I am going to take Corporal X and 
reconnoiter the bridge. Should we be driven back and pursued, we will 
turn up the west fork of the road, and you can then, as a surprise, 
charge any one who pursues us. 

As the old horse kept constantly ahead of Lieut. A and 
his companion and could not be quietly passed or caught, 
Lieut. A dismounted and acquired a handful of stones which 
he threw at the animal, thus causing it to keep a consider- 
able distance ahead of him on the road, along which mem- 
bers of the party rode in such manner as to keep as much as 
possible under cover of the weeds and bushes. Suddenly 
they were challenged in a foreign language; whereupon, 
Lieut. A and the corporal stopped but made no reply. At 
once the old horse wheeled about and came back toward 
them. As the old horse passed, Lieut. A and his compan- 
ion allowed their horses to turn and follow for a little way 



CAVALRY PATROL 137 

and then halted and listened. A few words in a foreign 
language were heard, followed by a laugh. 

By taking advantage of an unforeseen circumstance, 
Lieut. A had gained information without disclosing the 
presence of his patrol. First, he had learned that the 
bridge was guarded by the enemy, and second, that the 
guard was composed of cool, dangerous men, who did not 
shoot whenever they thought something moved, but quietly 
w^aited till they were sure they had seen an enemy. 

Lieut. A quietly rejoined his patrol, cut the fence, and 
taking his previous formation moved across country to the 
southwest. 

By midnight the patrol had forded the Conewago, 
and was at the junction of the country roads 400 yards 
east of Table Rock Station, which was found to be free 
of the enemy. 

Required s 

Action and orders of Lieutenant A. 



Lieut. A posted a lookout on each of the three branches 
of the road at a distance of 200 yards from the road junc- 
tion, assembled the remainder of the patrol behind a bush, 
and had them look at his map by the aid of the flashlight, 
the glow from which was limited by holding a slicker over 
it. 

He then ordered: 



Sergt. Y, take Pvts. and with you and go by the 

country road to the west till you strike the main north and south road 
at Texas, about a mile west of here. I want to know whether or not 
the bridge across the Conewago, about one-half mile north of Texas, 
is held by the enemy, and whether or not a party of the enemy is at 
or near Texas, or at the crossroad three-quarters mile south of that 
place. I am going east to the main road we just left, and then north. 
Pvts. and will accompany me. 

Corpl. X, you and Pvts. and will accompany me 

east to the main road, then go south and find out whether or not 
there is any party of the enemy at the main crossroad, about a mile 
south of where we enter the main road. 



138 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Pvts. and will recross the ford and remain on the 

north of the stream, prepared to cover the crossing of any of our 
three parties, should one be driven back.* 

I will be back here in an hour and a half and will expect the 
other two parties either to be at the ford, where we just crossed, or to 
send a report there by that time. Mount up and move out. 

Lieut. A and one private then preceded the remainder 
of his own and Corporal X's parties by about 100 yards, and 
moved quietly to road junction 1000 yards southwest of 
Table Rock. No enemy being found there, Corporal X and 
party turned south, and Lieut. A and party turned north 
in the formation — Lieut. A — distance 20 yards — one man 
— distance 100 yards — the other man. 

Road junction 567 was reached without incident, no 
enemy being found there. 

Required : 

(a) Lieut. A's estimate of the situation (brief and 
informal). 

(b) Further conduct of his party. 



(a) Lieut. A knows that the bridge at Table Rock 
is held by the enemy, whether by infantry or cavalry, a 
small party or a large one, he does not know, but wishes to 
find out. As no firing has been heard to the south, he 
thinks it likely that Corporal X found no enemy at Table 
Rock Schoolhouse, but this is not certain. He knows that 
there is no enemy at 567, or at the road-junction between 
that place and Table Rock Schoolhouse. He, therefore, 
estimates that the party at the Table Rock bridge is rather 
isolated and probably not large, or the bivouac of its main 
body would have been encountered by now. Coming upon 
this enemy from the rear, he would probably be mistaken 
for a friendly patrol or messenger, and might ride boldly 
into their camp with little danger. By so doing he would, 
however, probably spread alarm, and pursuit of him might 
easily cut off Corporal X. On the other hand, should Cor- 

*Leaving these two men at the ford is objectionable because it splits up the 
patrol too much. For this reason they might well be kept with Lieut. A. Left 
where they are, they woiild give warning, by firing, should the patrol unexpectedly be 
trailed by a hostile party ; would afford a well marked point for reassembly in the 
darkness ; and, should all the parties south of the stream be cut off, would insure 
word of their capture being sent back. 



CAVALRY PATROL 139 

poral X be attacked and pursued, Lieut. A can easily cut 
the fence and rejoin the patrol north of the river, by ford- 
ing the stream and working up its course. 

He, therefore, decides to cut the fence, conceal his 
horses in the orchard opposite 567, and try to approach dis- 
mounted till he can determine the strength and composi- 
tion of the hostile party, without himself being discovered. 

(b) He, therefore, moved about 100 yards off the 
road and, leaving his men and horses concealed in the edge 
of the orchard, went alone through the field toward the 
bridge, observing toward the road and the village of Table 
Rock as he advanced. 

Situation (continued) : 

Lieut. A found what he estimated to be 20 horses, with 
men bivouacked near them, in the fork of the road in Table 
Rock Village. By using his glasses, he was able to make 
them out quite distinctly without himself being discovered. 
(Any good field glass of moderate power is capable of be- 
ing used as a ''night glass"). He returned to his horses, 
mounted and started to return the way he had come. On 
the return journey he kept his men close to him, as the road 
to the rear is known to be closed, and united action can be 
better obtained with the men close to the leader. 

As he approached the road-junction between 567 and 
Table Rock Schoolhouse, a few horsemen were heard ap- 
proaching along the road from the south. They appeared 
to be south of the road- junction, and nearer to it than was 
his own party, when they were first observed by Lieut A. 

Required : 

Action of Lieutenant A, and his reasons therefor. 



Lieut. A dropped back to his two men and whispered : 

We will ride towards those fellows at a walk. Should they prove 
to be hostile, I will charge. Be ready to go with me. Do not speak. 

He then rode forward noiselessly at a walk. 

Reasons 

This is most likely Corporal X and his party, but it 
must be quickly and silently identified. To go quietly to 



140 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

meet it, will make a mistake in identification impossible, 
and will avoid any possibility of two Blue patrols engaging 
in an encounter with each other in the dark. Should the 
party prove to be hostile, it will most likely think Lieut. 
A's party a friendly one, till it is suddenly surprised by a 
charge and so scattered as to enable the Blue patrol to 
escape. Lieut. A's best route back to his rendezvous point 
is by the road beyond the point where he will meet the 
approaching party. A sudden charge would probably open 
that route, and would not, in case of failure, make it much 
more difficult to go back to 567, ford the stream near the 
orchard, and return to his party by that route. 

Another line of action would have been to halt and 
wait to see whether the other party turned west at the road- 
junction; thus giving additional color to the supposition 
that it was Corporal X. In circumstances such as these, 
a quick decision, followed by bold action on the line adopted, 
is of more importance than a fine balancing of the advan- 
tages and disadvantages of the different possible courses 
of action. 

Situation (continued) : 

The party developed to be hostile, was charged, and 
retreated rapidly to the south. At Table Rock School- 
house the enemy took the branch of the road that leads to 
the southwest, and Lieut. A halted his men. One of the 
enemy, on a slow horse, was captured. He was disarmed, 
and the patrol quickly returned with the prisoner to the 
rendezvous, Lieut. A questioning him en route. Owing to 
imperfect knowledge of the foreign language, all Lieut. A 
could learn was that the prisoner belonged to the 1st Red 
Cavalry ; that he had been a member of the patrol that was 
keeping up connection between different parts of his squad- 
ron, which was on contact duty; and that the prisoner's 
regiment, starting from Baltimore, had been marching 
for the past two days, but that he did not know where any 
part of it, except his squadron, was tonight. 

On reaching the rendezvous. Corporal X was found 
there. He had been up to the crossroads (608) as direct- 
ed, found no one there, and had returned without incident, 



CAVALRY PATROL 141 

probably having passed the road-junction where Lieut. A 
encountered the hostile patrol a few moments before that 
occurrence. 

At 1 :45 a. m., Private T, who had been with Sergt. Y, 
returned alone and reported that the remainder of his party 
had been captured. Sergt. Y, he reported, had turned 
south, after reaching the main road (Texas), and had ad- 
vanced about a mile when the party was challenged just as 
it stumbled upon a hostile bivouac. Private T saw a long 
line of horses there, he thinks more than 100, with men biv- 
ouacked beside them. His party hastily retreated, pur- 
sued by mounted men; but before it regained the cross- 
road, another hostile party rode into it from the north. 
He escaped by jumping his horse over a fence beside the 
road, and, after some wandering, returned to the rendez- 
vous. The others were captured. 

Required : 

Further actions and orders of Lieutenant A. 



By the aid of his flash light held under a slicker Lieut. 
A wrote the following message: 

From Patrol 1st Cav. 

At Near table rock station 

1 July 2:00 A. M. No. 1. 

To Commander, Carlisle. 

Hostile cavalry is observing the crossing of the CONEWAGO north of 
GETTYSBURG. I saw about 20 hostile cavalry at table rock bridge. 
Private T saw about a hostile squadron (foreign) bivouacked just west 
of GOLDENVILLE. Have encountered hostile connecting patrols south of 
the CONEWAGO on both roads to Carlisle. Prisoner from 1st Red 
Cavalry, sent herewith, reports his regiment marched from Baltimore 

the 29th. Have lost Sergt. Y and Pvt. captured. 

I go south. 

A, 

Lieut. 

He then ordered Private T and Private (whose 

horse is weakening) : 

Take this prisoner in charge, move northeast until you strike the 
main road by which we came, then go to Center Mills. There, telephone 
to our detachment headquarters the following message : 'This is Lieut. 
A's patrol. Lieut A found hostile cavalry observing the crossings of 
the Conewago with a hostile squadron near Goldenville in their support. 



1:45 a. m. 



142 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

I am bringing back a prisoner from 1st Red Cavalry. Lieut A is 
going south.' After telephoning go on back and deliver the prisoner 
and this written message to the first Blue officer you encounter and 
ask him to help you. If you are in danger of capture at any time, 
destroy the message and give instead the one I told you to telephone. 
When you are relieved of the prisoner rejoin your squadron. 
Move at alternate walk and trot after reaching the main road. Re- 
peat to me the message you are to telephone. All right, now repeat 
your instructions. All right. Move out. 

The horses were then offered water, and the patrol 

mounted and moved out in the formation : Lieut. A and 

one private — distance 100 yards — Corporal X and three 

privates distance 100 yards one private. The patrol 

moved south across country till the Mummasburg — Hunt- 
erstown road had been crossed and then took the main road 
2:40 a.m. towards Gettysburg. At 2:40 a. m., the vicinity of hill 
527 was reached, and Lieut. A decided to give his horses a 
rest and feed, and wait for daylight. 

(Horses can do more than these animals have done, 
but they have already had to stand the heat of yesterday, 
and then work nearly all night. To keep them in condition 
for further severe exertion, they must have a rest now. 
With all the rest and care he can give them, Lieut. A's 
horses will be so exhausted by a few days of this kind of 
work, that they will require weeks to recover. If not given 
frequent rests, feed and, above all, in this hot weather, 
water, it will take but a few hours to so exhaust them, 
that they will be incapable of taking a fast gait for more 
than a moment or two, and thus will be rendered entirely 
useless in an emergency). 

Lieut. A went to the farm house south of hill 527, 
which is off the main road, woke the farmer, and obtained 
some hay which was carried inside the small orchard. He 
then placed one man on watch, had the others loosen cin- 
chas, feed the hay to their horses, and rub the horses' legs. 
(Oats could not be safely fed until the horses had rested and 
cooled. Hay will not hurt them now, and will partially 
fill their stomachs and blunt their appetites, so that they will 
not bolt the oats when fed a little later. The horses could 
graze at this time of the year, but when hay is available, it 
should be fed, as being less likely to cause running of the 
bowels and consequent weakness). 



CAVALRY PATROL 143 

The men were then directed to eat their cooked meal, 
feed to the horses the oats they had with them, and rest 
till called; the man on watch being relieved from time to 
time. 

Having quickly given orders for this, Lieut. A, while 
eating his own meal, talked with the farmer and from him 
learned the following: 

Hostile cavalry yesterday afternoon requisitioned a 
wagon load of grain from the farm ; a large force of caval- 
ry and artillery camped just north of Gettysburg at dark 
last night, their bivouac being visible from the attic win- 
dows of the house ; the hostile forces came from the south- 
east, the main body arriving at Gettysburg about 2 :00 p. m. 

Accompanied by the farmer, Lieut. A went to the up- 
per windows. From there he could see enough camp fires 
to be sure the bivouac was still occupied. 

Required : 

Decision of Lieutenant A and his reasons. 



Lieutenant A decides to remain as at present till day- 
light, allowing his horses and men to rest as previously 
planned. 

Reasons 

Lieut. A, at daylight, which w411 begin in about an 
hour, can learn much by observation from his present lo- 
cation, and indications are that he will be able, from here, 
to get information back to the command. Should he go 
further toward the hostile camp, he is in danger of encoun- 
tering the hostile exterior guard, runs additional risk of 
capture, and may so arouse the hostile observing parties as 
to jeopardize any chance of further success. 

Having come to a decision that his horses and men need 
rest, he should stick to it. There is nothing which so quick- 
ly exhausts and demoralizes a command, be it large or 
small, as constant changes of plan by the commander. 
Having once come to a decision, a commander should stick 
to it till absolutely forced to change. 



144 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Situation (continued) : 

As day began to break, and the details of the terrain 
could be seen, Lieut. A had his patrol move to the small 
woods 500 yards northeast of hill 527 and remain in hiding 
there. Accompanied by the farmer, he remained in obser- 
vation of the camp. An orderly, tying his horse and that 
of the lieutenant in a shed near the house, kept a sharp 
lookout to prevent a surprise by any hostile party. 

While waiting for something to happen in the hostile 
bivouac, Lieut. A wrote the following message in triplicate. 

From Patrol 1st Cav. 

At 2 mi. north of GETTYSBURG, pa. 

1 July , A. M. No. 2. 

To Commander, Carlisle. 

My No. 1 reported hostile cavalry observing line of conewago. 
Hostile cavalry accompanied by artillery, bivouacked last night just 
north of GETTYSBURG. I estimate 

After daylight the enemy had breakfast, saddled up, 
and, what appeared to be an advance guard, started north 
a little later. 

Through his glasses, Lieut. A was never able to see the 
whole bivouac, on account of intervening objects; but he 
could see that such a bivouac was on the small hill near the 
almshouse and, from the portions he could observe, was able 
to tell approximately its whole size. By 4:15 a. m., he had 
added to his written messages: I estimate one brigade of cav- 
alry and one battery, from what I can see at a distance of two miles. 

As soon^ as the hostile advance guard began to move 
4:45 a.m. out at 4:45 a. m., Lieut. A added to his messages: Hostile 

advance guard has just started north. I remain in observation, 

then signed the messages, filled in the time in their date 
lines and hastened to his horse. 

Quickly mounting, Lieut. A and his orderly, screened 
by the house and the orchard, galloped to the patrol where 
Lieut. A ordered : 

To Pvt. R : 

You and Private take this message. Ride at alternate 

trot and gallop. Go northeast along the bed of this stream till you 
come to its head, then northwest from there to Center Mills. At Cen- 
ter Mills get fresh horses, at the place I pointed out to you while we 
were there, and continue on by the main road toward Carlisle till you 
meet your squadron. If you are in danger of capture, destroy the 



CAVALRY PATROL 145 

message and make this verbal report: 'Hostile cavalry brigade with 
a battery marched north from Gettysburg at 5:00 a. m.' While you 
are changing horses at Carlisle try to telephone that same message to 
headquarters at Carlisle. Each of you repeat the message. All right, 
mount and move out. 

To Corporal X : 

You and Private take this mesage. Ride at about six 

miles per hour, unless you can later get fresh horses, when you may 
go as fast as the ground permits. Take this by road to the northeast 
and then go by the pike that leads in the same direction. When ap- 
proaching the Conewago, keep off the roads and cross by fording. Near 
Plainview (pointed out on the corporal's sketch) turn northwest. Go 
east of Chestnut Hill and then work toward the Carlisle road. Get 
the message to headquarters at Carlisle, and to our squadron. Ask 
any Blue officer to assist you. If you are in danger of capture, de- 
stroy the message, and in its place make this report: 'Hostile cavalry 
brigade with a battery marched north from Gettysburg at 5:00 a. m.' 
Repeat the message. All right, move out. 

To the remaining two privates : 
Mount and follow me. 

Lieut. A followed the wooded stream lines, keeping as 
much as possible under their cover, and moved at alternate 
trot and gallop, first southeast to the stream fork, then 
northeast to the next fork, then along the south branch of 
that fork to the foot of Granite Hill. On Granite Hill, the 
horses were held under cover of the woods, while Lieut. A 
spent twenty minutes in observing through his glasses in 
all directions. He saw nothing except that on the Gettys- 
burg — Center Mills road clouds of dust, gradually moving 
north, showed that the lieutenant had not been mistaken 
in believing the party, he observed going north, to be an ad- 
vance guard. He was relieved to observe this, as he had 
previously had to report from indications only ; a thing that 
should not be done if verification is possible before the re- 
port must be sent. Otherwise, the indications only should 
be reported, not the conclusions draw^n from them. After 
sending off the report from near hill 527, Lieut. A realiz- 
ed that the hostile party moving north might be an inde- 
pendent party, or a flank guard. That his statement that 
it was an advance guard, and the verbal reports he had 
ordered, to the effect that the whole hostile force was mov- 
ing north, were both unjustified. It requires a cool head to 
avoid making such unjustified reports, which may lead 
a superior commander into making most serious tactical 



146 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

errors. From Granite Hill Lieut. A moved south and, 
by inquiry among the inhabitants, learned that the enemy 
came yesterday by the Baltimore Pike ; so he turned south- 
east by that route, reaching Littlestown without incident 
at 8 : 00 a. m. Here it was learned that wire communication 
had been interrupted in all directions, but that no enemy 
had been seen or heard of since noon yesterday, when the 
tail of a hostile cavalry brigade accompanied by artillery 
had passed through the town going towards Gettysburg. 
He also learned that there were several automobiles in the 
town. 

Required : 

Further action of Lieut. A. 



Lieut. A had his men care for and feed the horses in 
Littlestown, and then rest, while the citizens kept watch to 
see that no enemy approached unobserved. He then as- 
sembled several citizens who had automobiles, and induced 
them to ride out in all directions. They were instructed to 
go about twenty miles, find out from the inhabitants 
whether or not any enemy had been seen, learn where 
wire communication with Carlisle could be obtained, and 
then return and report. In case any enemy should be en- 
countered, they were to give business in the nearest town 
as their reason for being out ; to remain silent about Lieut. 
A's patrol; but to tell about having seen hostile cavalry, 
in order to give an air of truth to their statements. 

Situation (continued) : 

By 11:00 a. m., Lieut. A learned that no enemy could 
be found on any road within twenty miles of Littlestown; 
that from Spring Grove, fifteen miles northeast of Littles- 
town, the wires were open to Carlisle ; and that the last of 
the enemy had left Gettysburg before 9 :30 a. m., when one 
of the automobiles passed through that place, all having gone 
north according to the reports of inhabitants. 



CAVALRY PATROL 147 

Required : 

Lieut. A's estimate of the situation (brief and informal) 
and his decision. 



Lieut. A estimates that a hostile cavalry brigade with a 
battery is making either a raid or a reconnaissance ; that it 
is not followed by other troops ; and that the alteration in the 
direction of its march on leaving Gettysburg was made either 
in compliance with fresh orders received, the information 
they had gathered, or a desire to confuse the Blues and 
thus gain freedom of action, while spreading alarm over a 
wide area. As main roads lead in all directions from Get- 
tysburg, the stop of the Reds at that place would not indicate 
their objective; and, had they originally intended moving 
toward Carlisle, advance by way of Gettysburg would thus 
be advantageous, and would leave the direct Carlisle — Balti- 
more road available for a return journey. 

With jaded horses and tired men, Lieut A cannot pro- 
ceed, mounted, far enough to do any service. He can go by 
motor to Spring Grove in an hour and report direct to his 
commander by wire. From the rear of the hostile force, he 
is in a position to learn much, and able to transmit it by 
motor and wire. It may be that the commander will desire 
him to remain in rear of the enemy ; on the other hand, some 
other service may be more important. 

Decision 

To leave his patrol to rest in Littlestown while he goes 
by auto to Spring Grove and reports by wire to the com- 
mander. 



Part V Reconnaissance and Flank 

Protection by a Squadron 



Reconnaissance and Flank Protection by a Squadron 
General Situation: 

The Conewago is the boundary between two small hos- 
tile states — Red, north; Blue, south. War was declared 
Nov. 24th. 
Special Situation (Blue) : 

On the night of Nov. 24th, orders were received at 
Gettysburg for the troops at that place, consisting of 1st 
Inf. Brigade, 1st Field Artillery Battalion, and 1st Squadron, 
1st Cavalry, to move rapidly to Carlisle and destroy the im- 
portant railroad junction at that place (Carlisle is 30 miles 
north of Gettysburg. Both wagon road and railroad di- 
rectly connect the two places) . 

At 1:00 a. m., Nov. 25th, the detachment commander 
gave Major A, commanding 1st Blue Squadron, the follow- 
ing instructions : 

Our detachment is ordered to march to Carlisle and destroy the 
railroad junction at that place, Carlisle is known to be garrisoned by 
not less than 1,000 of the enemy. 

The detachment will march at 6:00 a. m. by the Gettysburg — 
Table Rock — Center Mills — Carlisle road. I expect to march about 
15 miles today. 

Your squadron will march at 5:30 a. m. You will reconnoiter suffi- 
ciently far in advance of the brigade to give ample security, but I do 
not desire to alarm the enemy unnecessarily, by the appearance of 
your squadron beyond points which must be occupied to provide se- 
curity for the night. 

The march order, when issued, will designate your squadron as 
independent cavalry. 

One non-commissioned officer and nine troopers will report to the 
Brigade Adjutant at 5:45 a. m. 

I will march at the head of the main body. 

Note: The ground is bare and damp, temperature 40 degrees, 
weather clear. 

The officers of the squadron have the %2500 Geological Survey Map. 

Required : 

(a) Major A's orders for the march, exactly as issued. 
148 



I 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 149 

(b) Briefly, the reasons for the" dispositions made. 
To his adjutant, verbally: 

Notify the troops that breakfast will be at 4:30 a. m., and that 
the troops will be formed ready to march at 5:25 a. m. All officers 
will report for orders at 5:15 a. m. 

Have 2d Lieut. B and Sergt. C of Troop A report to me now for 
orders. 

To Lieut. B and Sergt. C, on their arrival, verbally: 

It is reported that Carlisle, about 30 miles north of here, is occu- 
pied by the enemy. Our detachment marches today at 6:00 a. m., on 
Carlisle, by the Gettysburg — Table Rock — Center Mills — Carlisle road, 
but will advance only about 15 miles today. 

Our squadron will march in advance of the detachment, but will 
not approach nearer than ten miles to Carlisle. 

Lieut. B, you will obtain six selected men from your troop and 
march at 4:30 a.m., by way of Plainview and Heidlersburg, and thence 
generally north, keeping several miles east of the route of the detach- 
ment. I desire early information of the movements of any hostile 
bodies larger than patrols. If any such body is discovered, I wish 
to know its size and the direction of its movement. I shall expect a 
report at the crossroads two miles north of the Conewago, on the 
Table Rock — Center Mills road, covering the following points: con- 
ditions along your route for at least five miles north of the Conewago ; 
state of roads and bridges; information of the enemy. I expect to 
reach that crossroad about 7:15 or 7:30 a. m. Should I move on be- 
fore a message is received from you, I shall leave a post there to direct 
messengers. After this first report, send messages only when you 
have something of importance to report. Keep concealed and do not 
approach closer than five or six miles to Carlisle. Return to the 
squadron by dark, before which time new patrols will be sent out. 
Unless the action of the enemy prevents, a post for directing messen- 
gers and returning patrols will be established where the railroad 
crosses the Center Mills — Carlisle road 3J miles north of Center Mills. 

To Sergt. C, similar orders were given, except that 
he v^as sent by way of Biglerville — Brysonia — Benders- 
ville. (Bendersville is four miles northeast of Brysonia). 

To assembled officers at 5:15 a. m. : 

It has been learned that the enemy, at least 1,000 strong, occupies 
Carlisle. Our detachment marches at 8:00 a. m. on Carlisle, by the 
Gettysburg — Table Rock — Center Mills — Carlisle road, but wall ad- 
vance only 15 miles today. To avoid unnecessarily alarming the 
enemy, our patrols should not go closer than five or six miles to 
Carlisle today, and should keep concealed when beyond the point 
where the detachment will camp. 

Lieut. B and Sergt. C are now out with patrols well to the flanks 
of our line of march. Both patrols will send reports to meet the 
squadron about two miles north of the Conewago. 

Troop A will send one non-commissioned officer and nine men to 
report to the Brigade Adjutant at 5 :45 a. m. 

This squadron, as independent cavalry, marches at once by the 
route to be taken by the detachment. 



150 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Troop A (less detachments) will constitute the advance guard. It 
will keep a small patrol two or three miles to its front. The advance 
guard should average about four miles per hour, including halts. 

The main body, in the order Troops B, C, and D will follow the 
advance guard at about half a mile. 

All wheeled transportation will join the Detachment trains. 

I will ride at the head of the main body. 



Reasons 

The ordinary routine would not call for such an early 
breakfast. Horses, also, must be fed earlier than usual. 
Troops must, therefore, be notified at once of the intended 
march, so that the cooks and stable crews may attend to 
these matters in time. 

Lieut. B and Sergt. C are to start earlier than the squad- 
ron. They, also, must be notified at once, so they can secure 
and inspect their details, feed their horses, and have break- 
fast for their men in advance of the rest of the squadron. 

It takes time for patrols to do their work, and it also 
takes time for their messages to be transmitted to the com- 
mander. To permit information to be gathered by patrols 
and transmitted to the commander in time to be of use to 
him, these patrols must have an early start, or the rate of 
advance of the column must be very slow ; or time allowed 
by a combination of these two methods. Patrols do not go 
at a fast gait direct to the only point from which they may 
see anything, arrive there at the exact time when the most 
can be seen, and send a message at high speed to the exact 
point where the commander will have just arrived to receive 
it. Troop horses are not of a quality to stand this kind of 
pace. The patrol has to search for its information, spend- 
ing much time in quiet observation from available points be- 
fore anything is seen ; and probably moving to verify what 
it has guessed from the few things observed. Messen- 
gers cannot find the most direct route. Accidents happen 
to horses. Bridges are found destroyed or fords im- 
passable, and a route has to be searched for and found. The 
commander has to be hunted up after the messenger does 
get in contact with some troops of the column. If these 
things are not considered, the commander's patrols may 
gain some information, but they will never be able to trans- 
mit it in time to be useful. 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 151 

While, in general, patrols do not send in messages unless 
some positive information has been gained, in this situation 
it is desirable to have reports as to the condition of the roads 
and bridges in the valley of the Conewago, and to know that 
the patrols, on crossing the border, have found no hostile 
troops. For these reasons, Lieut. B and Sergt. C are or- 
dered to send messages to meet the squadron. 

At least six men must go with the leader of each of the 
above patrols, as a message requiring a double messenger 
(in hostile country) is required from each patrol; also, 
enough men to keep up the observation, after one additional 
message has been sent, should be provided. As patrols of 
this size will probably just be able to do the work required 
of them, they should not be larger. Larger patrols are more 
conspicuous and, what is worse, the detachment of large pa- 
trols soon greatly depletes the effective strength of the main 
fighting force. 

Until the enemy has been encountered, it is best to keep 
a small patrol well in front of the advance guard. Such a 
patrol will greatly facilitate the orderly march of the column. 
Knowing that the country for two or three miles in front 
of the advance guard is passable, apparently free of the ene- 
my, and contains no important and unexpected conditions 
to be met by the command, the commander can designate 
crossroads in advance where patrols are to send reports; 
can make his march at a regulated gait ; can stop to water, 
in security, at the most favorable place ; and can be advised 
of broken bridges or impassable places in the road in time 
to turn the column off by a passable route without counter- 
marching. Such a patrol lends security to the column, but, 
above all, it conduces to an orderly, well regulated march, 
which conserves the strength of the command. 

It is quite possible that the advance guard commander 
would send this patrol ahead without specific orders; 
but the practice of sending such a patrol ahead of the 
advance guard is not sufficiently well established in our ser- 
vice to make it certain that he would do so. Hence, Major 
A gives specific instructions to the advance guard comman- 
der to have a small patrol precede the advance guard. 



152 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

When the commander marches at the head of the main 
body, it is usually better to tell the advance guard comman- 
der at what rate to march, rather than impose on him the 
very difficult task of regulating his march on the head of 
the main body. The latter method is difficult and unsatis- 
factory, and requires the advance guard commander to keep 
his attention to the rear instead of to the front, where it 
should be centered. 

When near the enemy, cavalry commands smaller than 
a brigade must not be hampered by wheeled transportation. 
If a severe encounter is to be anticipated, extra ammu- 
nition must be issued before starting and carried on the 
horses. If supplies cannot be brought up in the evening, 
the cavalry must live off the country. The mission, how- 
ever, must be borne in mind when making a decision about 
transportation. For example, a squadron sent to a distance 
to work some particular destruction to the enemy's line of 
communications, might be obliged to carry with it the neces- 
sary tools and explosives, even though the only practicable 
method of so doing would be in wagons. 

Situation (continued) : 

At 5 :30 a. m., the squadron started pursuant to above 
order. 

Required : 

Conduct of the advance guard until a point two miles 
north of the Conewago is reached, nothing of importance 
having been discovered in the meanwhile. 

At 5 :30 a. m.. Captain A, commanding Troop A, mounts 
his troop and issues the following order: 

To Troop, verbally: 

Our detachment marches north today by the main road (point- 
ing) which passes through the villages of Table Rock and Center 
Mills and leads to Carlisle, about 30 miles north of here and gar- 
risoned by the enemy. It is called the Carlisle Road. 

Our squadron, as independent cavalry, preceeds the detachment 
by a few miles and marches by the route that will be taken by the de- 
tachment. The squadron will make four miles per hour, including 
halts. 

This troop will be the advance guard for the squadron. 

Lieut. B and Sergt. C, with patrols, are now out to the flanks of 
our route. 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 153 

Corporal X, with four men, you will go ahead of the troop, making 
about six miles per hour till Conewago Creek is crossed, and there- 
after about four miles per hour. About one mile north of Gettysburg 
the road forks, take the right hand road which goes through Table 
Rock and Center Mills. You will give me prompt warning of the 
appearance of any hostile troops and also promptly report any im- 
passable places in the road, or information of anything else which 
will interfere with the march of the squadron. If not recalled before 
that time, you will halt about ten miles north of Conewago Creek 
and send a messenger for orders. Move out. 

Captain A then placed himself at the head of the troop 
and commanded, Right by twos — March. 

The country around Gettysburg is friendly. If any 
enemy were in the immediate vicinity, his presence would 
have been reported. The advance guard formation will 
therefore be gradually assumed, but need not be fully de- 
veloped for the first few miles. To send out flankers or 
flank patrols, at first, will unnecessarily weary that many 
men and horses. 

Cavalry ordinarily marches in column of twos when 
far from the enemy, and when the number of troops that 
must use the road is not so large as to necessitate shorten- 
ing the column. This formation is less fatiguing to both 
men and horses. 

When the roadfork, where two Carlisle roads branch, 
came in sight. Captain A ordered : 

Sergt. T, we will halt here for ten minutes. Take four men and 
go ahead about 400 yards as march outpost. When the march is 
resumed you will act as point, keeping about 400 yards ahead of the 
troop. I will send out connecting files. 

Then to one of his trumpeters : 

My compliments to Major A and say that the advance guard is 
halting for ten minutes. After delivering the message return to me 
here. 

Captain A then signalled. Halt— Dismount, and ordered : 

Corporal W, take three men and follow that road which branches 
off to the left. March on that road. It goes almost due north till you 
reach Bendersville, which is nearly ten miles from here. You will 
pass through a small town, called Bigierville, about a mile north of 
the Conewago. Do not confuse the two places. If nothing has hap- 
pened by the time you reach Bendersville, you will bear to the east till 
you reach the road on which the squadron is marching. You may 
encounter some part of Sergt. C's patrol which is operating in that 
direction. Make about five miles per hour. 

I want information of the appearance of any parties of the 
enemy. Also, a report on the condition of the bridge over the Cone- 



154 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

wago and the condition of the roads. After you are well across the 
Conewago I want to hear from you, whether you have anything to 
report or not. You can send a single messenger, as the squadron will 
not be far from you. The road on which the squadron is marching 
will never be over two miles to the east of your route. If you make 
five miles per hour, any messenger you send should reach any point on 
the squadron's route at about the same time the squadron reaches 
the same point. 

About ten minutes after halting, Captain A signalled, 
Mount — Forward — March. He moved at a trot, from time 
to time, when road conditions warranted it. 

In this way, he is progressing at about five miles pei" 
hour while moving. This will allow for hourly halts when 
a desirable location is reached, and will also allow for a stop 
to water the horses when they have marched far enough to 
drink well. In this way his rate of march will average 
about the desired four miles per hour. 

The ''hourly halts" will not be made exactly at a definite 
time^ as is done in a long column, but when a defensible 
locality is reached after the time for such a halt. 

At the road junction, two miles north of Gettysburg, a 
patrol, of Corporal S and three men, was sent out to go by 
way of Goodintent School and Bender's Church, with orders 
similar to those of Corporal W's patrol. 

Troop A consisted of 3 officers and 86 men. They were 
distributed as follows: 

With the wagons — Q. M. Sergt., two cooks, wagoner. _ 4 

Captain's trumpeters 2 

In ranks, 1st plat., Lieut. D and 20 men 20 and 1 officer 

2d " 1st Sergt., commanding, 20 men 21 

3d " Sergt. R., commanding, 18 men 19 

4th " Lieut. B, 20 men 20 and 1 officer 

86 

At this time they are distributed as follows : 

Patrol to northeast, Lieut. B and 6 men 6 men and 1 officer 

" northwest, Sergt. C's patrol 7 " 

At Brigade Headquarters 10 " 

23 

The above were all taken from the fourth platoon, ex- 
cept three men required to complete the quota for Brigade 
Headquarters, taken from the third platoon ; thus reducing 
that platoon to 16 men. 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 155 

Later there were sent out : 

Patrol to front 5 men 

Point 5 " 

Patrol via Bendersville 4 " 

" Bender's Church 4 " 

18 men 

These details used up the third platoon and required 
one additional man from the second platoon. So out of his 
troop, Captain A now has left with him one officer, the two 
trumpeters, and the first and second platoons, less one man 
on patrol and two connecting files. 

When Captain A, at the head of the main body of his 
troop, reached the farm house on top of the ridge 500 yards 
south of Table Rock School House (4f miles north of Gettys- 
burg) he signalled, Halt, and ordered: 

Sergt. R, take two fours from the 2d Platoon as advance party 
from here on. For the present, precede the troop, water when you 
cross the creek ahead, and then go on to the top of that hill (pointing 
to hill 646, 1200 yards north of Table Rock — see 3" map) and act as 
march outpost while the troop waters. Send patrols to reconnoiter 
one-half mile to each flank of your route as you ascend the opposite 
slope of this valley. Halt on top of the hill I pointed out and remain 
there till ordered to move forward. The point is placed under your 
orders. Notify Sergt. T to that effect. 

Note: The map shows in this vicinity two hills 646, 
and four hills 647. When one is mentioned, the student 
should be sure he finds the right one. 

Then to Lieut. D : 

Take two orderlies with you and ride northeast behind this ridge. 

Thoroughly reconnoiter, through your glasses, the valley of the 
Conewago. Rejoin me at Table Rock, where I will be in about twenty 
minutes. (Lieut. D rejoined at Table Rock having observed nothing). 



Here we have illustrated the advantage of Major A's 
method of giving his advance guard orders to make a certain 
average speed ; and then allowing the advance guard to suit 
its march to conditions. A march in set formation, con- 
ducted by a commander at the head of the main body, would 
not permit of a valley like this being properly reconnoitered, 
and of placing troops of the command on the opposite crest 
before the whole squadron was badly exposed to unexpected 



156 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

artillery, or even infantry fire. In such a formation, with 
a commander striving to keep set distances, the main body 
of the squadron might easily be surprised by fire at 500 
yards from an enemy concealed in the small v^oods 600 
yards v^est of Table Rock, whose presence there the advance 
guard had had no chance to discover, and against whom it 
would be very diflficult to take effective action. 

Situation (continued) : 

The march of the advance guard continued without in- 
cident. Captain A halted the bulk of the troop on hill 646 
(1200 yards north of Table Rock), with the advance party 
on hill 647 (one-half mile beyond), while the squadron was 
watering near the ridge at Table Rock. 

While on hill 646, Captain A, at 7:30 a. m., received 
the following message by two men from Corporal X's patrol. 
(This message was sent from Mt. Olivet School House — 3" 
map). 

At 7:00 a. m., two long railroad trains were unloading Red troops 
at Center Mills Station. While I was watching them detrain, a hostile 
squadron, escorting a battery, came into Center Mills from the north. 
All the troops of the hostile squadron were noticeably smaller than 
our troops. I will continue in observation, falling back toward the 
squadron if the enemy advances. 

Required : 

Action of the advance guard commander. 



Captain A to the messengers from Corpl. X : 

Take your message on to Major A, who is near the bridge 
about one-half mile behind us. Report to Major A that I am advanc- 
ing to the next ridge ahead. Rejoin the troop when Major A is 
through with you. 

Captain A then signalled to Sergt. R (commanding 
the advance party, now on hill 647) : Forward— Trot— March. 
He then commanded : Mount— Forward— March, and after de- 
scending the steep slope, Trot — March. 

He halted the troop behind the crest of hill 647, that he 
might take a long look to the north through his glasses be- 
fore exposing the bulk of his troop in the broad valley be- 
yond. 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 157 

Situation (continued) : 

As Captain A dismounted to look through his glasses, 
Corporal S's patrol rode up, having been directed back from 
576 by Sergeant R. Corporal S reported that there was no 
bridge, but a ford, at the crossing of the Conewago about 
one-half mile southeast of Bender's Church. The ford was 
in good condition, water about three feet deep. 

Looking through his glasses. Captain A sees the follow- 
ing : Two Blue troopers trotting east about one-quarter of 
a mile w^est of 582 ; Sergeant R's party halted near 582 ; two 
or three Blue troopers, hotly pursued by a small party of 
Reds, coming down the slope about 600 yards north of 582. 
(It later develops that the two troopers seen approaching 
582 from the west were messengers from Sergeant C, carry- 
ing also a message from Corporal W. It was some mo- 
ments, however, before this was learned). 
Required : 

Captain A's actions and reasons therefor. 



Captain A mounted his horse and commanded, For- 
ward — Gallop — March. 

Reasons 

It is the business of the advance guard to clear the way 
for the main body. This can be done only by offensive ac- 
tion. In this case, offensive action appears doubly impor- 
tant because it is necessary to gain working room for the 
detachment north of the Conewago. Now at 7 :35 a. m., the 
head of the Blue infantry should be near 608, about one and 
one-half miles south of the crossing of the Conewago at Table 
Rock. This assumes the infantry to have marched three 
miles per hour, while in motion, and to have made one halt. 
The enemy in strength is known to be only a short distance 
away. If the enemy advances, it is probable that the squad- 
ron will have to fight a delaying action to enable the infan- 
try to cross the Conewago before the crossings of that 
stream come under hostile fire. Each succeeding height to 
the north which is secured will be an advantage. On the 
other hand, as the enemy is knoivn to have artillery, the 
squadron cannot erpose itself on the road in the broad valley 



158 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

north of hill 647 till smaller bodies of Blue troops hold the 
ridge beyond. Captain A made a try for these heights — it 
would not be equally advisable for Major A to risk the bulk 
of his squadron in the same way. 

Situation (continued) : 

As Captain A passed 576, heavy firing was heard to his 
front, the sound of the shots showing that Sergeant R was 
engaged in dismounted action with a hostile force which had 
a greater volume of fire. 

Required : 

Captain A's action and his reasons. 



Captain A stopped his troop, cut the fence and turned 
out of the road westward, halting his men behind the nose 
just northwest of 576. Leaving Lieutenant D in command, 
he galloped forward through the fields toward Sergeant R's 
men. 

Reasons 

Evidently the road ahead of Captain A will be under 
fire. Should he continue forward on the road, he will suffer 
severe losses with nothing to be gained thereby. His at- 
tempt to get to the heights north of 582, ahead of the enemy, 
has failed, but the attempt was nevertheless justified. With 
the enemy, apparently in some force, already holding these 
heights. Captain A, by moving to the nose west of 576, will 
be in a stronger position, suffer less loss, gain the ability 
to maneuver freely, and still command the road. He gal- 
lops to the front so he can see what is going on, and thus be 
able to plan for his next move. Lieutenant D will be able to 
take immediate action with the bulk of the troop, should 
anything unexpected happen while Captain A is gone. 

As soon as the troop was halted behind the nose, a com- 
bat patrol should have been sent to the higher ground just 
west of the troop. Perhaps Lieutenant D will have the 
sense and initiative to do this ; if not, it will be one of those 
things that are of no importance unless some move of the 
enemy brings out the omission, in which case both Captain 
A and Lieutenant D will be held to have been inexcusably 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 159 

negligent. In the hurry of a meeting engagement, such 
omissions are not infrequent with the best troops. They 
are sometimes very costly; so a commander must make 
every effort to avoid making them, thereby reducing the 
risks he runs to a minimum. 

Situation (continued) : 

Major A, on receiving the message transmitted from 
Corporal X's patrol, ordered the squadron, under Captain B, 
senior captain, to follov^ at a trot, and himself galloped 
ahead to join the advance guard. He reached hill 647 just 
after Captain A had started forward at a gallop. Major A 
halted to view the scene. He saw Sergeant R's party behind 
the farm buildings at 582, and a moment later saw it 
rush out and attack some Reds who were pursuing six or 
seven Blues down the road. (Corporal X's party having 
joined the point in the valley, both were swept back on Ser- 
geant R. Major A, however, knows only what he sees). 
Upon Sergeant R's mounted attack, the Reds retreated north 
on the road, and in a moment, a hostile party of a platoon 
or more opened fire from near the orchard 650 yards north 
of 582. Sergeant R's party hastily took cover behind the 
farm buildings, dismounted and opened fire. 

As the squadron was heard trotting up in the rear. Ma- 
jor A signalled Halt, and continued in observation. In a 
few moments Captain A was observed to have turned west- 
ward off the road. (Sergeant R's party now numbers: 
point five men ; advance party, nine men ; messengers from 
the west, two men — 16 men, less such losses as he has suf- 
fered up to this time) . In this study the care of the wound- 
ed, burial of the dead, etc., will not be touched upon. It will 
be good practice for the student to assume a few losses as he 
goes along, and then decide upon the sanitary measures 
that should be taken. 

As Major A watched, the enemy redoubled his fire and 
two troops galloped down the slope, off the road, taking 
shelter in the stream bottom just north of 582, while Ser- 
geant R's party mounted and galloped through the fields to 
join Troop A's main body. 



160 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Required : 

Action of Major A and his reasons. 



1. Sends combat patrol to hill 586, from there to send 
scouts toward Friend's Grove S. H. ; and another combat pa- 
trol to hill 674 (one-half mile east of Biglerville) , to send 
scouts from there toward Guernsey. 

2. Forms squadron in mass, off the road, and orders all 
fences in the vicinity cut, to permit easy passage of troops in 
any direction. 

3. Directs his adjutant: 

Tell Captain A to occupy that nose (the one 1000 yards north- 
west of hill 647, where Major A now stands) dismounted. The 
squadron will stay here and will support Captain A if he is attacked. 

Reasons 

Knowledge that the enemy has infantry and artillery 
close by makes it unwise for Major A to attack the hostile 
cavalry in the low ground, which is commanded from the 
heights held by the enemy. The same knowledge makes it 
unwise for him to engage in the obvious turning movement. 
Such a turning movement will at once open the road and give 
the enemy a chance to occupy, unopposed, the heights which 
command the crossings of the Conewago. For the present, 
Major A's mission requires him to stay between the enemy 
and the main body of the Blue detachment. Were the hos- 
tile squadron known to be, or strongly suspected of being 
unsupported, it would be Major A's duty to attack it and 
drive it off. He should then want to use a method which 
promised decisive results, not one that would merely result 
in driving the hostile cavalry from position to position in a 
long series of delaying actions. For such a quick and de- 
cisive result, he would prefer mounted action if he could 
maneuver the enemy into dispositions that would admit of 
such action. 



Situation (ccntinued) : 

Up till 8:30 a. m., the following had occurred: 
The hostile cavalry at first acted offensively, and it 
looked for a time as if it might walk into a trap ; but at 8 : 10 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 161 

a. m., it was observed that it was withdrawing north. Pur- 
suit was prevented by hostile infantry in position at the 
orchard 650 yards north of 582. 

Reports had been received from Lieut. B and Sergt. 
C showing- that, up to 6 :30 a. m., no enemy had been discov- 
ered in the area three miles north of Heidlersburg, or two 
miles north of Brysonia. 

Sergt. C's messengers brought a message from Corpl. 
W, dated Biglerville, 7:00 a. m., saying that he had so far 
encountered no enemy, and that the bridge over Conewago 
Creek, south of Biglerville, was intact and the roads good. 
Nothing else had been heard from Corporal W's patrol. 

The following members of Troop A have now rejoined, 

viz: 

Messengers from Lieut. B 2 

" Sergt. C 2 

CorpL X and his patrol 5 

Point (Sergt. T) 5 

Advance party (Sergt. R) 9 

Corpl. S and his patrol 4 

Total 27 

The following are still out: 

Lieut. B's party 4 and 1 officer 

Sergt. C's " 5 

Corpl. W's party 4 

At Brig. Hq 10 

Total 23 and 1 officer 

Thus, this troop now has its first and second platoons 
complete and a provisional third platoon, of a strength 
of 19 men, which is composed of members of the original 
third and fourth platoons. 

Patrols do not always return at the expected time and 
place. Some are always out, some are lost, and some get 
captured. If too many detached parties are sent out, or if 
they are made too strong, the effective strength of an organ- 
ization is soon dissipated. A balance between what forces 
must necessarily be detached for reconnaissance and other 
purposes, and what must be retained to give necessary fight- 
ing strength, should always be maintained. 

In the above study, the principle of making detachments 
of such strength as not to break up organizations has at 



162 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

times been violated. Thus Lieut. B's patrol was given a 
strength of six men. On the general principle that if half 
or more of an organization is detached, the whole should be 
sent, this patrol should have consisted of two fours. But 
for the purposes of this patrol, selected men and horses were 
required. If both Lieut. B and Sergeant C had been given 
two fours, there would have been an unnecessary loss of 
four men to the troop. Now, in spite of all theories to the 
contrary, the fours in a troop (squads under the proposed 
drill regulations) are never permanent. They are constantly 
changing in time of peace and even more so in time of war. 
There is always the line of file-closers into which an extra 
man or two can be introduced, and these extra men can be 
used the next time a small party is sent out. This principle, 
though an important one for large organizations where the 
method of messing, supply, and administration is affected, 
is seldom of any importance in dealing with fractions of a 
troop or company; and never in dealing with detachments 
or fractions of a platoon. 

It will be good practice for the student to go over all 
the detachments made in this study, and decide whether in 
each case a larger or smaller detachment would have been 
better; and why. 

By 9:00 a. m.. Major A had assembled the squadron 
near hill 647, on the Table Rock — Center Mills road, and 
had posted one platoon of Troop D, under an officer, about 
700 yards south of Guernsey, and the First Platoon of Troop 
A at Friend's Grove Schoolhouse. Red infantry was in 
evidence on both sides of the road near the orchard 650 yards 
north of 582, but did not attempt to advance beyond that 
point. It appeared to be intrenching. Nothing had been 
seen of the Red cavalry since it retreated north. 

At 9 :30 a. m., the detachment commander, from the po- 
sition of the cavalry on hill 647, on the Table Rock — Center 
Mills road, issued orders for an attack enveloping the hos- 
tile left : one infantry regiment to advance west of the road 
and one east of the road, with the reserve of one regiment 
following, echeloned behind the eastern regiment's outer 
flank. 

The orders for the squadron were : 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 163 

The cavalry will reconnoiter around both hostile flanks and will 
cover the right flank of our attack. 

Just after receiving the above order, Major A, squad- 
ron commander, received the following message from the 
leader of the platoon which was in observation to the right 
front, and dated 9 :35 a. m. : 

At 9:05 a. m., the hostile squadron that retreated north from the 
front of our squadron returned south, moving on Friend's Grove 
Schoolhouse. Is now at the woods surrounding that schoolhouse 
and is making defensive preparations. This platoon remains in ob- 
servation from hill three-quarters of a mile southwest of Friend's 
Grove Schoolhouse. 

Required : 

Major A's estimate of the situation, decision, and orders. 



Mission 

Major A is ordered to "reconnoiter around both flanks 
and cover the right flank of our attack." 

He can have no doubt as to what is intended by the 
order for reconnaissance. The latter part of his orders, 
however, require consideration in connection with the situa- 
tion. The Blue detachment is attacking, intending to en- 
velop the enemy's eastern flank. The hostile cavalry is in 
a position from which it can attack this enveloping move- 
ment either mounted or by fire. If allowed to stay near 
Friend's Grove Schoolhouse, the hostile cavalry will be a 
great impediment to the Blue enveloping movement. In 
order to assure the success of the Blue infantry attack, the 
Red cavalry must be dislodged. Major A's mission to 
cover the right flank of our attack, therefore, makes it 
necessary for him to attack the hostile cavalry and drive 
it off, or keep it so busy that it cannot interfere with 
the attack of the Blue infantry. 

The Enemy 

Major A's immediate enemy is a squadron, reliably re- 
ported to be depleted in numbers. That it feels itself weak- 
er than Major A's squadron is shown by its continually tak- 
ing a defensive attitude and avoiding a decisive action. 
Like Major A's squadron, it probably has a certain propor- 



164 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

tion of its strength detached for reconnaissance, etc. It 
evidently has, as its mission, the protection of the left flank 
of the hostile position, and it is not likely to be aided by its 
main body, except by artillery, and, possibly, by infantry 
fire, should Major A, in making his attack, expose his com- 
mand. 

Oiir Forces 

Major A's squadron has had some slight initial succes- 
ses and its morale should be good — somewhat better than 
that of the enemy. 

The Blue detachment is forming under cover for a 
well-organized concerted attack on the hostile position. It 
has its own duties to attend to, and the detachment com- 
mander expects Major A to accomplish, without assistance, 
his part of the program. Major A should not expect as- 
sistance, but he can notify the artillery commander when he 
is about to launch his attack and request artillery support. 
He cannot be sure that the circumstances will not be such 
that the artillery may, at that time, be obliged to use all its 
fire elsewhere. 

Terrain 

In general, the terrain consists of a series of ridges, 
running mostly east and west, parallel to the Conewago, with 
a branch valley extending north from the Conewago in the 
region just outside of the left flank of the hostile main posi- 
tion. These ridges offer cover for the formation and ad- 
vance of the Blue infantry and give good artillery positions. 
The Blue artillery will most likely be posted behind the 646 
— Bender's Church ridge and between the points named. 
It will be 2500 yards from the Red position, and 2800 
yards from the grove held by the Red Cavalry. 

The valley, just south of ridge 647-586, together with 
the trees just north of 534, and the valley just east of that 
point offer good cover for a flank march of the squadron, by 
which it can uncover the front of its infantry and reach a 
location from which an attack on the Red cavalry can be 
launched. 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 165 

In crossing the valley near 534, it is possible that the 
hostile artillery may locate the squadron ; hence, a formation 
that is little vulnerable to artillery fire and a fast gait are 
to be employed there. 

The ground southeast of the hostile cavalry position 
offers good cover for a dismounted attack, or for a mounted 
turning movement by v^ay of 587 or 632. The woods north 
of Beatrick will offer concealment and protection for led 
horses from hostile artillery fire. 

There are several wire fences in front of the hostile 
position, that position is in the edge of the woods, and the 
enemy is known to be preparing defenses. All these con- 
ditions render it probable that, on arriving where the 
ground toward the enemy can be clearly observed, it will be 
found that a mounted attack has little prospect of success. 

Plans 

Major A must make plans for two things — reconnais- 
sance around the hostile flanks, and combat with the hostile 
cavalry squadron. The reconnaissance around the hostile 
right and the protection of the Blue left, can be readily 
provided for by the platoon of Troop D, now 700 yards 
south of Guernsey. 

Under cover of an attack on the hostile cavalry, patrols 
can probably easily work around to the east and north of 
the hostile squadron and obtain good information. 

For the engagement with the hostile cavalry the follow- 
ing plans may be considered: 

(a) Move to the vicinity of hill 586 and from there 
protect the rear of the Blues' right flank. This does not 
completely carry out Major A's mission and, in case of a 
Blue success, leaves the Blue squadron in a poor position 
from which to take up the pursuit, and the Red squadron in 
position to best protect its infantry. Rejected. 

(b) To move around the Red cavalry and thus turn 
it out of its selected position, or else gain the Red rear 
unopposed. All the nearby routes for such a movement are 
exposed to view, giving the Red cavalry plenty of opportuni- 
ty to change front or change position to meet the movement. 
The effect of the Blue squadron's action would be delayed, 



166 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

united action in conjunction with the infantry attack would 
be lost, and, in the end, the Blue squadron would still be 
confronted by its opponent in a selected position. 

To move north around Chestnut Hill takes the Blue 
Cavalry entirely out of the zone of the main action and may 
well result in keeping the Blue squadron entirely out of the 
fight at the critical stage, when every man is most needed. 
Rejected. 

(c) To move to the ridge northeast of 534 and engage 
the Red cavalry by fire only. This is less objectionable, but 
is playing a safe course for the cavalry at the expense of 
rendering the most effective cooperation to its infantry. 
Rejected. 

(d) To move to the ridge northeast of 534 and from 
there launch an attack in cooperation with the infantry at- 
tack. This promises to be the most effective course. Until 
the conditions which exist at the time the attack is launched 
are known, and the ground in front and flank of the hostile 
cavalry position has been reconnoitered, the exact nature 
of such an attack cannot be determined upon. The chances 
are that it will be a dismounted attack, with a mounted re- 
serve acting by way of 587 as soon as success seems as- 
sured. Due to some move of the hostile cavalry in the mean- 
while, mounted action may be possible. Mounted action 
will be preferred, if it has any chance of success, as it is 
quicker and more effective. 

Decision 

To issue orders for reconnaissance at once, and then 
march the squadron under cover, changing formation when 
necessary, to the ridge northeast of 534, for the purpose of 
launching a dismounted attack from there. The Blue ar- 
tillery to be notified when the attack starts and artillery 
support requested. It will not be relied upon, as the artil- 
lery may be otherwise fully occupied. 

Orders 

To his adjutant, verbally, Send me a non-commissioned 
officer and two privates for messenger service. 

Major A then writes the following message : 



RECONNAISSANCE AND FLANK PROTECTION 167 

From 1st Sq., 
one mile north of table rock, pa., 

25 Nov. '15—9:40 a. m., No. 6. 
To Lt. Y, Tr. D. 

One-half mile south of guernsey. 

Our detachment attacks hostile position three-quarters of a mile 
east of GUERNSEY. Give Gen. A prompt information of any hostile 
move by way of guernsey. He will be found near the table rock 
— CENTER MILLS road. You will send patrols to reconnoiter in rear of 
the hostile right. 

A, 
Major 

The above is sent by the non-commissioned officer and 
the two men as soon as they report. 

Major A then orders, verbally, Captain B (senior captain), 
march the squadron behind this ridge to that hill (pointing to 586). 
I will meet you there. 

Accompanied by his staff and a couple of orderlies, 

Major then rapidly joins the platoon at hill 586 and orders, 
verbally : Lieutenant D, the squadron is marching on that woods 
(pointing to woods one-half mile northeast of 534). Your platoon 
will preceed the squadron. Cut a way one hundred yards broad in 
each fence and reconnoiter through the woods. I will give you fur- 
ther orders when the squadron reaches the woods. 

As Captain B approaches v^ith the squadron, it is 
formed in column of troops and, after Lieut. D has cut the 
fences and reconnoitered the v^oods, it is marched at a trot 
in column of troops to the woods. This formation is used 
as being the one least vulnerable to possible artillery fire. 

Just before leaving hill 586, Major A selects a non- 
commissioned officer and two men from the leading troop 
and orders : Remain here in observation. Notify both General A 
and myself, promptly, of any movement of the enemy which you are 
able to observe. General A will likely be found near that hill (point- 
ing to 646). 

Arriving at the woods further orders, including those 
for reconnaissance around the hostile left, will be issued 
according to the circumstances existing at that time. 



Part VI Cavalry Combat (Squadron) 



Situation : 

The Pennsylvania — Maryland state line is part of the 
boundary between hostile states, Red — north, Blue — south. 
War was declared Oct. 6th. Red troops are concentrating 
at York. Red infantry is reported near Gettysburg, and 
about a squadron of Red cavalry was known to be at Littles- 
town at noon, October 6th. 

Blue troops are concentrating at Frederick, and a bri- 
gade of Blue infantry at Woodsboro has sent the 3d Bat- 
talion, 3d Infantry, to the vicinity of Taneytown to watch 
the railroad. The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, Major A com- 
manding, is temporarily attached to this brigade. 

The squadron camped the night of October 6-7 about 
three miles east of Harney (800 yards north of hill 567, 
which locality is just south of the boundary). It had in- 
structions to watch the boundary, but not to cross into Red 
territory without orders. 

At 10 :00 p. m., October 6, Major A received the follow- 
ing order from the Brigade Commander, dated Woodsboro, 
Md., 6 Oct. '13, 9 :30 p. m. 

It is reliably reported that a squadron of Red Cavalry, coming 
from the direction of littlestown, camped at dusk this evening about 
one mile southwest of germantown; also, that a brigade of Red in- 
fantry is now at GETTYSBURG and will probably march tomorrow to 
LITTLESTOWN. Move early tomorrow, defeat this cavalry, determine 
the strength of any hostile columns moving from Gettysburg towards 
the east or southeast. Send reports to taneytown. 

In compliance with this order. Major A made an early 
start and, at 5 :45 a. m., October 7, halted the squadron on 
the Palmer — 520 road (roadfork 520 is 1^ miles a little 
east of south from Germantown, and 300 yards west of 
D. Spangler) , at a point about two miles south of German- 
town, to await reports from patrols sent out before day- 
light. The advance guard (1st Platoon, Troop A, Lieut. W.) 
is at 520, with a patrol of three men at the roadfork just 
168 



CAVALRY COMBAT (SQUADRON) 169 

east of the D. Spangler house ; and the point, consisting of 
one non-commissioned officer and five men, at roadfork 561 
(west of 520). 

The rest of the squadron (less 2d Platoon, Troop A, 
on patrol duty) is in column of twos, the head about half 
way between Palmer and 520. The field and combat trains, 
under the Squadron Quartermaster and Commissary, have 
been sent to Taneytown. The extra ammunition in the 
combat wagon has been issued to the men, and is being 
carried on the horses. Between 5 :45 and 5 :50 a. m.. Major 
A, who has his adjutant, sergeant major, and Lieut. W with 
him, at roadfork 520, receives the following information : 

From Sergt. K's patrol, one mile southeast of German- 
town (roadfork 547) : 

Baltimore Pike — this vicinity — and road leading from German- 
town are clear of enemy. I remain in observation. 

From Lieut. L's patrol, hill 606 (one mile west of 520) : 

A squadron of hostile cavalry is just starting to break camp 
in an open field, three-quarters of a mile northeast of here. There 
is a farmhouse just north of the camp and another (Collins) several 
hundred yards to the southwest of the camp. Can see an outguard 
near the Trustle house. Another outguard was at roadfork (586), 
three-quarters of a mile north of Trustle, but it has been withdrawn 
towards the camp. I remain here in observation. (Sent 5:40 a. m.) 

From Sergt. M's patrol at woods west of G. Hoffman : 

Can see hostile outguard at the G. Hoffman house and another at 
west edge of woods north of the Strangier house. I remain in obser- 
vation. (5:30 a. m.) 

Required : 

1. Major A's estimate of the situation. • 

2. Major A^s action and orders at this time. 

Major A has 3'' map of Gettysburg with him. Weather 
fair after a rain — wind from northwest. 



Mission 

Major A's mission is to defeat the hostile cavalry. 
Until this is done, his task of finding out what troops are 
moving from Gettysburg toward the east can not be ac- 
complished. 



170 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

The Enemy 

All reports received seem to confirm the belief that 
the hostile cavalry consists of but one squadron. If Major 
A can defeat it, or drive it away, the remainder of the 
task ought to be easy unless other hostile cavalry should 
appear on the scene. 

The enemy has no artillery, and no machine guns have 
been reported. His nearest infantry supports were at Get- 
tysburg when last reported. The hour is so early, that 
there is little likelihood of these having yet left that place. 

What are the intentions of the hostile cavalry comman- 
der? He has probably been sent to watch the frontier 
west of Littlestown, or to cover the march of the hostile in- 
fantry which, it is reported, will take place today from 
Gettysburg to Littlestown. 

Major A's Forces 

Major A can expect no reinforcements. Only about 
one-fourth of Troop A is absent on patrol duty. Another 
platoon is in the advance guard. 

The roads and weather are excellent. The absence of 
dust will favor the movements of the Blues. Everything 
seems to indicate that they are not yet discovered by the 
Reds. A sucessful march has been accomplished without 
mishap. Information of the enemy is definite. The men 
are in good spirits. To reap the full benefit of these ad- 
vantages. Major A must attack at once. 

The terrain is rolling and in many places wooded, thus 
favoring dismounted action. Numerous fences would seem 
to limit the chances for mounted action, though there is 
considerable open ground near the place where the camp is 
reported to be. Major A does not need to worry about his 
line of retreat. His cavalry is so mobile that it can avoid 
any infantry that is likely to appear. Unless there is more 
Red cavalry around than has yet been reported. Major A 
need not fear about his retreat in open country, even if 
defeated. 

Whether discovered or not. Major A must attack. His 
mission is to defeat the hostile cavalry. He can hope to do 
this only by offensive action. There are some circumstances 



CAVALRY COMBAT (SQUADRON) 171 

which seem to favor a mounted attack. (Student should 
see if he can not enumerate them). 

Major A would commit a serious error, however, if 
he decided upon a mounted attack, and gave orders for it at 
once. Thirty minutes will have elapsed from the time Lt. 
L made his report, 5:40 a. m., until the Blues get within 
striking distance. 

By the time he arrives at the point from which to 
launch the attack, the situation may have materially 
changed. The enemy may have discovered him, and be him- 
self advancing to the attack. The enemy may be marching 
on the road, across the fields, or even retreating, and a blow 
ordered now may spend its energy in the air. The Reds 
may even have taken up a dismounted position in the woods 
near their camp. 

Major A must get closer before giving the order for 
the attack, so as to be able to make it conform to the con- 
ditions which exist at the moment of combat. 

What plans are open to him? 

(a) He may move straight across country, over hill 
606, on the enemy's camp. 

(b) He may advance via 520 and across country to 
587, then along 587 — 586 road, and launch his attack from 
the woods west of 586. 

(c) He may advance via 561 — 588 — 598, and attack 
the enemy from southeast. 

(d) He may divide his forces and send part of his 
force by (b) and part by (a) or (c), or part by (c) and 
the remainder by (a) or (b). 

A detour to the north or south might also be made, but 
either would take too much time, and the squadron would 
be almost certainly discovered, particularly if the detour 
was to the north, via 549 and the Germantown — 563 — 
C. H. King highway. 

Plan (a). As the squadron passes over hill 606, it 
will be discovered. The hill is too far off to permit dis- 
mounted fire to be used effectively against a fleeting target. 
As soon as fire is opened, the enemy will seek shelter in the 
adjacent woods, and opportunity for mounted action will 
be gone. If it is intended to launch a mounted attack from 



172 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

hill 606, the fences and woods will delay the advance, and 
give the enemj^ time to prepare for action. 

Plan (b) . This plan has much in its favor. By mov- 
ing northwest from 520, cover can be secured all the way 
to 587. From 587 to 586, corn shocks, woods, hedges, and 
other vegetation along the sides of the road will give cover 
nearly all the way. The wind favors this route as it will 
blow the sound away from the hostile camp. The hostile 
outguards, through error or otherwise, have been recalled 
from 586. The way seems to be open. It is as short in 
point of time as any other route. If the enemy is defeated, 
he will be driven west towards the difficult, if not un- 
fordable Rock Creek, and there will be a strong probability 
of his being cut off from his infantry supports at Gettys- 
burg. 

Plan (c). This route is guarded by the hostile detach- 
ment at the Trustle house. There are a number of fences 
to be cut. The worm fences, woods, and slope of the ground 
to northeast will interfere with dismounted fire, should 
it be necessary to resort to that form of attack. If the ene- 
my is defeated, he will be driven back towards his infantry 
supports at Gettysburg, or on the Baltimore Pike. 

Plan (d) . Major A's force is too small to divide. He 
can afford to run no chance of failure to secure coodination. 
He must keep his command together and put every man in. 
As soon as a force is divided, the commander loses more 
or less control of that part not with him. In this problem, 
whatever happens will happen quickly; so that Major A 
should keep his troops in hand until the critical moment 
arrives. 

Plan (b), then, is the one that seems to give the best 
promise of success. 

In approaching 586, the gait will be a brisk trot. If 
the command moved at a walk, there would be a less of 
valuable time. The squadron at a gallop might become 
elongated and out of hand on the narrow country lane 587 — 
586. Major A should not waste time in riding to hill 606 
or in assembling his officers. He has such an accurate map, 
and the information from Lieut. L is so definite, that he 
feels that he can act at once. 



CAVALRY COMBAT (SQUADRON) 173 

Decision 

To move rapidly, with present advance guard formation, 
from 520, across country to 587, and thence via 587 — 586 
road, to woods west of 586 ; and then to attack mounted or 
dismounted, or by combined mounted and dismounted ac- 
tion, as may be warranted by conditions found to exist 
upon arrival within striking distance. 

Actions and Orders 

It is assumed that Lieut. W, the sergeant major, and the 
squadron adjutant are familiar with the three messages 
just received, and that the messengers who brought them 
are still with Major A. 

Major A, the squadron adjutant, Lieut. W, and the 
sergeant major are still at 520 and are familiar with the 
map, as they have been studying it while awaiting reports. 
Major A shows them the map and orders : 

The squadron will move at once by this route, at a brisk trot, to 
roadfork 586, (indicating 520 — across country — 587 — 586 road on 
map and pointing out direction on the ground as far as it can be seen) . 
Lieut. W, your platoon will continue to act as advance guard. Have 
fence cut at 586, and reconnoiter woods just west of there; but do not 
let your men show themselves west of the woods. Lieut. W, send 
Captain B (senior captain) word to have main body follow advance 
guard at 400 yards, in column of fours. 

Lieut. X (Sq. Adjt.), you will take the point of the advance guard, 
now at 561 yonder (pointing to it), and precede Lieutenant Ws pla- 
toon. You will be under his orders until the squadron reaches 586, 
when you will join me, turning the point over to the non-commissioned 
officer now with it. 

I will gallop to 561, but will join advance party as it crosses the 
field toward 587. Move out. 

Major A then turns to messenger from Sergeant K 
and orders: 

Go back to Sergeant K and tell him I am going to attack one 
squadron of the enemy which has been located about two miles west 
of roadfork at which you left him. Tell him to move northwest, 
keeping near the Baltimore Pike, and look for hostile troops com- 
ing from Gettysburg by that road. 

Major A, Lieut. X, the sergeant major and two order- 
lies, and the messengers from Lieut. L and Sergeant M, 
then gallop to near 561 and halt under cover. 

Major A orders : 



174 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Lieut X. Move out. 

Then turning to the sergeant major he orders : 

Inform Lieut. L. that I attack at once from 586 and desire any- 
new information he may have. Lieut. L's messenger will guide you. 
Hurry, time is important. 

Major A then gallops with his orderly to rejoin Lieut. 
W and the advance party. 

Note : On country roads, cavalry will habitually march 
in column of twos when the military situation permits ; but, 
as soon as an encounter with the enemy appears probable, 
it must, at once, shorten its column so as to facilitate deploy- 
ment when the moment of action arrives. Major A has not 
yet informed Lieut. W that Lieut. L is to cover the left, as 
something may happen to prevent the sergeant major 
from finding Lieut. L. No word is sent to Sergeant K to 
cover the right, for the messenger may not find that ser- 
geant, and, if he did, the latter's patrol could hardly arrive 
in the vicinity of 549 in time to perform that function. 

Comment 

This study is adapted from an old problem used for 
The Army School of the Line. 

In solving this problem, the following were the princi- 
pal errors committed by students: 

1. Many made no special provision for protecting the 
flanks. Notwithstanding the instructions contained in Ca- 
valry Drill Regulations as to combat patrols, it is believed 
that specific orders should be given, in important cases, 
for protecting the flanks. 

2. Many issued their attack orders from road junction 
520. This is a decided error. The last news of the enemy 
was from Lieut. L at 5:40 a. m. It will be 6:10 a. m., 
perhaps later, before you arrive within striking distance. 
In that time the situation may change very materially. 
It certainly will do so, if the enemy has discovered the Blue 
squadron. 

Major A can not determine the nature of the at- 
tack, nor how it will be made, until he arrives within strik- 
ing distance. Should he do this, he would run the risk of 



CAVALRY COMBAT (SQUADRON) 175 

precipitating an attack, which did not fit the actual con- 
ditions, and which, therefore, would probably result in de- 
feat. 

3. Many sent word to the brigade commander as to 
what was about to happen. The brigade commander him- 
self sent you word where the enemy was to be found, and 
ordered you to go and attack him. That you are doing it, 
will be no very important news to him. What he would 
like to know is how the fight came out. You ought to 
know this very soon, and will then have some real news 
for him. If it were a combat of large forces, or one which 
might last a long time, then it would be proper to send 
word to the brigade commander. 

4. Many assumed that Blue patrols had been seen. 
These patrols reached points of observation before day- 
light, and concealed themselves. The chances seemed good 
that they had not been discovered up to the time the prob- 
lem opened. 

5. In sending messages to Lieut. L and Sergts. K and 
M, many did not make use of the messengers from them, 
who, of course, knew where to find them, provided they had 
not been forced to move in the meantime. 

6. Many depended upon Sergt. K with his patrol to 
protect their right, and sent him word to that effect. It is 
doubtful he could have come up in time to do so during the 
attack. 

7. Many wasted time sending Major A to hill 606 to 
look over the country. Major A had an excellent map and 
very definite information from Lieut. L. He could see very 
little more from hill 606 than he already knew. It was con- 
sidered correct to send the adjutant or sergeant major to 
Lieut. L to find out if the situation had changed; but this 
could be done without delaying the advance. 

8. Many left the squadron halted and assembled troop 
commanders; some at 561, some at 520, some at B. D. Sny- 
der's, and some even on hill 606. In each of these cases 
it was considered an error, because time was lost, and be- 
cause the moment had not arrived for giving the attack 
order. 



176 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Situation (continued) : 

At 6:12 a. m., Major A has his squadron massed just 
west of roadfork 586, covered by the woods to the west. 

Lieut. W with the advance guard, now reduced to 
about eight troopers, is about 150 yards to the left front 
of the squadron. Patrols from the advance guard cover, 
from concealed positions, the northern, western, and south- 
ern edges of the woods (woods north of the Faulk house) . 

Major A is at the western edge of the timber with his 
adjutant, sergeant major, and several orderlies. 

He sees the Red squadron in an open field about 600 
yards to the west. The guidons have their places in column 
facing east, and a few dismounted men have fallen in along- 
side the guidons; the other men seem to be busy saddling. 
The last wagon has just pulled out of the field onto the 
country lane leading from the farm house just north of the 
camp to the main highway 400 yards further north (Ger- 
mantown — 563 — C. H. King road). 

Apparently the enemy does not suspect the presence 
of the Blue squadron. 

Required : 

Major A's Orders: 

Major A decides to attack, mounted, and at once. He 
rides back to the squadron accompanied by his adjutant, 
sergeant major, and orderlies, sending one orderly to Lieut. 
W with following order: 

Tell Lieutenant W to report to me at the squadron at once. 

The squadron is in order from right to left Troops D, 
C, B, A. 

Assuming all captains to be at their posts. Major A 
signals them to join him in front of the center of the squad- 
ron, and issues verbal orders as follows : 

The hostile squadron is in an open field about 600 yards west 
of these woods. The guidons are mounted, but the rest of the men 
are leading into line or saddling. The guidons are facing this way. 
The wagons have left camp and gone behind the woods just north of 
camp towards the main road. 

We will attack the hostile squadron, at once, mounted. Troops D 
and C, Captain D (senior to Captain C) commanding, will form the 



CAVALRY COMBAT (SQUADRON) 177 

attacking line. Capt. D, take advantage of that opening in the woods, 
150 yards to our front, and attack the enemy in close order, moun- 
ted, as soon as you clear the woods. Lieut. X (Squadron Adjutant) 
will accompany you to point out the enemy's position. 

Capt. B, your troop will be the support, and will follow the at- 
tacking line at 150 yards, looking out for the right flank. 

Capt. A, your troop (two platoons) will be the reserve, and will 
follow the attacking line at 400 yards, echeloned behind the left flank. 
Lieut. W, you, with the former advance guard, will cover the left flank. 
Signal nearby patrols to join you. 

I will be with the reserve. Move out at once. 

Comment 

(a) Many students lost time sending for troop com- 
manders to come to the western edge of woods. The situa- 
tion is so clear, that the order to attack can be given at 
once. The adjutant or "sergeant major can be sent to ac- 
company the commander of the attacking line, and point 
out the enemy to him. 

(b) Many gave no task to Lieut. W and his eight 
men. Give every part of your command something to do. 

(c) Many did not protect flanks. (See 1 above). 



Part VII Cavalry Regiment 



Situation (Blue) : 

Conewago Creek divides the Red (northern) and the 
Blue (southern) states. A Blue division is concentrating 
15 miles south of Gettysburg. It having been reported that 
the enemy was advancing from the northeast, the 1st Blue 
Cavalry was ordered to move via Littlestown and New Ox- 
ford to determine the nature of the hostile movement. 

Troops A and B, as contact troops, moved out in ad- 
vance ; Troop A via the valley of Little Conewago, Troop B 
by the high ridge two to three miles farther west. 

At 10 :00 a. m., Oct. 5th, when the regiment, marching 
on the Kingsdale — Littlestown road, has just cleared Kings- 
dale, Colonel A, commanding the regiment, learned that 
Troop A had encountered hostile cavalry, estimated at 
more than a squadron, and was falling back by the 566 — Le- 
fevre road. 

(566 is just west of Bashore Mill). 

Required : 

Colonel A's action at this time and his reasons therefor. 



It is to be assumed that Colonel A was marching in 
regular march formation with an advance guard and the 
usual attention to covering his flanks. Probably, he would 
send out patrols to the flanks, from time to time, whenever 
the ground indicated that they could get a good view, or 
roads joined his route which could not be efficiently recon- 
noitered from some nearby high point. This march pro- 
tection for the column is independent of the contact troops, 
which are not concerned with protecting the main body of 
the regiment. His action, then, is to direct his advance 
guard to march toward Troop A, and to signal for in- 
creased gait. If, on account of narrow roads, the regiment 
has been marching in column of twos. Colonel A will also 

signal. Form Fours. 
178 



CAVALRY REGIMENT 179 

Reasons 

Contact troops are sent out to find the enemy's forces. 
They are made strong enough to drive off hostile patrols 
and thus uncover larger forces. When one such contact 
troop encounters superior force, it can gain no further in- 
formation till the superior hostile force is disposed of. It 
must be reinforced to do this. When one contact troop 
finds strong opposition and the others do not, the chances 
are that the main force is on the route where the enemy 
has developed strength. It v^ould, therefore, be foolish to 
divide the regiment and run the chance of being defeated 
in detail. 

If, on the other hand, the force uncovered by the contact 
troop is only a fraction of the hostile force, Colonel A will 
have great superiority over the few troops of hostile cavalry 
and can quickly dispose of them; thus having his whole 
force ready to meet the other forces. To drive off hostile 
cavalry reported as more than a squadron, it is evident that 
a fight will be necessary. The more quickly Colonel A can 
bring on this fight, the less the enemy will be able to prepare 
for it; so the regiment should be closed up ready for quick 
action, and the gait increased as much as the terrain per- 
mits. 

Situation (continued) : 

Colonel A pushed rapidly forward on the Littlestown — 
622 — 623 road with the 1st squadron (less Troops A and B) 
as advance guard. Major B, commanding. 

When Colonel A, at the head of the main body, was 
about half way between 622 and 623, he saw his advance 
guard form for a charge just south of hill 636 and charge 
over the hill. (This point is 800 yards east of the eastern 
exit of Littlestown) . 

Required : 

Colonel A's action and his reasons therefor. 



On seeing the advance guard form for a charge, Colonel 
A turned the head of the column toward the hill occupied 
by the advance guard and ordered: Second Squadron, Line 



180 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

of Fours — Gallop, then to his adjutant : Third Squadron to form 
Line of Fours at a Gallop one hundred yards in rear of the Second 
Squadron. Then to the Lieut-Colonel : Lead the regiment at 
a trot toward that hill (points to the one just left by the advance 
guard). I will gallop forward to get a look from that hill. 

Reasons 

The opportunities for a mounted charge are quickly 
lost if any hesitation or delay occurs. When the advance 
guard commander saw his opportunity, he probably had 
no time to wait till he could report to the regimental com- 
mander. 

Troops which have just engaged in a mounted charge 
are in great disorder and are peculiarly liable to be over- 
thrown by a counter attack, even by a very small number 
of formed hostile troops. Whenever nearby cavalry is seen 
to launch a charge it is, therefore, made the duty of all 
mounted troops observing the charge to hasten to the sup- 
port of the charging cavalry, and thus be able to clinch the 
victory; or in case of a repulse, to cover the reforming of 
the charging line. There is no time for sending formal 
messages or requests for assistance; or usually, even to 
notify adjoining commanders or nearby superiors of the 
intention to charge. 

Colonel A sees that his advance guard is about to 
engage in mounted combat. He, therefore, orders his troops 
into a compact formation from which he can quickly act in 
any direction, moves his troops as rapidly as practicable 
toward the combat, and himself hastens forward to gain a 
view of the situation so as to be able to launch his troops 
in the most favorable direction and formation. He should 
have marched with the support of his advance guard when 
action was imminent, for there he could get more prompt 
information of the enemy and could take the necessary ac- 
tion more quickly and with a better understanding of the 
situation. 

Situation (continued) : 

Before Colonel A reached hill 636, the advance guard 
came back over the hill and started to reform. 



I 



CAVALRY REGIMENT 181 

On reaching the top of the hill Colonel A saw the situa- 
tion as follows : 

Advance guard reforming just behind the crest of the 
hill. 

2d Squadron, in ''line of fours", about 500 yards south 
of hill 636, moving forward at a trot with the machine 
gun troop on its left. 

3d Squadron forming line of fours at a gallop in rear 
of 2d Squadron. 

Troop A, dismounted and deployed on the east shoul- 
der of hill 646 (near Lefevre), firing to the north. 

A hostile firing line, about 200 yards long, just leaving 
the west edge of the woods between hill 636 and road-junc- 
tion 609, and moving toward hill 636 at a double time. 

A mounted column, just appearing over the steep slope 
which hides from his view the bend of the road 200 yards 
north of Valley Grove Schoolhouse, is moving southwest at 
a trot, in column of fours, the head of the column approach- 
ing the lane that leads west from 609. It stretches north 
from there toward the bend of the road. Further north 
on the road, where it can be seen, and extending to 566, a 
hostile cavalry column, apparently part of the same column, 
seems to be trotting south in column of twos. 

As Colonel A passed the advance guard commander, 
the latter reported : 

I smashed the leading hostile troop, but two others were in the 
woods where 1 could not get at them. 

Required : 

Colonel A's estimate of the situation, decision, and 
orders. 

Note: The terrain is to be taken exactly as shown on the map. 
Corn is standing, but it is of poor quality and sparse growth. Other 
crops have been cut. Leaves have begun to fall but trees are not 
entirely bare. 



Colonel A finds himself in a position facing such rapid 
changes that his success will depend entirely upon the ex- 
tent to which he may possess that quality of "coup d'oeil", 
so often spoken of as necessary in a good cavalry command- 
er. In this map problem we attempt to follow in a deliber- 



182 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

ate manner the impressions made on his mind, the deductions 
he makes, and the decisions at which he arrives ; though in 
reality, in the field, all of this would pass through his mind 
in a second or two. 

Mission 

Colonel A's mission is to move via Littlestown and 
New Oxford in order to determine the nature of the hostile 
movement reported to be taking place in that direction. 
The information received at Littlestown does not change 
his mission, but indicates an obstacle to its accomplishment. 
The Blue commanding general evidently wishes the country 
reconnoitered as far as New Oxford. To determine the na- 
ture of the hostile movement, Colonel A will need to know 
whether or not there are troops of any kind behind the cav- 
aliy that has been encountered. To do this, it will probab- 
ly be necessary to defeat the hostile cavalry. Colonel A 
will never get information by defensive or timid action. 
He will also wish to prevent hostile reconnaissance of the 
Blue main body. The easiest and surest way of doing so 
is to defeat the bulk of the hostile cavalry. His immediate 
mission, then, primarily resolves itself into defeating and 
driving back the hostile cavalry. 

The hostile force consists of a dismounted skirmish 
line about 200 yards long. This would indicate about 100 
men, and together with horse holders, patrols, etc., would 
account for about two troops. (This assumes a skirmish 
line similar to the one used under Cavalry Drill Regulations, 
1909. Should the more dense skirmish line of one man to 
the yard be the one employed. Colonel A can, of course, see 
which is in use and would then reckon twice as large a 
force) . One troop has just been dispersed. 

About 400 yards of mounted men, in column of fours, 
is about one squadron ; and 1000 yards of mounted men, in 
column of twos, is four or five troops. The accuracy of 
the last two deductions depends on the amount of elongation 
that has taken place in the hostile column. With Colonel 
A on the ground, it would not be a case of measurement and 
calculation; the impression that the enemy numbered 



CAVALRY REGIMENT 183 

about a regiment would be the same, but would be instan- 
taneous. 

Whether or not the hostile cavalry covers other troops 
is Colonel A's mission to find out. At any rate, no such 
troops are close enough at hand to take part in the im- 
pending action. The hostile cavalry is pushing forward 
with energy and determination, but its poor formation in- 
dicates that the Red commander, at least till the last few 
moments, has expected his advance guard to be ample 
to deal with the Blues in his front. The fact that the 
inhabitants are hostile, has undoubtedly assisted in keep- 
ing the Red commander in ignorance of the real situation. 

Note : Not to be too hard on the Red commander for 
being caught in such formation, we may note that, had he 
been two minutes earlier and Colonel A two minutes later 
in changing from road formation, the situation would have 
been exactly reversed. Then the Blues, at the very least, 
would have lost their advance guard and Troop A, and 
would have had their further advance effectively blocked. 

The Blue forces and their dispositions are stated in 
the problem. Troop A is probably firing at that portion of 
the enemy near the small woods. Colonel A is twelve to 
fifteen miles from supporting troops. 

Hostile Intentions 

The enemy appears to be making a determined attempt 
to gain possession of hill 636. He has evidently been caught 
in a poor formation for fighting, and is trying to change for- 
mation at a gallop, while still advancing the head of his col- 
umn on hill 636 at a trot. If left to continue these move- 
ments, the enemy's dismounted men would reach hill 636 in, 
400 yards -^ 160, equals 2| minutes, and the head of his 
mounted column in, 700 yards -^ 235, equals 3 minutes. 
The mounted column could accomplish this change of for- 
mation at a gallop en route. 

So far, nothing has developed to show what was the 
original intention of the hostile cavalry, whether to seek in- 
formation, cover hostile movements, or simply make a raid. 



184 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Terrain 

The immediate terrain consists of a hill, occupied by 
the Blue cavalry, with a comparatively gentle slope toward 
the enemy. The ground between the 566 — Lefevre road 
and the electric road is open, except for a small amount of 
corn of sparse growth, which will not greatly hinder move- 
ment, and for the small clump of woods, which is an obstacle 
to mounted movement in close formation, though foragers 
could easily pass through it. 

Fences on both sides of the 566 — Lefevre road and of 
the electric railroad would somewhat delay any mounted 
movement that required them to be passed, though the de- 
lay would be slight, for wire fences are serious obstacles to 
mounted movement, o:^^?/ when they are under effective fire. 

The lane west from near 609 is unfenced, while the one 
west from 619 is fenced with wire — what kind could not be 
told at the distance from which Colonel A sees it. 

The slope of the ground is nowhere too great for mount- 
ed action which is, therefore, suited to the terrain. From 
his horse Colonel A can see all the ground in the vicinity, ex- 
cept a small piece behind the clump of woods, the bottoms 
of a few ravines, and the foot of one steeper slope. 

Courses of Action Open to Colonel A 

1. Any move that Colonel A can make, which does 
not contemplate attacking and driving off the Eed cavalry, 
will necessitate his giving up his mission. This is not to be 
considered. 

2. Colonel A might dismount his whole force to fight 
on foot. This would be dangerous and, as it gives up the 
initiative, it also practically abandons his mission, and for 
no good reason. 

3. He might use partly mounted and partly dismounted 
action. For the moment Troop A is dismounted. It would 
take some time to reach it with orders, and it may be doing 
effective work where it is now ; hence this small fraction of 
the force should be the last to receive orders. As regards 
the balance of the regiment, to dismount Troops C and D 
would simply take time and place both men and led horses 
in the way of mounted action by other parts of the regiment. 



CAVALRY REGIMENT 185 

To use these two troops mounted against the hostile skir- 
mish line would stop it sooner, would probably be sucessf ul, 
and, if so, would give the greatest results. To wait for the 
machine guns to go into action anywhere would simply 
waste time. The use of the combination of dismounted 
with mounted action by the main body of the regiment is, 
therefore, to be rejected. 

4. Col. A may order Major B, with Troops C and D, to 
charge the hostile skirmish line and have him act at once. 
These two troops are reforming. They can be rallied in a 
second or two for a charge, either in line or as foragers, 
while moving toward the enemy. To dismount they must 
get into regular formation and count fours, thus losing time 
while remaining in the way of the other squadrons. 

The formation of the approaching second squadron is 
favorable for a charge to the front, and there is nothing to 
be gained, and a good opportunity to be lost, by an attempt 
at a turning or enveloping movement. In fact, a charge 
straight to the front is bound to result in all the envelopment 
that would be useful. 

For such an attack combat patrols are necessary. 
Troop A sufficiently protects the right flank. The full 
view to the front and left front, taken together with the 
probable protection from that quarter of the left flanking 
group of the former advance guard, will be sufficient for the 
moment. 

Should the action continue for any length of time, a pa- 
trol should occupy hill 637, unless the flanking group of the 
former advance guard can be observed to have already done 
so. The left flank also has some protection from the two 
wire fences, though it must again be urged that the protec- 
tion from a rapid hostile advance afforded by wire fences is 
very slight, indeed, unless such fences can be brought under 
effective rifle fire. 

In going into action with his mounted troops, Col. A will 
find the machine gun troop in the way if it is sent to hill 
636; besides, if placed on that hill, it can neither gain a 
field of fire unobstructed by our own troops, nor effectively 
assist in covering a possible reverse. 

In case of initial success, which is to be expected, an 



186 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

advance of Troop A north towards 566 will be likely to reap 
a rich reward. 

The 2d Squadron will be ample for the first attack on 
the hostile column, and will be most effective on a compara- 
tively narrow front, say of two troops in the first line. This 
will leave the whole 3d Squadron as a reserve with which 
Colonel A can himself influence the action. Troop B is too 
far away to be recalled. Its existence might not even enter 
Colonel A's mind at the present time. 

Decision 

Colonel A decides to attack the enemy mounted and at 
once ; to send Troops C and D against the hostile skirmish 
line and the 2d Squadron against the mounted column; to 
use the 3d Squadron according to the way the fight devel- 
ops; to order the machine gun troop into action near the 
railroad cut, but not to wait for it ; and for the present, to 
leave Troop A where it is. It is taken for granted that a 
patrol from the advance guard has been on or near hill 637. 

Note: Part of the above estimate had already been made by 
Colonel A. Each event, as it came to his notice before and during the 
march, having left its impression. The remainder of the estimate and 
the decision in the field would be almost instantaneous. The object of 
map problems of this nature is to prepare the mind to make such in- 
stantaneous decisions, based on a quickly realized conception of the 
opportunity. In war, such decisions will have to be reached in a 
very short time. The commander's mind will act more quickly 
and logically under stress if peace time study has developed the 
channels of thought which must be brought into play. 

Orders 

To Major B, advance guard commander : 

Charge in two lines against that (pointing) skirmish line. Move 
at once. 

To Major C, commanding 2d Squadron, which should ar- 
rive on the hill by the time Major B has started his charge : 

Charge in two lines. That mounted column (pointing) your ob- 
jective. 3d Squadron will be in reserve. 

To his Adjutant: 

Have the machine gun troop go into action from near that rail- 
road cut (just west of hill 636). 



CAVALRY REGIMENT 187 

Further orders will depend on the result of the move- 
ments already ordered. The 3d Squadron has not been 
halted ; being available for use as a reserve against any un- 
broken portions of the enemy, the led horses of the dis- 
mounted line, or any formed bodies of the enemy that may 
come forward from the road; or it may be sent in pursuit. 
On the first signs of success, Troop A will be mounted and 
sent in pursuit up the road. As soon as time permits Troop 
B and the Blue division commander will be notified of the 
action and its results. 



Part VIII A Field Battery 



Situation : 

On October 11, 1911, a Blue force, consisting of 3d In- 
fantry, Troop A, 3d Cavalry, Battery D, 1st Field Artillery, 
under command of Colonel A, is marching on Hunterstown 
via the Littlestown — Pleasant Hill Schoolhouse — Boneau- 
ville road. The country is hostile to the Blues. 

Battery D is marching near the head of the main body. 
The reconnaissance officer with one scout, and one signaler 
are with the reserve of the advance guard. 

At 9:00 a. m., when the head of the main body has 
reached the small creek four hundred yards northwest of 
Pleasant Hill S. H., the cavalry advance party is stopped by 
rifle fire from the village of Whitehall. 

Upon hearing the firing. Captain D, commanding bat- 
tery, taking with him his executive officer, and two musi- 
cians and the chief of 5th section who has with him the 
B. C. telescope, rides to the front with Colonel A, who in- 
forms him that it is urgent that the march be continued 
and that an attack may be necessary. 

At 9:30 a. m., at the farmhouse three hundred yards 
southeast of Alloway Creek, Captain D receives the follow- 
ing order from Colonel A : 

About a regiment of infantry with a battery of artillery is taking 
up a position on both sides of this road near 637. A part of our ad- 
vance guard is in the village of Whitehall. We will attack the enemy 
at once, enveloping his left flank. Place your battery in position on 
this side of Alloway creek and support the attack. Develop the 
enemy's artillery as soon as possible. 

Captain D also hears Colonel A's orders for the dis- 
position of the other troops in the attack. 

The artillery reconnaissance officer rejoined his Cap- 
tain and reported that he had been unable to locate the posi- 
tion of the hostile artillery but that one of his scouts, at 
9:15 a. m., had seen artillery near the farmhouse southeast 
of Sweet Home Schoolhouse and that it was moving towards 
St. Luke's Church. 
188 • 



A FIELD BATTERY 189 

The battery is halted at 598, while the head of the 
main body has arrived at Captain D's position. 

Required : 

1. Captain D's estimate of the situation in so far as it 
relates to the disposition of his battery. 

2. Orders and messages issued by Captain D in get- 
ting his battery into position. 

3. A tracing showing positions occupied by firing bat- 
tery, combat train, limbers, and B. C. station after battery 
is in action and the route followed by firing battery, and 
combat trains. 

Note: State in solution disposition and use of agent, 
scouts, and signal men while battery is in action. 

AN APPROVED SOLUTION 
Requirement : 

Mission i 

1. Captain D's mission is to divert the attention of 
the hostile artillery, as soon as possible, from the Blue in- 
fantry ; and then to assist this infantry in its attack on the 
enemy's position, as soon as it comes within range of the 
enemy's rifle fire. 

Estimate 

2. The enemy's strength and position is better known 
than would, many times, be the case. Captain D has been 
informed that our advance guard has observed about one 
regiment of hostile infantry, deploying on both sides of 
the road near 637; he knows, also, that the enemy has 
one battery of artillery, which was seen approaching St. 
Luke's Church from the northwest, at 9:15 a. m. It is 
not probable that this Red battery advanced beyond St. 
Luke's Church, as it would surely have been discovered had 
it done so. Neither is it likely it went back the way it 
came. The chances are, that it is in readiness back of the 
ridge on which St. Luke's Church stands; but whether 
north or south of the road, and how far from the road, can 
not now be told. That it is not yet in position, may be in- 
ferred from the fact that the Blue infantry on the road, 



190 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

where it is certainly visible from St. Luke's Church, has 
not drawn its fire. 

It is almost certain that observers will be posted in 
the steeple of St. Luke's Church, or in the trees near that 
point. It will soon be hazardous for Blue troops to appear 
in vulnerable formation in possible sight of these enemy 
observers. 

3. Captain D also has full information as to Colonel 
A's intentions ; that the latter proposes to attack the enemy 
by enveloping his left. Over what ground will this attack 
pass? In all likelihood, the frontal attack will be made 
along or near the Whitehall — St. Luke's Church road, on 
either or both sides ; while the enveloping attack will move 
over the ground in the vicinity of the stream lines northeast 
of Shebley's. 

4. Captain D clearly sees that his mission requires 
him to select a position for his battery which will admit of 
the following conditions being fulfilled: 

(a) Bring an effective fire on the neighborhood of St. 
Luke's Church and of road junction 637. 

(b) Have an observation station in connection with 
this position, from which can be seen the vicinity of St. 
Luke's Church and of 637, and the ground over which the 
Blue attack will pass. 

(c) Be out of view of the enemy observers in steeple of 
St. Luke's Church, or trees or buildings near enemy's posi- 
tion. 

(d) Be capable of being quickly occupied, and, as far 
as possible, in such manner that the enemy may nowhere 
see the battery. 

(e) And the position must, in accordance with Col- 
onel A's orders be southeast of Alloway Creek. 

5. In the half-hour which Captain A has had since 
leaving his battery, not more than 10 minutes were needed 
to ride forward to his present position. He has had 20 
minutes to spare which he has employed in reconnoitering 
neighboring positions, and receiving the report of his re- 
connaissannce officer as to positions the latter had visited. 
With the knowledge obtained from these reconnaissances, 



A FIELD BATTERY 191 

and from his map, Captain D, upon Colonel A's orders, can 
at once decide as to the disposition of his battery. 

6. The following possible positions are considered by 
Captain D: 

(a) Hill 627. The north end of this hill is bare, and 
affords a position for either direct or indirect fire, good 
place for observation station in trees on south end of hill. 
Can be approached under cover. Range to 637 about 3850 
yards, and 350 yards more to St. Luke's Church; rather 
long to obtain good results from shrapnel fire. A good 
place if the Blues were to fight a defensive action, but too 
distant for supporting an attack if a closer position can be 
found. 

(b) Hill 647. Bare spot about center of this hill, 
with trees or buildings on both sides, limiting field of fire. 
Top of hill quite flat; guns can not be run up readily for 
direct fire. Ranges to targets too great. Similar to (a). 

(c) Saddle between hill 627 and Schild's hill. This 
position is so shallow — only 5' lower than the crest in front 
— that even after making allowance for crops on ground 
concealing the battery itself, the gun flashes would at once 
be located by hostile observers. 

(d) Near 610. This position can be quickly reached 
by going across country west of hill 627, the crops being 
probably high enough to conceal the movements of the bat- 
tery. But a better route would be by the ravine east of hill 
627, northwestwardly, past the group of houses northeast 
of Schild's; thence, southwest along edge of woods. An- 
other method of approach would be to pass Grawmer's on 
the road at a rapid gait, turning northeast up the ravine 
300 yards northwest of that point. At the head of the ra- 
vine the walk should be taken, all men dismounted and 
horses led in order to reduce the chance of being seen. 

There is a good position for an observation station on 
Schild's house or the ridge in front of it, or, better, in one 
of the trees just northeast of Schild's. The woods here 
are heavy ; and, at a distance, all trees in a wood look alike. 
It might be necessary to cut out a few branches to give the 
observer an unobstructed view, while still leaving him con- 
cealed, but this can be easily done. 



192 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Range to 637 is about 3050 yards, a good artillery 
range. But the position of a battery near 610, while not 
visible to an observer on the ground near 637, or St. Luke's 
Church, would probably be visible to an observer in the 
church steeple, or in some of the trees near there. It would 
certainly be betrayed by the flashes of the guns. 

(e) Ravine northwest of Grawmer's. This position 
would be a concealed one, which could be approached most 
of the way under cover; but on account of the ridge lines, 
and houses in front and rear of this position, on which the 
enemy could accurately observe his fire, and the fact that 
the gun flashes would be visible, and at once attract the 
enemy's attention, the position is poor one. 

Positions c, d and e, have the worst feature an artillery 
position can have, — lack of depth. Once located by hostile 
artillery, a battery in such a position can be kept immo- 
bile as long as the hostile artillery chooses to maintain its 
fire. Even a direct fire position should have depth, enab- 
ling the guns to be withdrawn by hand to where the limbers 
may come to them. Generally speaking, a narrow ravine 
is a poor place for artillery. 

(f ) In ravine of Alloway Creek. Not enough cover 
to permit position being reached, without long and de- 
laying detours. 

(g) South of Pleasant Hill S. H.— Whitehall road. 
Same objection as (f ) , with added one that no good observa- 
tion stations exist, especially, with reference to observing 
the progress of the enveloping attack. 

(h) Field 600-800 yards northeast of Schild's. This 
position can be reached under cover, via east side of hill 
627 and houses on road northeast of Schild's. The woods 
in front make a perfect screen and afford some protection. 
Observation station could be located in a tree on west side 
of these woods, and would give excellent view of all the ter- 
rain of the expected action. 

Guns at the fence running north from the group of 
houses 600 yards northeast of Schild's will clear the trees 
when laid for a range of 2,000 yards ; about that required 
for the line, E. Ecker's — Whitehall — roadfork 595, as short 
a range as is likely to be needed. 



A FIELD BATTERY 193 

7. If position 6 (h), is selected, limbers and combat 
train can be located on either flank of the battery, under 
cover from the enemy's observation, behind the trees shel- 
tering the battery from view, or behind the trees south of 
the road 610—633, west of north from hill 627. The latter 
position is best protected from possible hostile cavalry pa- 
trols. 

8. Captain D considers the advisability of establish- 
ing an auxiliary observation station. Possible places are : 

(a) House about 300 yards northwest of road junc- 
tion 606 ; or in trees 300 yards west of this house, and north 
of Small's. 

(b) E. Ecker's. 

(c) House on hill 607, northeast of Whitehall S. H. 

(d) Whitehall. 

(e) House 1,000 yards southwest of Whitehall. 

Of these positions (a) appears the most promising, as 
giving a near view of the enveloping attack. It mi^'ht, 
later, as events develop, be pushed forward. If the recon- 
naissance officer be sent to this place, he could, if communi- 
cation can be maintained, report as to the effect of the Blue 
artillery fire, the advance of the Blue infantry, counter 
attacks of the enemy or other hostile movements, etc. The 
reconnaissance officer and one signaller are present. A 
musician, as horse-holder, can also be given him. The sig- 
naller, by utilizing wire fences and connecting them up 
across roads and open spaces with his buzzer wire, can 
establish a telephone line with not too much delay. He 
might even find, for at least part of the way, existing farm 
telephone lines which he could use. Failing this, flag com- 
munication could be established with a party stationed at 
the Schild house. 

9. Captain D sees no necessity to ride back and per- 
sonally bring up his battery. His executive officer, whom 
he brought up with him for this purpose, and who has ac- 
companied him for the last half hour, becoming thoroughly 
oriented in this time as to the situation and his captain's 
views, can be given suitable instructions, and sent back to 
lead the battery into its position. 

10. It is not necessary for Captain D to indicate the 



194 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

exact spot which the battery is to occupy. While this is 
frequently necessary when many troops are to be in the 
same neighborhood, there is no need to take up valuable 
time, when one battery, which has ample ground in which 
to maneuver, is the only one concerned. Captain D can 
best employ his time, while his battery is moving into pos- 
ition, by establishing his station and by careful, continuous 
observation of the terrain, endeavoring to locate as many 
hostile targets as possible. 

11. The plan of the Blue attack, and the position of 
the leading troops in Whitehall, indicate that the battery 
will soon be a mile behind the attacking infantry; and if 
a support is not provided by Colonel A, Captain D will be 
justified in asking for one. A company would be ample, 
and would not draw too heavily on the attacking force, 
since part of it could be sent forward in case of need. The 
commanding officer of the company would, after consulta- 
tion with the battery commander, be responsible for the 
posting of the support. 

A possible arrangement would be, one platoon at the 
house 450 yards north of roadfork 599, patrolling to north 
and east; half a platoon at Grawmer's, and the other half 
at 633, patrolling and observing to south and east; the re- 
mainder of the support in reserve at the house south of 
the battery. 

12. Some means of communication with Colonel A is 
necessary: but Captain D has reliable non-commissioned 
officers, one of whom can be detailed on this duty. 



Decision of Captain D 

13. To post his battery 400 yards east of the woods 
north of 610 ; the battery observation station to be on west 
edge of same woods (near south end) ; reconnaissance 
officer to establish an auxiliary station at house northeast of 
Small's ; limbers and combat trains to be south of the 610 — 
633 road, behind trees southeast of 610; an agent to be 
provided for Colonel A; and, finally, the latter requested 
to furnish an infantry company as battery support. 



A FIELD BATTERY 195 

Requirement 2: 

14. Captain D issues the following messages and 
orders. 

15. At 9:31 a. m., verbally, to Colonel A: 

Request a company be detailed as battery support, as the bat- 
tery will soon be a considerable distance in rear of the infantry. 

If Colonel A assents to this, he will undoubtedly 
detail a company of the main body, which is close by, and 
the captain of this company will soon be up. 

16. At 9:32 a. m., verbally, to Lieut. R (reconnais- 
sance officer), Lieut. E (executive officer), Corporal X 
(scout), and Sergeant S (chief of 5th Section) : 

You have heard Colonel A's orders and are familiar with the 
situation. 

Lieut. E, ride back to battery and bring it up quickly under 
cover, east of hill 627, into position in the field north of the 610 — 633 
road, about 150 yards north of the road, and 400 yards east of the 
woods just north of 610. Limbers and combat train south of the 
610 — 633 road, and east of trees southeast of 610*. 

I go at once to establish my station on west edge of these woods, 
northeast of Schild's. 

Corporal X, report as agent to Colonel A. 

17. Lieutenant E gallops back to the battery, while 
Captain D waits a minute or two to consult with the com- 
mander of the infantry support. The latter refers to his 
map and, after having been advised of Captain D's inten- 
tions, suggests an arrangement similar to that outlined 
above in par. 11: To this. Captain D readily gives his 
approval. 

18. Captain D, accompanied by Lieutenant R, Ser- 
geant S, two musicians and one signaller, keeping under 
cover of Schild's hill, now gallops off towards 610. Ar- 
riving there. Captain D selects, in the edge of the woods 
north of 610, a tree of good height, not too difficult to climb, 
or needing much trimming; and at 9:40 a. m., verbally, 
states : 

The battery observation station will be in this tree. 

Lieutenant R, take the signaller and one musician, and establish 
an auxiliary observation station at the house 400 yards northeast of 
SmalFs, about 1,500 yards from here. Use wire fences to establish 
and maintain telephone communication with me if possible. Other- 
wise arrange for a flag station at Schild's. 

19. Captain D now climbs the tree and with the help 

*Captain D illustrates his remarks by pointing out orientation features on the 
ground and on his map. 



196 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

of Sergeant S establishes his observation telescope,* break- 
ing off branches where necessary. The one musician left, 
holds the horses and watches Lieutenant R who rides off 
carefully, his signaller wiring up as necessary; the musi- 
cian with Lieutenant R holding the signaller's horse as 
required. 

20. Captain D need give no further orders until 
ready to open fire. The battery, when it comes into its 
designated position, will send forward and lay a telephone 
line to the B. C. station ; the signal corporal will attend to 
all the details of establishing the station ; and the executive 
officer will report, after communication is established, when 
the battery is ready to fire. The Executive Officer would 
give an initial laying by compass, site and range being 
estimated or taken from the map. The captain corrects 
by observation of the first fire. In the meantime. Captain 
D can give his undivided attention to observing the enemy's 
position and the location of the Blue infantry. 

21. The executive officer will retain, at the battery's 
position, one of the signal men; the remaining signal man 
and one remaining scout he sends to the B. C. station. They 
lay the telephone line as they go. This line is connected to 
the end of the line laid by Lieut. R. Meantime, the pro- 
gress of the latter is watched by the musician from the east 
side of the Schild house so that flag communication may be 
established at any moment. 

*If not equipped with the model 1913 instrument, he would use his field glasses. 
Sergeant S assists in observation. Whenever the captain is conducting fire. Ser- 
geant S maintains the general observation of the field. 



Part IX A Field Battery 



A Blue brigade, reinforced by a battery and a troop, is 
marching from Emmitsburg on Taneytown. The advance 
guard consists of the 1st Infantry and Troop A, 2d Cavalry, 
under command of Colonel B. 

The country is hostile to the Blues. 

The advance guard crossed the Monocacy at Bridgeport 
about 9 :00 a. m., and upon arrival at the heights east of the 
river became engaged with the enemy. 

General A with the main body, west of the river, upon 
hearing musketry fire, rode forward to join the advance 
guard, taking Captain D, battery commander, with him. 

As they rode past Alexander's, artillery fire was heard 
to the northeast, and General A directed Captain D : 

Send orders for your battery to join the advance guard, and you 
report at once to Colonel B. 

Note: Captain D has with him an agent and two musicians; the 
reconnaissance officer and two scouts are with the advance guard. 

Colonel B was found at the house 150 yards east of 500. 
Captain D reported that his battery was coming up, and 
Colonel B gave him orders as follows : 

I have a battalion of infantry deployed along the farther edge 
of the woods on that hill (532), and another battalion in the woods 
west of Eckhardt's ; but they cannot advance, on account of the fire of 
a battery of artillery at Longville. The battery is right out in the 
open. You can see the upper part of the flashes from this house. 
About a battalion of hostile infantry is on hill 526, and our cavalry 
from north of Taneytown, has just reported that more infantry is 
approaching Longville from the east. 

Get your battery into position quickly and stop that artillery fire. 
As soon as you open fire I am going to drive the enemy off hill 526. 
You must stop any infantry reinforcements from advancing to his 
support. 

Captain D notes that the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, is 
halted about 500 yards northwest of 500 road junction. He 
estimates that the Blue battery will be now between Mono- 
cacy bridge and the small stream-crossing to the east. 

Lieut. C, reconnaissance officer, reports that he has 

197 



198 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

seen the hostile battery, and that it is in the cornfield south- 
east of 541. 

Required : 

1. Any orders issued, or messages sent by Captain D 
upon receiving General A's instructions at Alexander's. 

2. Captain D's estimate of the situation in so far as 
it affects the disposition of his artillery. 

3. A tracing showing positions selected for firing 
battery, combat train, limbers, B. C. station, auxiliary ob- 
serving stations (if used), and the routes followed by fir- 
ing battery and combat train. 

4. State disposition and use of reconnaissance officer, 
scouts and telephone apparatus while battery is in action. 

AN APPRO\TD SOLUTION 

Requirement 1: 

Upon receiving General A's orders, at Alexander's, 
Captain D directs a musician : 

Ride back to Lieutenant C; tell him to form for action and bring 
battery up this road at a trot, halting at the roadfork (500). 

He indicates to the musician the Alexander — 500 road. 

Requirement 2 : 

Two tasks are assigned to the battery commander: 
First, to stop the hostile artillery fire; second, to prevent 
any Eed reinforcements from approaching hill 526. 

Captain D considers the first task to be the more im- 
portant one, for it is the fire from the Red battery that has 
stopped the progress of the Blue advance guard. In se- 
lecting a position for his battery he will, therefore, make 
sure of being able to deliver an effective fire on the hostile 
battery. It must be a position that can be occupied quickly, 
for Colonel B's orders indicate that the whole movement 
forward will be delayed until the Blue battery opens fire. 

The hostile battery being already in position and en- 
gaged in fire, the Blue battery should seek an approach 
along a covered route to a position affording defilade and 
then open fire as a surprise to the enemy. 



A FIELD BATTERY 199 

With the Red battery definitely located in the open and 
the Blue battery concealed, but with good observation sta- 
tions, Captain D should have no diflficulty in neutralizing 
the hostile artillery fire to such an extent that Colonel B can 
resume the advance of the infantry. 

Captain D, v^hile riding forward, has been able to esti- 
mate, pretty well, the country on both sides of the road for 
about 500 yards, with respect to its use by artillery. He 
notes that this area is screened against Longville and vicin- 
ity by the woods to the northeast, where the Blue infantry 
is engaged, but that there are no high places along the road 
suitable for observation stations. 

Arriving at hill 524, and looking over the country from 
the farmhouse, he sees that the country to the north and 
northeast, between the road and the woods, is all defiladed 
against the enemy's position near Longville, and that there 
are several positions near the house suitable for the firing 
battery. 

From the farmhouse, he sees the tops of the flashes of 
the hostile battery; he will thus be able to adjust ap- 
proximately the fire of his own battery on the target. With 
the aid of an observing officer at the front of the woods to 
the north, he should be able to deliver a quick and effective 
fire on the Red battery. 

He might go forward himself and establish his B. C. 
station there, but it would be a considerable distance from 
his battery, with the further disadvantage of being right in 
the midst of the Blue infantry firing line, which is now under 
hostile artillery and infantry fire. 

Captain D can see from the house more distant parts of 
the terrain that may offer suitable places for the battery. 
About 1000 yards north of 500 road junction, and two or 
three hundred yards west of the bend in the road, there 
seems to be a position behind the crest that will also permit 
a fire across the north front of the woods, on the the hostile 
infantry. There is also an open area in the woods to the 
north which may be practicable for the battery. 

Captain D knows, though, that his battery will be up 
in five or six minutes and that the reconnaissance of these 
distant positions will take considerable time. He believes 



200 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

that the time element is important, and that he should have 
a position selected for battery to occupy as soon as it comes 
up. 

He decides, therefore, to place the battery in position 
near the farmhouse where he now is, and to use the house as 
the B. C. station. Looking over the terrain near the house, 
he sees the ravine to the west of hill 524, and also the one to 
the southeast of hill 524 ; but neither of these offers any ad- 
vantage over the flat country to the north of the road. So 
he selects a position on the cultivated ground north of the 
farmhouse with the right piece near the barn. 

The range to hostile battery will be about 3,000 yards, 
and the battery from here will be able to fire also on hill 526 
and the country to the northeast. 

The limbers will be placed behind woods on south slope 
of hill 524, and the combat train near farmhouse about 500 
yards southwest of the limbers ; an auxiliary observing sta- 
tion will be at Eckhardt's farmhouse. 

Requirement 3: 

See map on bulletin board. 

Requirement 4 : 

The reconnaissance officer is in charge of the auxiliary 
station at the Eckhardt house; an agent is with Colonel B 
for the purpose of transmitting messages and information 
to Captain D. One scout is with the reconnaissance officer ; 
the other regular scout and one specially detailed are at 
Boyd's providing for security of battery. One telephone 
is at the B. C. station, one at the firing battery and one at 
thie auxiliary observing station. 

Comments on Solutions 

In several solutions, under Requirement 1, the orders 
issued were not given in proper form ; that is, as they would 
be actually expressed by Captain D. 

The orders for the occupation of the position and a de- 
scription of the manner of occupying position were not 
called for under Requirement 2. This was given in several 
solutions. 



A FIELD BATTERY 201 

In seventeen solutions the firing battery was placed in 
vicinity of hill 524. 

In seven solutions the firing battery was placed on the 
slope west of the bend in road about 1,000 yards north of 
500 road junction. This is a good position for carrying out 
the tasks assigned to the battery. Flash defilade can be 
obtained against Longville, as well as an uninterrupted fire 
across the front of Colonel B's infantry toward hill 526. 
The B. C. station in this case should be at the northern 
point of the woods west of Eckhardt's. 

Under the conditions stated in problem, the objection to 
this position would be the length of time required to recon- 
noiter and occupy it. If the reconnaissance oflficer recom- 
mends this position to his battery commander and is ready 
to lead battery to it, it satisfactorily solves the problem. 

Four solutions placed the firing battery near head of 
ravine 500 yards north of 500 road junction. . There is no 
good observing station close to the battery in this position. 
The battery being on lower ground than the woods in front, 
an unnecessarily large dead space is formed in front of 
woods. 

Four solutions placed the firing battery in north edge 
of woods near Eckhardt's, or on top of the crest near the 
house. This position is untenable, considering conditions 
stated in problem. In some of these solutions, battery was 
moved to position through the woods, while the map in- 
dicates that the woods have thick underbrush. 

Three solutions placed the firing battery in open space 
in woods southeast of Eckhardt's. It is doubtful if more 
than "mounted defilade'* can be obtained here, and that 
only by moving back to the edge of the woods. In this case 
the position of the battery and its range would be found 
easily, on account of the flashes appearing against the 
woods in rear. 

One solution had the firing battery in the middle of the 
woods, and another one, in rear edge of woods. 

One solution had the firing battery in ravine near Alex- 
ander's, with B. C. station on hill 503. In this case the 
range is too long and the battery commander cannot see 
his objective. 



Part X Artillery 



General Situation: 

A Red army is holding the line Taneytown — German- 
town against an equal Blue force attacking from the east. 

Special Situation: 

The 1st Cavalry (Blue), is covering the front Marysville — 
Whitehall, with headquarters at Gebhardt's. 

A Blue detachment detrained at Sells Station, is march- 
ing on Whitehall via Bashor Mill, with orders to cover 
the Blue right flank. 

Troops in Order of March 

Advance Guard, Colonel A commanding; the 1st In- 
fantry and Battery C, 1st Field Artillery (less combat 
train). 

The advance guard support consists of the 1st Bat- 
talion and one platoon of machine guns of the 1st Infantry, 
under Major B. 

Main body, the 2d Infantry; 1st Battalion, 1st Field 
Artillery (less Btry. C) ; the 3d Infantry. 

General A, Major B, and Major C, and Captain D (Bn. 
Adjt.) of the artillery, are riding together at the head of 
the support, and a rest halt is ordered as they arrive at 633 
crossroad. Messages from the cavalry and from the main 
army cause General A to issue the following order: 

Heavy hostile columns are approaching Whitehall and Square 
Corners from the west and northwest. 

We will take position in readiness here. Order of march ceases. 

The artillery will go into position at once to cover the front 
Square Corners — St. Luke's Church, and will open fire without further 
orders on any hostile body that appears. 

Major B, with the support establish a march outpost with your 
headquarters at that group of houses about half a mile west of us. 
Patrol well out and get in touch with our cavalry without delay. 
Their headquarters is at Gebhardt's, that farmhouse yonder, (point- 
ing). 

The rest of the 1st Infantry will close in mass behind that woods 
(about 400 yards east of 633). 

The 2d and 3d Infantry will close up on the 1st. 

Trains will wait orders at Sells Station. 
202 



ARTILLERY 203 

Required : 

1. Tracing showing the detachment on the march. 
The line Sells Station — 633 to be the center line of the sheet. 
Usual road map features to be shown. 

2. Actions and orders of Major C, 1st F. A. Mes- 
sages, directions, in fact, every word uttered by Major C to 
be reported verbatim. 

3. Tracing to include the line Square Corners — St. 
Luke's Church and the position of the 3d Infantry. 

Show roads, blue stream lines and 20-foot contours of 
600 and above. 

Indicate infantry and cavalry positions roughly, artil- 
lery positions accurately and fully. 

AN APPROVED SOLUTION 
1st Requirement: 

The head of the support is at 633 which is therefore 
the point to work from. Assume one company in the ad- 
vance party, with its point at the group of houses one-half 
mile to the west, its main body on the 620 nose. The sup- 
port extends back to 612. 

Assuming 600 yards distance to the reserve, the head 
of the latter is at 613, its tail about 200 yards west of 566. 
The battery is in rear of the infantry. 

Assuming the distance to the main body to be 800 
yards, its head is at Bashor Mill. The 2d Infantry oc- 
cupies 1,000 yards of road space, the artillery the same, 
the 3d Infantry has about two battalions in column of march, 
the remainder in column of companies, in mass, near the 
detraining point. 

The field trains are parked in the grass field south of 
the station. 

2d Requirement: 

Remark 

Every problem in tactics contains some main idea, the 
recognition of which is essential to a successful solution. 
If the main idea is recognized, a satisfactory solution has 
been entered upon. Means of carrying the solution to com- 
pletion will differ, for all the factors in a tactical problem 



204 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

are variables and no two minds will assign them equal 
values, but a majority of such solutions will differ only in 
unessential details. Rarely will a man who has recognized 
the main idea go wide in his judgment as to how it should 
be treated. Where the main idea is not recognized, solu- 
tions are mere gropings in the dark, occasionally successful, 
but by the law of chances, more often not. 

The pre-essential to a good solution is, then, the deter- 
mination of the main idea, the important feature of the situ- 
ation. 

The problem is a simple one. A General, undecided 
as to his next move, orders his artillery to take a position 
from which it can attack by fire an enemy that is expected 
to appear on a certain line at any time, and meantime has 
his other troops close up on his head of column to be handy 
when he decides how he can best use them. How soon the 
enemy may appear is not known. 

What is the ''main idea" for the artilleryman? Sim- 
ply that he should, with no unnecessary delay, prepare to 
fire on the ground where the enemy may appear, from a 
position hidden from hostile observation, and reasonably 
close to the supporting infantry. 

Discussion of the Problem 

So far as the artillery is concerned. General A's order is 
one that calls for quick action. Heavy hostile columns are 
approaching from the west and northwest. The skyline, 
beyond which they are, is about two and one-half miles dis- 
tant — not a bad artillery range when conditions of observa- 
tion and the character of the probable targets are con- 
sidered. An enemy appearing on that crest would have but 
a few hundreds of yards to traverse to, gain shelter in the 
valleys to the east. How near he may be to this skyline is 
unknown ; but, in any case, that is where he must be forced 
to halt, deploy, or change his direction of march. 

The battalion commander has with him, as a rule, his 
musician, orderly, and the agents. The sergeant major, 
the scouts, the two signal men and the two reel cart drivers 
are the command of the adjutant. With him are usually 
the sergeant major and the scouts, the signal men being 



ARTILLERY 205 

with the reel cart, of which the signal corporal is in charge. 
In this case, the statement of the problem indicates that 
the reel cart is in its usual place at the head of the battalion. 

The battalion quartermaster, the quartermaster ser- 
geant and one orderly are with the field train. 

Major C knows that his nearest battery, C, is nearly 
a mile back, and the remainder of the battalion at least two 
miles back. The former can be brought up in 10 to 15 min- 
utes, the latter in from 30 to 35 minutes. This assumes that 
an agent is sent at a gallop and that the command comes up 
at a trot. 

It will require half a minute to instruct the agent and 
possibly a full minute. To ride to Battery C and deliver 
the message will require about four minutes. The ques- 
tion naturally arises, "Why not use the flag?" The proce- 
dure in that case would be as follows: Since the battery 
is probably hidden, more or less, by the woods at 612, the 
scout charged with sending the message must go to one 
side and find a place from which he can see it. He must 
avoid signalling from a skyline, and must select a back- 
ground such that he will be readily picked up by the battery 
and his signals read. At the distance, this is apt to be 
difficult. The nearest likely place is about 100 yards to 
the south. Arrived there the scout "calls" with his flags 
until answered from the battery, and then sends his mes- 
sage at the rate of about ten words a minute. At the best, 
this method would save very little time, and it might lose 
a great deal of time. 

Major C decides, therefore, to send a messenger; one 
will suffice, since the batteries are all on the same road. 

Corporal C, (agent) tell Captain C to report to me here, as 
soon as possible, with his reconnaissance party; his battery to follow 
him at a trot. Then go on to the battalion and tell Captain B to 
report to me, as soon as possible, with Captain A and the reconnais- 
sance parties of both batteries. The battalion is to follow him at a 
trot. The combat trains are to halt together in the woods north of the 
road and about a mile east of here. Stop there on your way back 
until you see them established, then rejoin me at a trot. Gallop. 

Major A has a very good view of the country in which 
the enemy is expected to appear, but even a 14-foot greater 
elevation is not to be despised. Besides, hostile artillery is 



206 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

quite likely to sweep this, the most prominent road crossing 
the ridge. The enemy territory should be taken under 
observation at once. Until the reel cart arrives field glasses 
alone will be available; all the scouts have them, and no 
better employment could be found for the adjutant and his 
party. This form of reconnaissance must begin when a 
sector of observation is assigned to any artillery unit, and 
be maintained as long as the assignment continues. 

Captain D, leave three scouts with me; take the rest of the 
headquarters party to yonder hill (647), and take the sector Square 
Corners — St. Luke's Church under observation. When the reel cart 
comes up, run a line to the batteries and also establish flag communi- 
cation. The batteries w^ill go in north of here. 

Having made these initial dispositions, Major C looks 
about for positions for the batteries. There is plenty of 
suitable ground to the south and north and on the ridge on 
which he stands. Other things being equal, he would prefer 
to go to the north, as the ranges will be shorter. 

The ridge on which he stands is the most prominent 
one for miles in any direction, and is undoubtedly under 
hostile observation throughout its length. It is within 
reasonable range of possible heavy artillery in the main 
Red position. A movement across this ridge will certainly 
be seen and valuable information thus given to the enemy, 
viz., that Blue artillery is approaching the Red flank. The 
batteries could go under cover around the flanks of the ridge, 
but this would require much time. 

In the distance, west and northwest, are many likely 
looking places where positions for batteries might be found, 
but much time is certain to be lost in getting to them ; they 
are far from the supporting infantry ; General A's final dis- 
positions may be such that a retrograde movement would 
be necessary; or a serious engagement, with the rescue of 
the guns for its object, might be brought about. The pre- 
sence of the cavalry is no inducement to go forward, — it is 
not a part of General A's command, and the instructions 
under which it is operating are unknown. 

Major C dismisses all thought of the distant positions, 
and looks for that one to the north which can be most quick- 
ly occupied. He can see over the field to the north, and 



ARTILLERY 207 

might very well designate a position in it for Battery C ; but 
there is time to see personally that no impassable object ex- 
ists in it. If there is, or if the proposed position is other- 
wise unsuitable, he will be able to make any other dispo- 
sitions at once, which he would not be if he sent a scout to 
see. 

With Corporals A and B (agents), Corporal X, Pri- 
vates Y and Z (scouts), his orderly and musician, Major 
C rides into the field to the north, and trots to its northeast 
corner looking over the ground. 

C Battery will go in here. Limbers near that woods to the east 
(pointing). Private Y, post yourself 100 yards from this corner in 
line with it and the crossroads. (633) . You will mark the left of the 
battery. When relieved join me. 

Corporal X, you and Y open the fence yonder (612). Conduct C 
Battery to its position, and join me at the crossroads (633). 

Returning to the crossroads 633, the major meets Cap- 
tain C, and has him halt his party while on the east slope 
of the ridge. Then to him and his reconnaissance officer 
he gives a full statement of the situation, of the information 
and orders received from General A, points out the position 
the battery is to occupy and tells him to establish his own 
station "in this vicinity." He does not attempt to give firing 
data for Captain C, — the latter can get it for himself by the 
time the battery is ready for it, — but he might very well des- 
ignate an aiming point, since while on the ground he could 
have selected one. It may not be possible at 633 to select 
an aiming point that will be visible and unmistakable at 
all the guns. 

It is not necessary to order defilade; the major has 
already determined that in selecting the position. 

Captain, heavy hostile columns are approaching the line Square 
Corners — St. Luke's Church (pointing them out) from the west and 
northwest. Our cavalry covers the front Marysville — Whitehall, with 
headquarters at that farmhouse (Gebhardt's) (pointing out the places 
or their directions). A position in readiness is ordered here, the in- 
fantry closing up on that woods (612), the support of the advance 
guard establishing a march outpost with headquarters at that group 
of houses (pointing). The artillery takes a position in observation 
along this crest. My station is being established on that hill (points 
to 647). Your station will be in this vicinity, your battery in that 
field. That scout (pointing) marks the left of your line. 

Take the sector Square Corners — St. Luke's Church under obser- 
vation at once and in the absence of further instructions, open fire 
on any hostile parties of any size that you may discover. 



208 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Let the adjutant know your dispositions as soon as they are 
complete, and have another agent report to me. 

Post your limbers about 500 yards east of the battery. 

I am going north to locate the positions for the other batteries. 

Captain C directs his reconnaissance officer to arrange 
the communications, designates an aiming point and gives 
firing data. The executive (the senior officer at the battery) 
has the guns laid accordingly, and reports the battery 
ready The captain studies the terrain from some con- 
venient position, — in this case the roof of a building 
since the trees north of Schild's interfere with his view 
from the ground. 

The chief of the fifth section comes up, and he and the 
R. 0. assist in observing or computing data, or both; or 
prepare a covered place of observation to be occupied in 
case of need, as the captain may direct. Signalman No. 1 
and a substitute operate the telephone line from the B. C. 
station to the battery; signalman No. 2 connects with the 
battalion line at the B. C. station. For flag connection 
three men are required, who may be scouts, and a sub- 
stitute, or three substitutes. The signal corporal super- 
vises the work of all. 

One scout with flags ready, keeps near the battery 
commander, in view of the battery and out of view of the 
enemy, ready to communicate his orders. 

When the battery approaches, the scout stands facing 
down the line it is to occupy, right arm extended in that 
direction, left arm pointing in the direction of fire. By this 
means, the executive officer is able to place the battery in po- 
sition without delay, without even riding to the crest him- 
self, and the guns will be pointed in the correct general 
direction. 

When the battery is met by the scouts in the road near 
612, the corporal sends the private to rejoin the major, as 
he is only needed to help open the fence. The corporal 
then points out to the executive officer the position the bat- 
tery is to occupy. The latter, without halting, leads the bat- 
tery through the gap in the fence, straight towards the scout 
who marks the position ; the corporal meantime telling him 
the details of the position, so far as he knows them. The 
ground being suitable, the executive officer signals : 



ARTILLERY 209 

Form for action, double section, left oblique, march. 
The leading carriage takes the walk ; the others continue 
at the trot, the caissons obliquing out of column to the left 
until clear of the guns by two yards, and then continuing 
parallel to them ; except the first, which closes up in double 
section column with its piece and takes the walk. The 
others form double section in succession in the same manner. 
The rear caisson of the fifth section passes by the whole bat- 
tery on its right, places itself ahead of the leading section, 
and takes the walk. Having reached the position of the 
scout, the column changes direction half right and marches 
on the fence corner. As the head of the column reaches it, 
or the rear carriage reaches the position of the scout, the 
executive officer signals: Action left. The battery halts, 
the cannonneers dismount, unlimber the guns and caissons, 
and put them in the order in battery. The limbers move 
out by the right flank, and are conducted by the first ser- 
geant to the position designated by the executive officer or 
by the battery commander ; in this case, to the small woods 
about 500 yards to the east. The executive officer mean- 
time orders : Prepare for action, which is executed. 

The battery was at a trot until double section was 
formed; hence, no earlier opportunity was presented of 
preparing for action, nor, until the gap in the fence was 
cleared, of forming for action. 

The signal men prepare their telephones, one to con- 
nect with the battalion line if laid, the others to connect the 
executive officer with the battery commander if necessary, 
and take their flags from the cases in readiness for use. 

Having assured himself that all is in readiness, the ex- 
ecutive officer reports to the captain: Battery in order, sir. 

The captain designates an aiming point, gives the firing 
data for some point, as Shebley's, adding: Do not load. 
Instruments are set and guns laid. 

Major C rides north under cover of the crest, his men 
cutting the fences, until he reaches the one running east 
from the farmyard 600 yards north of 633, then goes up to 
the crest and looks about him. 

He might as well have taken the road, perhaps, for he 
is far in rear of the covering cavalry, and his small party 



210 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

would attract little attention. On the other hand, some hos- 
tile observer might spot the artillerymen (rifles and sabers 
missing, semaphore kit cases slung on their backs) . Again, 
such an example on the part of the major would be certain 
to be followed by others, and signs of activity on the ridge 
are certain to draw unwelcome hostile attention. 

At the wire fence, the major finds ample room for a 
battery on each side of it, space for their limbers in the open 
country to the east, and for the two battery commanders' 
stations on the crest to the left front. It w^ould be better if 
the latter were more separated, but the chances of confusion 
can be minimized by a little judgment. 

From the crest he can see Square Corners and St. 
Luke's Church, part of the road connecting them, and part 
of the slopes west and east of that road. He decides on 
this position: 

Y, go 200 yards east along the fence and remain there to mark 
the place; B Battery will take a position in observation north of 
you; A Battery south of you, lines parallel to C Battery. B. C. 
stations to the left front on the crest. Limbers just beyond that 
fence about 500 yards east of here. Agents, ride across to that corner 
(pointing to 613), meet the batteries there and conduct them here. 
Tell the executive officers what is wanted. Then rejoin me. I am go- 
ing back to the crossroads to meet the battery commanders. Move 
fast. 

By this time the main body of the artillery should be on 
its way. The batteries might continue to 612 and there 
turn north to position; but if, by any chance. Battery C 
should have drawn fire, this passage in rear of it will be 
highly dangerous. The fence corner at 613 is visible, and if 
the batteries can be diverted at that point they can be 
brought straight across. The distance is less, but this is 
balanced by the ground being cultivated; so that time will 
be about the same, but safety will be assured. 

The B. C.'s should be up — or soon will be — by the time 
Major C arrives at 633. He repeats the information as in 
the case of Captain C, and adds : 

Your positions are about 700 yards from here. That scout 
(pointing to Private Y) is between them. Agents are meeting 
the batteries at the corner half a mile east of here, and have 
instructions to conduct them to their positions. They are also in- 
formed as to the position of the limbers. Your own positions will 
be on the crest to the left front of A Battery. 



ARTILLERY 211 

Wire and flag communication will be established as soon as 
possible. B Battery's sector is Square Corner, and 200 mils to right 
and left of it; A Battery's sector is St. Luke's Church, and 200 mils 
to the right and left of it. 

C Battery is at present covering the whole sector with orders to 
fire on any hostile parties. You will report any such that you may 
see, and will prepare to fire, but will not do so without orders from 
me. Go to your stations under cover of this crest; look to security 
of your right flank, and report when you are ready. 

Major C now goes to his station and receives the report 
of the adjutant as to its establishment, and what has been 
done. 

Captain, take four scouts and go to the cavalry headquarters. 
Arrange for signal communication with me and send me any useful 
information the cavalry may have. Remain there in observation and 
have routes reconnoitered for a possible movement over there. 

Corporal D, (additional agent who joined from C Battery), re- 
port to the brigade adjutant as agent. 

The sergeant major, under direction of the adjutant, 
runs a line from Battery B's B. C. station, keeping the reel 
cart out of sight behind the crest. Men from the batteries 
carry the line forward where necessary, to the places de- 
signated by their battery commanders for telephone men. 

When communication with the batteries is established 
and the latter are in position, Major C gives the following 
message : 

All batteries: C Battery will now observe the sector Whitehall 
to 500 mils south. If the wire is busy be careful not to break in 
with reports, but use the flag. Do not fire without my order. The 
adjutant is at cavalry headquarters in observation. 

Direction point is St. Luke's Church. 

The position as chosen fulfills the following condi- 
tions : It meets the tactical requirements of the situation, 
in that it can be occupied quickly without attracting hostile 
attention; and from it, the hostile columns can be forced 
to halt, deploy or change direction at the maximum dis- 
tance of which the terrain will admit. 

It is good for a defense organized on this line, or in 
front of it, or for an attack to the front or toward the main 
hostile army's left flank. 

Ranges are reasonable, observation fair. 

Absolute protection for limbers and combat trains can 
be assured by simply sending them well to the rear. 



212 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Ammunition supply is easy. 
- Well concealed routes to the front, rear and flanks are 
available. 

The trees east of the line Schild — Grawmer screen it 
somewhat from the hostile main position, where heavy 
artillery may be. 

Major C turned over the observation to his adjutant 
at a time when he had no batteries available for action ; he 
gave Captain C orders to fire without reference to him, on 
any hostile forces that might appear, during the time that 
Captain C's was the only battery available ; by the time all 
batteries are in position, he is at his own station, thoroughly 
informed as to the powers and limitations of his batteries 
in their respective positions, and assumes his duties as di- 
rector of fire, assigning a direction point, taking into his 
own hands the assignment of targets and the opening of 
fire upon them, and assigning such a sector to Battery C 
as assures the most dangerous flank of the possible hostile 
position being kept under observation. 

3d Requirement: 

The march outpost is shown as follows: One com- 
pany at Schild, with a squad at Small's, at White Hall 
Schoolhouse, at the farm 600 yards southwest and at the 
one 800 yards south of Schild. 

The support, as it was in march, at the group of build- 
ings one-half mile west of 633. 

Battalion and battery commanders and important aux- 
iliary stations indicated by small circles, each battery by 
a single conventional sign, its width that of a battery to 
scale (100 yards), positions of limbers and combat trains 
indicated by circles. 

Infantry indicated by rectangles to scale showing col- 
umn of masses east of the woods at 612. 

Notation opposite each fraction, or figures referring 
to marginal notation. 

Comment 

1. The command had detrained at Sells Station; it 
was reasonable to assume it to be in some formation at 



ARTILLERY 213 

that point — not as marching through that point from the 
southeast. 

2. In a small command, artillery is best placed at the 
rear. 

3. Distances in column may be quite short in an 
advance to a covered front. 

4. On such a short march little or no allowance 
should be made for elongation. 

5. Allowances should be made as follows in an ar- 
tillery command: Battalion headquarters, two carriage 
lengths; battery headquarters, distance between battery 
and battalion headquarters, distance between batteries and 
between them and attached fractions (as Battery C's com- 
bat train), one carriage length. 

6. Several students had four batteries in the battalion. 
Several betrayed a lack of knowledge of the composition of 
a battalion headquarters. 

7. The order of march showed the battalion to be 
together, except for the firing battery of Battery C, yet 
many put the combat trains behind the 3d Infantry. 

8. Infantry combat trains were held in rear by some. 
As in the case of the artillery, the statement of the problem 
showed that the regiments were complete. 

9. The time element in the problem was not grasped 
by some; others, while apparently appreciating it, did not 
appreciate the distances involved. 

10. Some positions were too far from the infantry. 

11. Some batteries were widely separated, with no 
compensation. 

12. Nothing warranted the assignment of counter 
and infantry batteries so early in the game. 

13. The terrain should be placed under observation 
at once. 

14. B. C's. and batteries should be sent for at once. 

15. In some solutions Major C scattered his scouts, 
agents, etc., broadcast, without delay, a mistake only too 
common in practice in all arms. Economy in use of mes- 
sengers should be practiced. 



214 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

16. Better prepare for action either just before or 
just after entering the firing position. Some batteries 
were prepared miles in rear. 

17. Good positions noted were: just south of 612, 
normal order ; in the field north of the woods at 612, normal 
order. 

Positions to the north are best because of shorter rang- 
es and better observation, and greater security from heavy 
artillery fire from the hostile main position. 



Part Xr Troop Leading 



The 1st Blue Division, weakened by the detachment 
of a reenforced brigade under General A, on the early 
morning of March 26, 1915, took up a defensive position 
northeast of Gettysburg extending from McElhany to the 
orchard south of 501, to oppose a Red force invading Blue 
territory from the west. 

General A's command consisted of the 1st Inf. Brig.; 
1st Sq., 1st Cav. ; 1st Bn., 1st L. A. ; Co. A., Engrs. and 
the 1st Amb. Co. At 5 :30 a. m., March 26, 1915, the de- 
tachment was breaking camp six miles north of Center 
Mills when a message from the Division Commander 
brought information that the Red forces, estimated as a 
division, at 5:00 a. m., were deploying for attack. General 
A was ordered to march at once to the aid of the division. 

The detachment marched via Center Mills with the 1st 
Inf.; 1st Sq., 1st Cav., and Co. A, Engrs., in the advance 
guard. All attempts to reach the division by wire after 
6 :00 a. m. had failed. 

At 9:30 a. m., when General A, at the head of the ad- 
vance guard reserve, reached hill 646 north of Table Rock, 
he received information to the effect that the Blue divi- 
sional cavalry was engaged with superior Red cavalry near 
D. Wirt ; and that at 9 :20 a. m., the Red division had thrown 
in all its infantry but two regiments, one of which was 700 
yards northwest of the 501 crossroads, the other near 504, 
and that the Blue division had absorbed all its reserves but 
one battalion. The advance cavalry was at Goodintent 
School. 

Advance party: Co. A, 1st Inf., 60 yards; distance, 
400 yards. 

Support : 1st Plat. Tr. A, 1st Cav. ; Mtd Det. Co. A, 
Engrs.; 1st Bn. 1st Inf. (less Co. A), 240 yards.; distance, 
500 yards. 

Reserve: 1st Inf. (less 1st Bn.), 710 yards.; Co. A, 
Engrs. (less Mtd. Det.), 60 yards; distance, 600 yards. 
215 



216 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Main Body, in order of march: 2d Inf. (less 2 bns.) ; 
1st Bn., 1st L. A. (less C. Tns.) ; 2d and 3d Bns., 2d Inf.; 
3d Inf. ; C. Tns., 1st Bn. 1st L. A., 1st Amb. Co. 

Total road space Main Body: 3,260 yards. 

Trains follow the Main Body without distance. 

General A was accompanied by his staff and orderlies, 
the advance guard commander, the artillery commander 
and the commander of Company A, Engineers. After 
receiving the messages, at 9 : 30 a. m.. General A read their 
contents to these officers. He then consulted his map 
briefly, and after warning the officers to make notes of his 
instructions, issued verbal orders directing the detachment 
to continue the march with a view to attacking the enemy's 
left, advance guard to take the road to Herman's; the ad- 
vance cavalry to go to the assistance of the divisional cav- 
alry near D. Wirt, leaving patrols to watch the Red left; 
the firing batteries to trot up to the tail of the reserve of 
the advance guard; regimental commanders to join him at 
the head of the support. 

General A, riding at the head of the advance guard 
support, had reached the ridge crest 700 yards northwest 
of Herman's at 10 :05 a. m., when he received the following 
message : 

Aeroplane No. 7, 

TABLE ROCK, 

26 Mar., '15, 10-02 A. M. 
C. O., 

Blue Brig.: 
Red left extended by one Bn. from regt. northwest of 501 cross- 
roads. One bn. from regt. near 504 now moving toward VARNEY. 
Red art. posted 1 regt on OAK RIDGE, other with right at stock farm, 
left near 513 roadfork. Red attacking line now about 500 yds. from 
Blue position; has made very slow progress in last half hour, but is 
still advancing. Our cavalry still engaged with Red cavalry; fight 
is slowly drifting toward southeast. 

K, 
Lieut., Sig. Corps. 

General A, after reading the above message, with his 
stafl^, the cavalry platoon and officers who had reported to 
him for orders, galloped to the fence corner 400 yards 
southwest of the point where the road crosses the ridge 
crest. By the aid of field glasses the artillery regiment in 
action towards the Stock Farm could be plainly seen. A 



I 



TROOP LEADING 217 

small mounted patrol near 513 moving rapidly to the south 
was also observed. It was now 10:10 a. m., the Blue col- 
umn had continued the march without halting. 

At 10:10 a. m., General A read the aviator's message 
to the assembled officers, cautioned them to make notes of 
his instructions, and then issued the following verbal 
orders : 

We will attack the Red left. March conditions now cease. 

The artillery battalion will move at once to position, in this 
vicinity, against the Red artillery and their attacking infantry; 
later supporting our attack. The 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, is 
assigned as support. 

The 1st Platoon, Troop A, 1st Cavalry, will take position on that 
hill (pointing to hill 651), to cover our right and to report changes 
in hostile dispositions. 

The 1st Infantry, less 1st Battalion, will advance through Her- 
man's and, when deployed, will atttack with its right through J 

WEAVER. 

The 2d Infantry will move, under cover, toward hill 586, north- 
east of VARNEY, and, when deployed, will attack with its left directed 
on hill 586. 

The 3d Infantry, as reserve under my command, will move for- 
ward to the GOODINTENT SCHOOL. 

Emptied combat wagons will assemble at table rock after troops 
have cleared the road. 

Station for the slightly wounded at table rock. 
Messages to goodintent school. 

(Completed at about 10 :14 a. m) . 

1st Requirement: 

Action and orders of Major Q, 1st F. A. 

AN APPROVED SOLUTION 

On seeing the hostile artillery, Major Q at once called 
out, Agents. They ride up. Have the battery comm'anders 
report to me at once. Gallop. 

When General A completes his order, Major Q turns 
to his adjutant : 

Captain, A and B Batteries will take position in that hollow in 
the north end of this field just inside the fence; A on the left, B on 
the right. Have them trot out, passing by the right of the infantry. 
C Battery follow them, keeping to the road until closed up on the 
infantry support. Mark the positions of A and B Batteries and 
have their firing data ready. They will fire on hostile artillery, A 
taking the farther half of the line and B the near half. 

Corporal K, take this message to the Commanding Officer, 1st 
Battalion, 1st Infantry, down at that road corner (pointing towards 
Herman's) : "Your battalion is assigned as artillery support. One 



218 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

battery takes position on the hill southeast of you. Please occupy 
it at once." 

Corporal T (scout), report to the brigade adjutant as agent. 

Upon arrival of Captains A and B, about 10 :20 a. m., he 
issues the following order, indicating directions and local- 
ities as mentioned: 

Our division is in position along the Harrisburg road, about two 
and a half miles south of here, facing west. 

The enemy in superior force is attacking it from the west. 
Between 3,000 and 4,000 yards to the southwest you can see a long 
line of his artillery in action. 

Our divisional cavalry is engaged with hostile cavalry about two 
miles east of here. Our advance cavalry was on that hill ( Goodintent 
School) and has moved to the assistance of the divisional cavalry, 
leaving patrols to the south. 

The 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, now marching down the road 
yonder, is artillery support and will occupy that hill. 

Our infantry marches in a general southerly direction from 
here, in attack formation, against the hostile left. 

Batteries A and B attack the hostile artillery from position in the 
north end of this field. Battery C goes to that hill (592), to attack 
the hostile infantry. 

Battery A's target is the farther half of the line of guns; Bat- 
tery B's, the near half. The positions are marked. Occupy them 
at once and prepare for immediate action. The adjutant will give 
you firing data. Range by volleys. Report when ready and await 
my order to commence firing. I will be on the left of A Battery. 

Captain C arrives by the time these orders are issued 
and Major B repeats the information, adding: 

A battalion of hostile infantry is probably holding those woods 
(586). 

Hostile reserves are reported from one to two miles south of 
the hill up which our support is marching (pointing). 

You should be able to see them or the hostile attacking lines, 
perhaps both, from that hill. Take a position over there and fire 
without further orders on the enemy's reserves or on his main at- 
tacking line, whichever in your judgment offers the more important 
target. 

Batteries A and B have reported ready at 10 :24 a. m. 
Major Q signals Commence Firing, and rides back to the left 
of Battery A. 

Captain D, direct the sergeant major to establish wire and flag 
communication with Battery C. Then join the cavalry to our right 
front and send me word of the effect of our fire, and of changes in 
the hostile dispositions. 

Lieut. W, (Agent, Combat Train), ride back to the combat train. 
Tell Lieutenant M what you know of the situation, and tell him to 
retain his present place in column; when he comes up to those woods 
(pointing to the northwest), to halt his train, and report to me here 
in person. Ride at a six-mile gait. 



TROOP LEADING 219 

Captain, (Medical Officer), station for the slightly wounded is 
to be at Table Rock. Send two of your men with C Battery, and 
establish your aid station at that house. (400 yards N. E.) 

2d Requirement: 

Action and orders of Captain C to include selection 
and attack of a target. 



AN APPROVED SOLUTION 

Captain C joins his battery on the road, assembles his 
officers at its head, and explains the situation as they ride 
along, adding, to the Executive Officer, Follow the infantry 

support, keeping a sharp lookout for signals from me. I am going 
ahead to reconnoiter. 

He gallops off accompanied by the reconnaissance offi- 
cer and his party. On arrival at the top of hill 592, he sees, 
to the south, a small part of the 501 — McElheny road 
(about where the 520 contour crosses). Beyond that point 
the road is hidden by the trees on the west slope of hill 552. 
The house and orchard southwest of 501 are visible over 
these trees. The house near 543 is visible, as are parts of 
the battlefield from about 400 yards beyond it. The re- 
ported positions of hostile reserves are not visible, being 
hidden by the trees on the line, hills 586 — 552. Captain C 
has, then, jio option but to fire on that part of the battlefield. 
This fire should be very effective, — enfilading and at from 
3,500 to 5,000 yards. Besides, it will have the effect of 
drawing the attention of the hostile reserves, perhaps of 
keeping them out of the main fight. The Red artillery is 
hidden from view by a heavy wood about a mile southwest 
of his position. 

Captain C decides to go into position just west of 
Goodintent School, with observation station on hill 592, 
and fire first on the hostile main line. He considers that 
he should waste no time in looking for a safer position. 
By having the battery cross the ridge near the orchard, 
about 400 yards north of its firing position, the latter will 
not be betrayed to possible hostile artillery to the south- 
west, and it is not probable that any hostile artillery is east 
of the ridge 592—586. 



220 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Though in an open position he will use indirect fire, 
at least to begin with, because of its ease of control, dis- 
tribution, etc. 

Corporal L, gallop back to the battery. Tell the Executive Offi- 
cer to lead the battery over that crest (pointing north) to the or- 
chard, then south into position near the schoolhouse (pointing) . Po- 
sition will be marked. Battery to come in at a trot. Limbers re- 
turn to orchard. 

Corporal P, you and K mark the line of the battery, direction 
of fire towards that woods (pointing to south). 

Lieut. R. 0., place the woods in our front under observation and 
see if you can, from the schoolhouse or nearby, get a view down the 
valley through that gap in the trees. (Between the woods on the 
east slope of hill 586 and those on the stream line). 

Captain C selects an aiming point to the front, mea- 
sures the deflection for the right piece, calculates the de- 
flection difference, measures the angle of site, and estimates 
the range and corrector. 

The battery being in position, he opens fire by volley 
on the hostile attacking line. 

3d Requirement: 

Conduct of the infantry support, and its final disposi- 
tions, assuming no interference by an enemy until they 
are completed. No orders. 

AN APPROVED SOLUTION 

The support continues the march, bearing off to the 
left ; the leading company being detached towards the Wea- 
ver house, there to establish a march outpost. The re- 
mainder closes in mass in the woods north of Goodintent 
Schoolhouse, sending one squad to the roadfork due north 
of 592, another to roadfork 548, and another to the farm- 
house 400 yards southeast of the schoolhouse, as outguards. 

The company sent to the Weaver house sends a squad 
to the stream bottom on each flank and a platoon under 
a lieutenant to the edge of the woods about 600 yards 
south, with orders to explore those woods, and provide for 
security from that direction. The remainder of the com- 
pany prepares a defensive position, extending from the 
Weaver house west over the ridge to the farmhouse on the 
west slope. 



TROOP LEADING 221 

The support commander joins the battery commander 
and the two make known to each other their plans, and ar- 
rangements to meet them, as far as is necessary to ensure 
mutual understanding. 



Comment 

The problem is one calling for quick action. The 
regiment of Red artillery near the Stock Farm is in a 
most vulnerable position. Two batteries opening a flank 
fire upon it will inflict very great loss on the personnel 
and materiel, and prevent the limbers coming up to take 
it to safety. Only one or two of its guns could probably 
be turned to fire to the noi'th, and their personnel would 
be exposed to the Blue artillery fire from the east. Although 
not the most threatening element of the Red attack, the 
neutralizing or destruction of this Red artillery will be 
more valuable to the Blues than the participation of Major 
Q's battalion in the attack of the detachment against the 
left of the Red infantry. 

Moreover, it is not at all certain that the Red infantry 
can be seen or fired upon from hill 592, and advance south 
from there will not be advisable until the Blue infantry has 
advanced well beyond it, at least assuring that the woods 
(hills 586 and 552) are not held by the enemy. The move- 
ment of the hostile battalion from 504 towards Varney, 
indicates that the Reds are becoming alarmed for the safety 
of their left flank, and are either sending a support for 
their artillery or occupying the woods on 586. In either 
case, the Blues cannot expect to approach those woods un- 
observed and unmolested. They are too near the scene 
of action to be left unpatrolled. 

Students generally, recognize the value of time in a 
problem, but forget it in the solution, and waste much valu- 
able time in galloping about the country, looking for ideal 
positions. It is a case where the opportunity to damage 
the enemy justifies even an open position. But there were 
a few who went about the selection of the position, with 
all the deliberation characteristic of the selection of the 
one for permanent occupancy. Others did not appreciate 



222 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

the scale of the map, and had Major Q gallop many miles 
in a remarkably short time. 

Many good positions were selected for the artillery, 
whose occupation would have taken so much time that the 
chance of taking the hostile artillery at a disadvantage, 
would undoubtedly have passed. 

Many positions selected were excellent for the guns, 
but had no suitable positions for B. C. stations within a 
reasonable distance. This is a serious error. The two ab- 
solute requirements of a battery position are (1) that the 
battery commander see his target; and (2) that the fire 
of his guns be able to reach it. 

Several students were led into very serious errors by 
their failure to read, understandingly, the original problem 
and the partial solutions issued to them. Several students 
indulged in the use of a number of technical terms which 
they did not understand, and which were not essential to 
their solutions. Others seemed to feel that they had to as- 
sign some task to every member of their personnel, whether 
there was any need or not. 

There was a noticeable lack of care in determining the 
position of units on the road at the time General A's order 
was completed. There is no excuse for this. Their loca- 
tion should have been the student's first business. 

In the 2d Requirement, several students showed much 
apprehension about continuing the march down the road 
past Herman's, and sought devious ways through the 
fields to the north, in an effort to avoid being seen. The 
road is two and a half miles from the nearest hostile ar- 
tillery, which is extremely busy in another direction; and 
even if seen, a single battery could traverse the distance 
practically in safety. Much time is lost by a detour, and 
just now time is more important than safety. 

Positions selected for Battery C were generally good. 
Yet the Reds can not possibly have any artillery east 
of the line 592 — 586 ; therefore, a position in the open east 
of that line is permissible. A few took positions north 
of the woods by the S. H., necessitating a long line of com- 
munication to the B. C. station, increasing greatly the dead 



TROOP LEADING 223 

space in front of the guns, and, in general, reducing the 
efficiency of the battery very materially. 

The conduct of the support varied from excellent to 
very poor. A support should be handled as an outpost, the 
artillery being the object to be guarded. In this case, there 
was danger to be apprehended from the southwest (hill 
586), probably in possession of the enemy (see problem), 
and from the north and northeast where the Red cavalry 
is known to be. The artillery battalion commander may 
need the services of part or all of the support later on. 

Some students spoke of keeping hostile rifle fire at 
least 1200 yards away from the battery, and for this rea- 
son sent a line of outguards out to that distance. If that 
is to be the line of resistance, it is so extensive that it could 
not be held by the w^hole battalion. Others have established 
observation posts as far as a mile distant. The lay of the 
land permits of observation posts, reasonably near the 
reserve, which can see the country perfectly for at least a 
mile. This indicates the line of observation and the line 
of resistance as the same. 

Some examples of faulty handling of the support were : 
Deploying it all in a semi-circle with Battery C as a center ; 
having it intrench right and left of the line of guns ; having 
it intrench 300 yards in rear of the line of guns; leaving 
one platoon as a local support for Battery C, and taking 
up a position with the rest of the battalion, a mile east of 
the battery. 

The artillery commander does not issue orders to 
the infantry commander. (See par. 583 I. D. R.) 



Part XII A Battalion in Action 



General Situation: 

An invading Red army, based on Baltimore, has cover- 
ing detachments on the line, Havre de Grace — Parkton — 
Westminster — Mt. Airy. 

A Blue army is concentrating in the area Carlisle — 
Harrisburg — York — Gettysburg. 
Special Situation: 

On the morning of October 28, a Blue force, engaged 
in covering the Northern Central railroad at Littlestown, 
marched to the support of a similar Blue force east of 
Taneytown, now menaced by superior Red forces advancing 
from the direction of Westminster. 

At 9:00 a. m. the situation was as follows: 

The cavalry, (2d Sq., 2d Cav.,) which had gone direct 
from Silver Run, leaving one-half of Troop G to continue 
reconnaissance toward Westminster, was about a mile south 
of Big Pipe Creek Mill, stopped by hostile cavalry on the 
hills to south and east. One-half of Troop G was near 
roadfork 516, stopped by hostile cavalry on hill 584. 

The 10th Infantry, as a flank guard, had marched by 
the road southeast of the railroad, and its advance party 
was at roadfork 626, on the Piney Creek — Mayberry road. 

The 4th Infantry Brigade, (less 10th Inf.), the 2d Bn., 
3d L. A., and the 5th Amb. Co., marched by Gait. Its ad- 
vance party was at roadfork 545. 

A ten minute rest was ordered. Cannonading had 
been heard for some time toward the south. Information 
had been received that there was no hostile movement north 
from Westminster. 

A message had just arrived, reading as follows : 

Det. 1st Div., 

TANEYTOWN — WESTMINSTER road, 

1 mile east of taneytown. 

25 Oct. 15, 8-30 A. M. 
C. G. Det., 2d Div.: 

Enemy estimated at strength of a division. Advancing from 
TYRONE cind uniontown. He has begun deployment in the valley 
224 



A BATTALION IN ACTION 225 

of BEAR CREEK, the woods east of TREVANION, and the heights south of 
that place. His artillery has fired from a number of points, mostly 
in the direction of fairview school, weishaar's mill, and Tyrone. 
A few shots came from the direction of mayberry. 

I am preparing to meet an attack on the line OREGON school — 

STUMPTOWN. 

c, 

Brig. Gen. 

General A, with his staff, Colonel C, 11th Infantry, 
and artillery commander, Major K, was riding in rear of 
the support. After reading this message he galloped on 
past the support and advance party to the house at 571. 
Here the party dismounted, maps were oriented, locations 
determined, General C's message read aloud, and General 
A gave the following instructions. 

I intend to attack the hostile right flank in the direction of that 
hill (584). 

The left flank guard will follow that road on the other side of 
that valley (576—490). 

The main column will go across country to the second road south 
of here, keeping out of sight from the country east of Big Pipe Creek, 
— and then turn east. 

The artillery will at once take position, prepared to support the 
Det., 1st Div., and later our attack. 

I ride with the support for the present. 

Required : 

1. Actions and orders of Major K, 3d L. A. 

2. Tracing showing: 

(a) The detachment at 9 :00 a. m. 

(b) The artillery at (time), when its occupation of 
position is complete, and the flank and advance guards. 

AN APPROVED SOLUTION 

Upon receipt of his orders, Major K called out, Agents. 
They rode up. 

Corporal X, report to the Brigade Adjutant. 

Corporal Y, take one scout with you and ride to the battalion 
at a gallop. You will follow the road running west from where the 
advance party rested, to the main road west of the railroad track; 
there turn to your right. Leave the scout there as marker, if the 
road is passable for the battalion; if it is not, take him with you. 

The battalion is to come up at a trot, by the way you are going, 
if passable ; otherwise, by the w^ay we marched. Remain with it. 

Battery commanders and their reconnaissance parties come up 
at the gallop by the road we marched over. 

No orders for combat trains. 



226 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Major K had the agent repeat the message and mark 
the route on his map. 

At 9 :10 a. m., the man started, as did the column. At 
road corner 481 he told the scout to fall out, and continued 
on, meeting the battalion at Washington S. H. at 9 :23 
a. m. He delivered his message to Captain D, who was 
leading the battalion, and reported the road good. Captain 
D signalled trot, and told his executive officer to follow the 
agent, while he turned out on the road to Gait with his 
reconnaissance party, and sent a scout back along the road 
to warn the battery commanders to fall out with their re- 
connaissance parties and join him. At 9 :26 a. m., all had 
joined, and the party set off at a gallop via Gait. 

Major K selected this road for the advance of the bat- 
talion, because it was about the same distance as the one 
the column was marching over, was surely safe, was probab- 
ly quite as good, and led to a point, roadfork 509 — squarely 
in rear of the covering crest that would determine the posi- 
tion of the artillery, and from which two roads led to that 
crest. Time would be saved by not having to pass three 
or more detachments of infantry in a narrow road, and the 
infantry itself would not be delayed. 

From where he was. Major K could see nothing of the 
country east of a line through the summit of hill 584, and 
he could see little of the valley west of that hill. A position 
further south must be sought. The proposed lines of march 
of the columns, on Bashere Mill and the road leading down 
to Zimmerman Mill, indicated the general location and dir- 
ection of their deployments. The crest, a mile east, was 
too far away to be considered, since time was important. 
A position further to the south would not only be well loca- 
ted with reference to the line Zimmerman Mill — Bashere 
Mill, but, also, to the line Stumptown — Oregon School; and 
cooperation with the artillery of the other Blue force would 
be easier. 

Corporal M (scout), you and N ride along this crest to the south- 
west and open each fence you come to, just below the crest on the 
west side. 

Major K rode along the crest to the southwest studying 
the country as he went. His Adjutant, Captain L, rode 



A BATTALION IN ACTION 227 

with him. The rest of the party kept abreast, but on the 
west slope, and out of sight from enemy territory. At the 
south end of the woods on hill 587, he stopped for a more 
careful observation. From here he had an unobstructed 
view of the crest of the hills, 584 and 567, to the road over 
the east end of the latter, their western slopes down to about 
the 480 contour, the line of the Stumptown — Oregon School 
road, of Stumptown, and parts of the valley east of that 
line. 

A better view might not be had, so far as he could 
judge from map and the terrain, and he decided at least 
to establish observation here. The long slopes to the west 
would afford ample room for the batteries, and any desired 
degree of defilade could be had. Guns at the fence on the 
west side of the field west of 576, for instance, would have 
flash defilade against hill 584 in the hostile territory, would 
be at least 400 yards from the covering crest, and yet could 
clear the trees south of them at 2,000 yards range — 2,400 
yards, allowing for the slope of the valley. 

The hostile artillery was apparently, for the most part, 
far to the southeast ; but part of it would be certain to move 
to the support of that known to be in the vicinity of May- 
berry. It could readily occupy, unobserved, positions be- 
hind the line 584—567. 

Captain L, remain here with three of the scouts, and take the 
sector from Stumptown to that road (east end of hill 567), under 
observation. The rest of the party come with me. I shall reconnoiter 
further. 

9 :20 a. m. He then continued along the crest, com- 
paring the changing view with what it was from where he 
left his adjutant. He noted that the view opened out to 
the east, but closed from the west. Finally, he went 
through the woods to hill 583. Here he found the view to 
the east limited to the country south of a line through the 
saddle 584 — 567, by the woods east of 563. South of that 
line, he had a fine view of the valley to a line through the 
northeast edge of the woods at Stumptown. 

This locality offered no advantage not possessed by the 
other, while it had some disadvantages, such as a lessened 
view of the valley in front of the Blue position. It was 



228 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

a bare, flat hill top, difficult for observers to use without 
attracting unwelcome hostile attention. The trees at the 
first place, too, might afford observation points 30 or 40 
feet above the ground, which would greatly extend the area 
otherwise visible. 

9:30 a. m. Major K to the two scouts with him: 

Remain here and keep those heights (pointing southeast) under 
observation. Should you notice anything of importance, one of you 
will come and report to me; the other remaining in observation. 

The woods to the southwest could be seen to extend to 
the neighborhood of the Taneytown — Stumptown road. A 
position in those woods was to be avoided, while one to the 
south of them would greatly delay the entry of the artillery 
into action, would sacrifice the advantage of oblique fire 
in front of the Blue position, and would be rather too far 
from the line of advance of the 4th Brigade. 

Information as to the dispositions of the detachment 
of the 1st Division would be necessary, if cooperation with 
it was to be had. 

To Lieutenant C, agent combat train: 

Headquarters of the detachment of the 1st Division should be 
on or near this ridge, about a mile or so further on (pointing). Go 
there with your men and report to General C as information officer. 
I want early information as to his dispositions, and those of the 
enemy. 

I will call up another agent to take your place here. 

Our position will be west of the saddle between hills 584 and 587. 

Major K rode rapidly back to 576, arriving there about 
9:35 a. m., as the Battery Commanders, with their recon- 
naissance parties, rode up to report. 

To Corporal Z (agent) : 

Gallop down the road (pointing toward roadfork 509) ; meet the 
battalion and conduct it up this road. 

To the Battery Commanders : 

Battery D will go into position in the field just this side of that 
house (pointing to house surrounded by trees about 500 yards N. W.), 
face about 20 degrees east of south, right at the south fence. 

Battery E, on the left of D, left on the road. 

Battery F, north of the road, 100 yards from it and in line with 
the others. 

All B. C. stations will be in the woods (pointing) near mine. 

Reconnaissance officers mark out the battery positions and see 
that they are occupied at once. Battery Commanders come with me. 



A BATTALION IN ACTION 229 

Major K then rode to the rear of the woods, where all 
dismounted and walked to the position of the adjutant. 
The latter reported that no enemy had been seen, but that 
shrapnel had begun to burst along the Oregon S. H. — 
Stumptown line, which might mean an early infantry attack. 

The Major rapidly oriented the B. C.'s on the terrain, 
issuing his orders at the same time. 

The enemy is reported as a division in strength. He has been 
deploying, for about an hour, to the south of that hill (pointing to 
584), so that his infantry attack may be expected to develop at any 
time. 

The detachment of the 1st Division is prepared to meet the 
attack on the line Oregon School-Stumptown — you see buildings on 
that line (pointing to them). 

Our flank guard is on that road just east of us. Our advance 
guard turns east on a road just south of those woods (pointing south- 
v^est) . 

Our cavalry was last reported on the north slope of those hills 
(584 — 567), stopped by superior hostile cavalry who hold those hills. 

Sectors of observation : 

Battery E; Stumptown, half way to the summit of that hill (584) . 

Battery F; from there to the house on the east slope of that hill 
(584). 

Battery D;to include the three roads crossing those hills (584 — 
567). 

Battery D will establish an auxiliary observation station near 
the southeast corner of those woods (pointing to the southwest to hill 
584). 

Batteries will be prepared to fire into each other's sectors. 

Combat trains in the grass field west of the batteries and near 
the railroad. 

Targets will be reported, but no fire opened mthout my order. 

Report to me when ready. 

The 10th and 11th Infantry, now the flank and ad- 
vance guards, would soon be deploying, and information as 
to their dispositions and progress would be necessary; the 
view of the terrain in front of the Blue line was not all 
that could be desired, if effective fire was to be opened upon 
it ; the chances were good that some one of the spurs on the 
west side of Big Pipe Creek would afford a good view of 
it ; the battalion reel was not needed, since the battery com- 
manders were close to the battalion commander, and each 
had his own lines to his battery. 

Major K, therefore, issued the following additional 
orders : 

To Corporal Z, (agent) : 



230 STUDIES IN MINOR TACTICS 

Meet the combat train and conduct it to its position via the road 
the battalion followed. Tell the commander to send me a non-com- 
missioned officer as agent, in place of Lieut. C who is on other duty. 

To the Adjutant: 

Captain L, you will lay a wire from here, passing in rear of the 
batteries, and following the line of advance of the advance guard, 
to some point in the valley where a station can be established for 
relaying messages. After that, you will establish observation of the 
terrain in front of Gen. C's line. Take four battalion scouts. 

Take the reconnaissance officers of E and F Batteries with you, 
each with two scouts. Explain the situation to them as you go along, 
and attach them to the advance and flank guards as information 
officers. 

At 9:45 a. m., the occupation of the position was com- 
plete, except for the establishment of the auxiliary and sig- 
nal stations by Captain L. The Combat Train was near- 
ing Washington Schoolhouse. 

Major K so reported to General A. 



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AGGREGATE 



Qualification 



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N ^ S. S. 190 \ 

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Date Completed. 



Commanding Company 



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INSTRUCTION PRACTICE 



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TOTAL 



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300 yda. Slow Fire, Target D. (Prone) 



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AGGREGATE 



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Qualification \ 2nd Cl. 130 >■ 
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